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Abstract.
Abstract.
The. objective-QL.this thesis is to present an analysis to help clarify our under­
standing of the nature o f management o f people in the modem business corpo­
ration from a theoretical point o f view.
The argument of this thesis is that management theory and practice is based on  
an impoverished conception o f human nature. The focus on persons as a resource 
has led to complacent practices which are doomed to fail. The lack o f focus on 
the nature of the relationship between manager and worker (or employee) is be­
coming increasingly masked by the focus being placed on the nature o f the cor­
poration and its status as a person. The notion that the formal organisation of the 
business corporation is a person in any moral sense, is examined and dismissed 
on the grounds that there is no clear case for attributing moral personhood to a 
business corporation. There can be a case for arguing that, under normal cir­
cumstances, we do treat corporations as persons in way which allows us to ex­
press our experience of them in ordinary speech. But this intuitive view says more 
about us, as persons, than it does about corporations. What is important about 
business corporations is that we should address ourselves to how we should treat 
them from a moral point of view. My claim about the nature of business corpo­
rations is that they are functional entities, forms of organisation o f  people, de­
signed by people to align the aims and efforts of each member in a common 
purpose; corporations on this view, are big motivational devices and it dilutes the 
essence of individual moral responsibility to consider corporations as some kind 
o f moral being. Corporations are functional devices operating as regulators of 
motivation, and of relationships between the people who make them up.
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I claim that because the efforts o f management aim to get employees to behave 
as if  they shared the goals of their employing business corporation, they consist­
ently fail to address the real issues o f motivation of the workforce, and that this 
is a product o f the emphasis placed by management on control of their subordi­
nates. As a result an inherent insincerity predominates the relationships existing 
between persons within the workplace. This thesis presents an analysis o f the 
development o f consciousness o f self as a product o f patterns of manipulation 
emanating from desire and its relation to recognition. It is this analysis which 
provides a framework for a better understanding o f the worker and how work re­
lates to the desire for recognition as a self conscious subject. Management would 
do better to address the fundamental characteristics o f the relationship between 
manager and worker by dispensing with the impoverished view of human nature 
implicit in management theory and practice and become receptive to a better 
understanding o f work as a fundamental form of expression of the demands o f the 
self conscious subject. Taking this approach, management would direct their ef­
forts at getting the workers to actually share the corporate goals. However, this 
might create the ideal where the relationships between superior and subordinate, 
characterised throughout history by ever changing patterns o f manipulation, 
would radically change, perhaps resulting in no need for managers.
Abstract. 3
Introduction.
There are two cenfral points which this thesis aims to establish. This first is that 
philosophy is a much undervalued academic pursuit, and philosophers are to 
blame. The value of philosophy is not realised principally because it is restricted 
by the lofty status it enjoys as an academic subject. Whilst philosophers continue 
to ignore the very practical and real problems o f the world, that real world is very 
steadily creeping in upon philosophy itself. As an academic subject, it offers little 
to indicate that it could be valuable beyond the confines of universities. The lack 
of evidence of the value of philosophy as an academic pursuit consists in an ap­
parent unwillingness to seek new contexts in which philosophy could make a real 
contribution to a clearer understanding o f the communities in which we five.
To most of the general public the term philosophy is interpreted in many different 
ways, but when used as a term describing an academic subject, it brings with it 
connotations of inaccessibility. As an intellectual pursuit, philosophy does not 
generally have practitioners that have a bearing on t1 e world in the way that other 
intellectual pursuits do; Seldom are philosophers selling their time to industry to 
guide the businessman on how to analyse a project in terms of its internal con­
sistency, or to facilitate and direct a discussion between executives to help establish 
corporate or company goals. There are no doubt many initiatives and perhaps 
successful endeavours on the part of philosophers to offer some tuition to indus­
trialists on such topics as creative or logical thinking. On the other hand, philos­
ophy has made a significant impact in helping to form the laws of the land by 
leading study groups commissioned by the government to formulate policy on the 
ethical aspects o f law on abortion, adoption, children's rights and so on. But there 
is an extremely large area of potential interest to philosophy that I seek to draw 
attention to; it is the area of activity in which most people spend most o f their
time - that is management, or to be precise, being managed. What we do and 
what we have done to us in the name of paid employment pervades every aspect 
of the life of each individual in the modem industrial society. We cannot escape 
the fact that we spend most o f our lives in organisations whose very existence is 
determined by the requirement o f human beings to manage themselves and others.
Not only do we generate most, if not all, o f a nation's wealth via corporations, 
but we live and die in formal organisations, which are little different from the 
business corporation. It is surprising and somewhat disturbing to realise how  
much philosophers have to offer the large business corporation and how little in­
terest is in evidence in the influential management literature. This thesis is an 
appeal to philosopl. 2rs to take an interest in the way people live - that is, the oc­
cupational life of the community. By making my second point, I shall demon­
strate that philosophers are leaving it to others (ill-fitted for the role) to engage in 
the philosophical problems and challenges in business and the world o f work - 
that very context in which we spend most o f our lives.
The management of the modem business corporation has, in recent years, been 
seeking not only to justify the methods it employs in using the labour of its 
workforce, but also to establish management as an academic pursuit. The conse­
quence of this is that management theory has become an academic subject in its 
own right and has vtilised significant output from the sociologists, psychologists 
and the academic world in general. The terms and concepts which philosophers 
use so guardedly and so rigorously are becoming common parlance in the man­
agement briefing rooms, the consultants reports and management communication 
documents. Philosophising by theorists, in the most careless sense, is to be found 
in management journals, briefing documents and the business literature in general.
As the contribution to management and their business organisations from psy­
chology and sociology are being valued less (perhaps because they have become 
exhausted with management as a topic for study), the use of philosophical jargon 
is on the increase. Successful managers are writing about their success in terms 
of an identified formula expressing the view that people can be managed and 
business will succeed if this or that method is followed. Books are sold which do
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little more than trade in hacked out jargon and worn out psychology. The latest 
set of terms and buzz words are being taken from philosophical literature. Con­
cepts, terms and arguments are being used and abused in a way that gives a kind 
of credibility to management theorists and enhances their status as students of 
human behaviour who can formulate a method applicable to almost any situation 
that any manager can use to successfully motivate and control his employees.
Not content with their success in business, those lucky few then seek further ap­
plause by writing the book on how they did it! Seeking academic credentials, one 
fmds a multitude o f publications expounding one theory after another, and the 
careless use that is made of philosophical terms in these publications can do 
nothing but damage to the subject and its role in the longer term. For example, 
consider just what the Kuhnian-sounding term paradigm paralysis might mean. 
Those to whom it was sold as a management concept did not question it too 
much, but it was sold very successfully by the business consultants, who also 
shipped a whole pile of such nonsense with it. If one were to determine its 
meaning by observing its use, it simply means an inability to see things differently 
- which when cashed out, means the unwillingness to accept change and really 
means an inability to see things from your manager's point of view.
It is imperative that, if philosophy is not to be consistently abused and underval­
ued, the business world must be considered by phik sophers as a perfectly legiti­
mate context in which to contribute to the debate on issues surrounding the 
human condition. This thesis is therefore practising what it preaches: although 
perhaps not constructive, it aims at knocking down some attitudes and ideology 
prevalent in management theorising and setting the foundation for a proper 
understanding of the relationship between employer and employee.
The second point which this thesis aims to address is that management theory is 
in its intellectual infancy and its practice in the modem business corporation is 
correspondingly crippled. My charge against management and their theorists is 
that they do not seem to care about the truth of their theories. They are 
instrumentalists in a double sense - arguing thus:
We are not interested in what really makes individuals tick. What is important is 
identifying and working from those assumptions which are best geared to achieve a 
pay-off in terms o f  productivity, growth, profit and so on.
It is for this reason that the theories of human nature they put forward are not 
defended by management theorists. For the curious, a few authorities are cited; 
for the sceptic, it can be pointed out that truth does not really matter:
Look! Study the case histories, this theory will deliver the goods (literally) i f  you  
put it into practice.
A management theory which exhibits a crude treatment of people in its assump­
tions, diminishes them (albeit theoretically) and must in its application be seen to 
be devious, otherwise it is manipulative. If the employee is not to know the as­
sumptions upon which such a practice is founded, then its efficacy depends upon 
the employee not understanding what is going on (not smelling a rat). As soon 
as employees judge that they are being undervalued the dominance and sub­
mission game is on - the practices will be subverted and the management 
instrumentalism will fail. It may lead to false assumptions which may work for a 
time, but when these are unearthed, as they surely will be, then it's back to the 
drawing board.
This thesis draws the conclusion that a managemer» theory must proceed on the 
basis o f realistic theories about employee motivation. At present it seems that 
management, when looking at how to motivate their workers, at first blinker 
themselves and then see employees, production and other factors relating to their 
endeavour in very narrow terms. Somehow openness, open-mindedness and a 
willingness and capacity for experiment must be injected into management theory 
and the system of management training.
The manner in which I have presented this thesis expresses implicitly my point 
about philosophers and the contribution they can make to the working life of 
citizens in general and the performance of business in particular. My charge of 
instrumentalism on the part of management is set out explicitly in what follows.
The remainder of this introduction cites some views on organisations and moti­
vation. My aim in presenting a brief illustrative account of organisations is to set 
the context in which my discussion will take place. I take it as given that formal 
organisations exist as a means of organising people in a way which will motivate 
them to act in pursuit of established objectives (regardless o f how crude or so­
phisticated the terms in which these objectives may be expressed). After the brief 
survey of payment systems and motivation in this introduction, I tackle the notion 
that the organisation is something other than a collective o f people unified in some 
way by their status as members of the organisation.
Chapter One therefore takes on the notion that is becoming ever more popular in 
management theory and popular philosophy, that the organisation is in fact a 
person. Chapter Two illustrates a management practice (known as Management 
by Objectives) which was once a theory and practice in its own right, but now has 
many variations. I have tried to pick out the essential elements o f this manage­
ment method and show that its success is not due to the individualistic assump­
tions upon which it was constructed, but that it draws upon something much 
deeper than that which led to its design.
Chapter Three addresses the concept of a person from a standpoint which 
criticises the philosophy of individualism (in a very general sense) for its fostering 
the notion that the self is given and not a product o f experience. My reason for 
taking this critical line is to do two things. The i rst is to contrast the self of 
individualism with the much more rich and complex concept o f self as a product 
of community; the second is to break down this impoverished concept as an in­
adequate view of the individual - a view which seems to have such strong appeal 
to management that it blinds the management theorists to the alternative views 
on the self-consciousness of the individual.
Chapter Four argues that self is a rich and complex concept which is developed 
by way of interpersonal interaction. The interaction is depicted in terms of 
dominance and submission - a mode of engagement motivated by desire for re­
cognition. I argue that it is out of this scenario that the notion of work as a 
formative activity is generated and pursued.
Chapter Five presents a concrete example o f management theory and practice. 
This is a very real example of management practice which not only denies im­
plicitly that human beings, as workers, should be treated as complex beings, but 
also engages in a pretence which amounts to concealing the fact that the practice 
rests on a theory which assumes employees to be simple, reward orientated beings. 
The inherent manipulation and dishonesty in this practice can only lead to failure. 
It is illustrative of the inevitable manipulation which is generated by closed sys­
tems of management, where only those in control can know the full extent of the 
callousness of the assumptions upon which they are based. As one might expect, 
this manipulation is reciprocated by the workers. Management hold the key to 
unlocking this conflict, but there is little prospect that they will remember where 
it was hidden.
Organisations and Motivation.
Etzioni (1964) defines Organisations as “social units (or human groupings) delib­
erately constructed to seek specific goals”, which, on his view, quite simply states 
the key characteristic of all formal organisations. On this account, formal 
organisations are not random, unplanned occurrences but are social entities which 
are the product of acts of deliberation and planning. Etzioni distinguishes between 
formal organisations and other unplanned social entities such as families, tribes 
and ethnic groups on the grounds that organisation are rational insofar as they 
are deliberately constituted to carry out key tasks in the pursuit o f stated goals and 
objectives.
It has been argued that organisations are a fundamentally important feature of 
modem society; this would seem obvious even to the disinterested and it is hardly 
illuminating for Etzioni to point out that “we are bom in organisations, educated 
by organisations, and spend much of our lives working for organisations”; the
1 This term is used widely in Organisational Theory, and although its meaning varies from one author 
to another, it is generally accepted as a technical term within this field of study. Its use will be ad­
dressed and questioned in my discussion of the moral responsibility of corporations.
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question is why? Why also do we spend so much of our leisure time in 
organisations? In fact, most of us will die in an organisation and, as Etzioni also 
points out, “when the time comes for burial, the largest organisation of all - the 
state - must grant official permission.” There are many reasons why organisations 
are worthy of analysis, and much has indeed been written about the importance 
of organisations and their impact on individuals and society,2 but the answers to 
the questions above lie in an understanding of the function o f organisations in the 
lives of citizens in general.
Organisations can be very powerful and can, both directly and indirectly exert a 
powerful influence over the life of states, communities and individuals. In most 
instances we are d rectly dependent on organisations for our livelihood. They 
provide employment, goods and services which allow us to maintain and improve 
our quality of life and standard of living. Furthermore, the effective working of 
an industrial society can only be realised through organisations allowing 
specialisation and mass production. In fact, the return to a pre-industrial world 
without large organisations seems not only unthinkable but also unworkable! The 
professional expertise so necessary to the skill and knowledge base o f society, as 
well as the growing technological complexity in many fields, are invariably 
organisationally based. For example medicine requires an organisational support 
base and medical techniques, treatment and nursing care are usually best provided 
in a capital-intensive hospital environment.
Disenchantment with organisational life frequently pervades accounts o f experi­
ences of individuals who have seen the more unpleasant aspects o f the power and 
authority o f organisations. Solzhenitsyn's description o f life in Soviet forced 
labour camps in the Gulag Archipelago illustrates this in the context o f a 
totalitarian organisation. In contrast, a more orthodox view of organisational life 
is frequently cited by American journalists who depict the benefits of a large-scale 
materialistic consumer society as bought at the cost o f unpleasantness, boredom, 
fatigue and routine of many production processes.
2 See Bradley & Wilkie 1974.
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Work is undoubtedly the source of many personal discontents and many would 
prefer not to have to do it. The importance of work to our lives raises the inter­
esting question of the extent to which organisational roles exercise an influence 
over us outside the organisation as well as inside it. Attitudes and values acquired 
within an organisation may spread over its boundaries to influence our behaviour 
in those parts o f our lives which are remote from the direct influence of 
organisational rules and characteristics.
The influence o f organisations raises further issues regarding their accountability; 
they are outside the formal political arena yet they have been seen to share or ef­
fectively take over powers initially exercised by government. Most governments 
have no reservations in principle about handing over decision-making powers to 
organisations which are not directly accountable to the public at all. The Con­
servative and Labour governments in Britain during the past twenty years have 
seen fit to work hand in hand with the trade unions and employers' organisations. 
Whilst this may be inevitable since government may neither have the resources 
nor the expertise to legislate unaided in highly complex technological matters, the 
question arises as to what is it about organisations that make it acceptable to an 
electorate for democratically elected governments to abdicate power or responsi­
bility in this way.
Probably the most prevalent reason given for study mg organisations is to seek a 
way of improving the management (and control) of the people within them. 
Organisations represent collective action. For goals to be attained effectively and 
efficiently managers must understand the processes which occur within 
organisations, and the way that these might be improved.
Let me now review in outline the various views and theories3 which have proved 
most influential and resilient in the study of organisations.
3 The very loose sense in which I use the term theory reflects the very imprecise way it is used in 
management and organisational studies in general.
Classical Theory of Max Weber: From a study o f authority relationships in so­
ciety, Weber (1922) produced an incisive characterisation of bureaucracy. Its 
growth in society, he insisted, was allied to the development of industrialisation. 
In outline, Weber's view of society was one which identified certain evolutionary 
or developmental tendencies. Traditional patterns of authority, represented for 
example in kinship systems, were giving way under the drive to industrialisation 
towards a legal/rational form of authority. Persons exercising the power o f com­
mand in such a society were appointed not by custom and tradition but by legally 
sanctioned procedures. Weber showed that the process o f modernisation in soci­
ety involved a process o f  rationalisation of authority relationships. Such a 
rationalisation process had organisational consequences. Bureaucracy represented 
the development o f an organisational system constructed upon a bedrock of rules 
and regulations. The impersonal application o f these rules to both members and 
clients (rather than rules based on the whim of an autocrat) would render the 
organisation instrumentally effective to attain its goals.
Ilcnri Fayol: Fayol (1949) attempted to provide a universal approach to the
problems involved in administering organisations o f all types, public or private, 
large or small, manufacturing or non-manufacturing. He employed an inductive 
approach to the organisational phenomenon, attempting to derive general princi­
ples applicable to ail situations. He had a mechanistic view of organisations. 
Relatively unconcerned with the behavioural charac'eristics of individual workers, 
Fayol provided a top down or strategic view of the organisation. In essence, he 
argued that the administrative functions o f any organisation could be divided into 
the following; forecasting, planning, organising, commanding, co-ordinating, and 
controlling. He stressed the necessity for authority, clear objectives, decisions and 
tasks, and insisted that one of the cardinal principles of organisation should be the 
establishment of a unity of command from top to bottom. All personnel should 
be linked in a clear hierarchy. Similarly, the span o f control o f managers should 
be bounded so that they supervised a limited number of subordinates. An ex­
ception principle should also operate with routine decisions being delegated to 
subordinates.
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The Scientific Management of Frederick Winslow Taylor: Taylor centred on the 
workshop which he saw as the focal point o f the organisation for the application 
of his system of scientific management. Taylor regarded the problem of 
organisation as a technical one requiring the consideration o f three separate but 
linked aspects of organisation. First, questions o f organisational structure and 
routine. Secondly, problems of work and task design. Thirdly, the question of 
the selection and motivation of workers. The first o f these did not detain Taylor 
long. However, he did produce an important interpretation of the matter of unity 
o f command. He authored the idea of functional foremanship, seriously contending 
that workers should be made responsible to four first-line supervisors rather than 
one. This, on the prounds that a division of supervisory responsibility could lead 
to more effective control.
Taylor, however, claimed that his system was more than a way o f running the 
industrial organisation more efficiently. In his view it removed dependence on 
personal authority and he said that it “substituted joint obedience to fact and laws 
for obedience to personal authority. No such democracy has ever existed in in­
dustry before” (Taylor 1911:217). In the pursuit of his version o f industrial de­
mocracy he advocated a reversal of the relationship existing between the manager 
and the worker. The manager was to become the worker's servant or assistant, 
and his main function was to provide all of the assistance of efficient organisation, 
training and unimpeded material supply. The manager was to be, in a sense, a 
resource.
It is generally accepted that scientific management failed. Taylor complained that 
whilst certain technical components of his system had been accepted in isolation, 
his philosophy had never been completely applied as a whole system. Yet its real 
influence is considerable. It has provided the foundation for what has come to 
be known as administrative managerial theory (a variation o f organisational the­
ory) and the so-called technical aspect o f management; this includes the founda­
tion of the apparatus of job analysis and evaluation, production planning and 
control, and functional organisation itself.
Taylor may not unfairly be presented as the father o f ergonomics or time and 
motion study within the organisation. The basis of his method was the detailed 
and careful analysis of all tasks and functions within the organisation along with 
time studies of the component parts.
The second element in this approach was the selection and training o f a staff of 
first-class men, producing a fair day's work. Taylor believed that organisational 
inefficiency could be rooted out by showing workers that it was in their interest 
to put in a fair day's work. Paid according to piece-rates, they would thus gain a 
greater return on their investment of toil. Management would similarly benefit. 
This simple truth contained in Taylorism must have seemed extremely seductive 
to owners and managers of his time and it continues to act as a central feature of 
management ideology to the present day. Conflict and restrictive practices were 
anathema to Taylor. Both impeded the move to a more productive organisation 
and society. He took a hostile view of trade unions, seeing them engaged in the 
crime of encouraging systematic soldiering - the collective withholding of labour.
Taylor attracted many followers, to the extent that Taylorism possesses historic 
significance: it represented a consistent attempt to improve organisational per­
formance through close examination of work and individual human character­
istics.
There is little doubt that all organisational theories re 'resent the prevailing cultural 
and historical values of Society. For example, Fayol's centralist solution to ad­
ministration reflected its French origins, just as the individualism o f Taylor, based 
on his concentration on the worker as his unit of analysis, reflected the new fron­
tier of American folklore. Both, however, were testimony to an idea which has 
acquired surprising resilience, that there is one best way to run organisations. 
When questioned many managers often express the view that there is an obvious 
or golden solution to all organisational problems.
Human Relations Theory: Just as many of the ideas of today's managers can be 
traced back to the writings of the classical school, the work of another group of 
theorists, human relationists, has been equally influential.
While Etzioni is undoubtedly correct in stressing that human relations theory 
marked a significant break with its classical counterpart, it should be remembered 
that both classical and human relations writers proceeded from the same point of 
departure, which is that organisations could be rendered more efficient and pro­
ductive. This point of departure is exemplified by a summary of the characteristics 
of the, so called, model of human beings and the organisations to which they be­
long.
1. Individuals are primarily motivated by economic incentives and will do that 
which gets the greatest economic return.
2. Since economic incentives are under the control of the organisations, man is 
essentially a passive agent to be manipulated, motivated and controlled by the 
organisation (through the provision or withholding o f economic rewards).
3. A person's feelings are often a source o f irrationality and must be prevented 
from interfering with his rational calculation of self-interest.
4. Organisations must be designed in such a way as to neutralise and control 
individual unpredictability. This will be achieved largely through the impo­
sition of constraints and the provision o f economic incentives.
However, as a result of empirical research conducte * by Elton Mayo (1945) and 
others at Harvard University in the 1920s and 1930s, the above model of 
organisations and organisational man was revised in favour o f another comprising 
the following elements:
1. Man is basically motivated by social needs as well as his economic needs. 
He obtains his basic identity largely through interaction with other human 
beings and not exclusively in the work situation.
2. As a result of the rationalisation of work, meaning has gone out o f work and 
must be sought in the social relationships within the organisation.
3. The focus of the work group will do more to influence behaviour than the 
incentives and controls of managers.
4. A supervisor will only be effective to the extent that he can satisfy his sub­
ordinates' social needs.
This approach had such a significant impact on organisational and management 
theory and practice that the cult of the group began to dominate managerial 
thinking. The reported findings o f the Hawthorne4 studies were so contrary to the 
school of scientific management that its influence was the cause o f significant re­
vision of many organisation and management theories; but, like many of the 
profound findings in this area, it suffered from over-generalisation and has since 
fallen almost out of fashion.
Mayo's work gave considerable credibility to the view that groups aided creative 
thinking and therefore such practices as brain-storming became the way o f gener­
ating new ideas which, because they were produced by the group, would be ac­
ceptable and in fact promoted by the group. Whilst it took some considerable 
time before anyone got round to testing the validity o f this belief in the power and 
effectiveness of group thinking, the fact that it was found to be true only to a lim­
ited extent5 has not significantly inhibited this method of problem solving in in­
dustry today. It is still a widely used practice.
However, the most important effect o f Mayo's Hawthorne experiment was that 
descriptions of organisations in purely formal terms provide only a partial and 
incomplete picture of their complexity. To .he classical view, that the 
organisational chart and impersonal authority structure were all important attri­
butes, was added the human relations perspective that organisations are not simply 
to be seen as machines. They are, additionally and importantly, informal social 
systems. Behaviour in organisations may, or may not, conform to managerial 
purpose. People are social actors enmeshed in a cultural system of socially ac­
quired meanings and values. Such a system, unless properly handled, might frus-
4 See Roethslisberger and Dickson (1939).
5 For a re-assessment of the group approach, see R M Belbin (1981). 
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trate managerial intentions and policies. The Hawthorne studies revealed the 
presence of groups at every level o f the organisation and two basic group processes 
were identified:
•  Conformity - groups were seen to develop norms or standards of behaviour 
to which their members were induced to conform;
•  Support - groups provided comfort and aid to their members, particularly in 
frustrating or threatening environments.
The studies carried important implications for managerial strategy. First, the 
manager must pay attention not only to the economic motivation o f subordinates 
but should also con :em himself with their needs for social acceptance, belonging 
and identity. Secondly, he should recognise that informal groups in organisations 
pose a puzzle. Well-handled, they can act with considerable effectiveness as law- 
enforcing agencies within the organisation, bringing the behaviour o f their mem­
bers into conformity with managerial purpose. Badly-handled, such groups can 
direct the efforts of their members in opposition to organisational goals. Managers 
should adopt a supporting and counselling role. They must harness group forces 
and ensure congruence between group norms and organisational mission. In this 
respect, the style of leadership adopted by management is extremely important. 
The assumption lying behind such human relations thinking is that employees 
will work harder for managers employing a participative and supportive rather 
than directive stance. Good leadership, on this view, consists in a democratic 
rather than authoritarian approach, and is concerned with the establishment of 
good interpersonal relationships rather than the rigid enforcement o f bureaucratic 
rules.
Systems Theory: Whilst Classical and human relations theory have both been 
subjected to criticism in later years, one of the more modem developments is 
systems theory. An wealth of literature has appeared in recent years outlining and 
developing the idea that organisations have system characteristics. The key ideas 
in this literature are as follows. First, each part of the organisation is seen as being 
inextricably linked with each other. Change introduced at one part of the
organisation will, therefore, have repercussions throughout. Secondly, in order to 
survive, the organisation must take in inputs from the wider society outside - men, 
materials, money and so on. These it will transform into outputs. This implies 
that the boundary between the organisation and society is open rather than closed. 
The important point to bear in mind here is that of organisational variation. 
Organisations must be assumed to operate in widely differing environments occa­
sioning differences in design and established patterns o f organisation. This is in 
contrast to the ideology of classical management that there is one best way to run 
all organisations.
Contingency Theory: One example of systems theory is contingency theory. This 
is based upon the view that organisations and management processes vary with 
purpose, environment, technology and a whole range of other situational vari­
ables. Contingency theory rests upon the assumption that organisational charac­
teristics have to be shaped to fit best with situational circumstances.
The contingency approach takes account of the variation to be found in 
organisations; the implication o f this is that management methods found useful in 
one organisation may be transferred only with the greatest difficulty to another 
of a different type. In some cases, the transfer of a particular method may di­
minish rather than improve organisational performance. The variation referred to 
here is the following: first, the question o f ownership seems to be of significance, 
in particular whether the organisation is publicly or privately owned; second, the 
size of organisations is felt to be significant; and third, organisations are widely 
expected to differ in terms of the environmental and technological circumstances 
they face. Contingency theory has brought about a reorientation in thinking since 
the early days, and has resulted in a move away from certain simplistic assump­
tions contained in early theory. The dominant (bureaucratic) model of 
organisations featuring in early accounts, has been modified in favour of the view 
that while bureaucracy is viable in certain situation, it is a liability in others.
The acknowledged variation in types o f organisation, has also influenced the 
thinking in terms of the organisational man; this model has been dumped in
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favour of a more sophisticated, contingency model. Individuals are now assumed 
to be much more complex motivationally than was originally thought. While 
some individuals may be motivated by money, others appear to be motivated in 
a much more complex fashion. Early views seem to suggest that achieving im­
proved motivation is only a question of providing extra money.
While contingency theory has served to change the views on organisations, other 
developments have also been significant. Industrial sociologists and industrial re­
lations experts have moved away from the unitary view of organisations which 
characterised early theory in favour of a more pluralistic account of their working. 
Early theorists are now regarded as having failed to appreciate the complexity of 
the relationship between manager and worker. These earlier writers and students 
are considered by later writers to have mistakenly taken social harmony for 
granted.
There is now a more jaundiced view of the issues o f conflict and cooperation in 
organisations. Although it is accepted that cooperation to some extent is forced 
by virtue of the function of the organisation itself, there seems to be a greater 
awareness of conflict as ever prevalent in the organisations of industrial society.
Motivation is a relatively new word in the manager's vocabulary. More often than 
not textbooks on management written some thirty or forty years ago would not 
have included the word in their indices. To the conventional manager, motivation 
presented, and to many still does present, few problems. The relationship between 
manager and worker, between employer and employee, was a simple contractual 
one. The employee entered a contract to perform certain activities for which he 
was paid by the employer. The manager acting on behalf of the owners o f the 
enterprise made use of the firm's property or capital to increase wealth. What he 
did or how he did it was no concern of the worker. The latter was to contribute 
his effort, ability and skills during the working day, as the manager saw fit. If the 
worker performed his task exceptionally well, or perhaps simply to a previously 
set standard, the worker might have received increased reward. If the worker failed 
consistently to meet the standards required of him, he could be penalised finan­
cially for his failures and would soon be dismissed from that employment. So
what was the problem? The worker was there to do as he was told. If the worker 
was not motivated to perform the task well, the employer could motivate him by 
threatening to penalise him financially or threatening him with the sack. That 
was motivation by fear - the oldest form of motivation, that which moved the 
slaves who built the pyramids or who rowed the galleys o f the ancient world. And 
there is still a lot of it about. There is evidence that in severe economic recession 
managers find it congenial to return to that ancient habit. Early in 1983, headlines 
in the Scottish press told of how an American-owned company gave their 
workforce the choice of a wage cut of between 13 and 18 per cent, or face the 
closure of the plant and search for new jobs in an area where unemployment was 
then over 20 percent. When employers have great power over their workforce, 
as in a recession, the temptation to manage by fear is ever-present.
Motivation, then, became a subject of serious study for managers when it became 
apparent that old-fashioned motivation by fear or by economic incentive was not 
having a great deal o f effect. In conditions of overfull employment, the norm for 
most Western societies from 1945-1975, managers had to find new ways, different 
ways, to get people to perform to an acceptable standard. Management by threat 
did not work. If an employee did not like the way he was treated, he would seek 
and quickly obtain employment elsewhere. In times of rising demand for indus­
trial products and of full employment, trade unions could become stronger. De­
mands could be made of management. Management, might resist but soon the top 
leaders of a company would realise that the costs of fighting a particular dispute 
would be greater than submitting to the employees' demands, but this was at a 
time when demand was running ahead of competitors' ability to supply the mar­
ket, in the new industrial state o f the 1960s. The costs of disputes could be 
therefore be passed on to the customer.
One reason, therefore, for the increased concern for understanding employee m o­
tivation stemmed from an erosion of managerial power which rendered managers' 
traditional methods o f coercion and incentive obsolete. Not merely was it costly 
to have confrontation with the workforce, in day to day activity, attention had to 
be given to getting employees to give of their best when fear was absent. Where
a man was performing some boring or arduous job and he was not paying a lot 
of attention to quality or quantity of output because he no longer feared the 
consequences of not doing so, and his rising level of normal pay meant that the 
earning of bonuses for high output or the opportunity to earn extra income 
through overtime working was less important to him, management somehow had 
to motivate such a worker.
There was, however, another reason. In enterprises characterised by a large 
number of semi-skilled or unskilled jobs it could be argued that, provided man­
agement were able to use effective methods to control both quality and quantity 
of output, then it was not too important that the workforce was unmotivated. It 
has been becoming apparent, however, that an increasingly important number of 
tasks could not be controlled along conventional lines. The phenomenal growth 
in the employment of scientists in industry is the most striking example o f the 
trend for organisations to require new skills. Moreover, while the typical line 
manager knew well enough the tasks his subordinates had to perform, the man­
agers responsible for directing the increasingly specialist world of the scientist 
could not. Increasingly, managers were having to supervise, or be responsible for, 
the work of others whose jobs they could not themselves do. The tendency for 
work to become more complex, and, at the same time for the jobs of those car­
rying out the work to become more specialised, has created new problems for 
managers which traditional or conventional methods o f managing cannot resolve. 
Hence the concern for new ways of motivating people to work.
Motivation
What we mean by motivation, and what moves people to work, is difficult not 
only because it touches on the very nature of the human beast, but also because 
a an apparently simple response will suffice as an answer - namely money. But 
money for what? For survival, to earn a living to get the basic necessities of life, 
to provide for one's wife and children; this would feature highly as a first response. 
It would be odd to suggest otherwise, yet whilst these appear to be some of the 
fundamental reasons for working, these reasons do not take us very far in trying
to understand the motivation of the worker to work as though the company's 
goals were his own.
Ifabit also features highly as a reason why people work We do not know what a 
world without work would be like. Similarly, there are social pressures. Everyone 
else expects you to work. Thus, in working, we are succumbing to social norms 
not just our own beliefs. Money is sought not just for necessities but as the 
wherewithal for conspicuous consumption - the new car, the video camera, the 
holiday abroad. At work, considerations of status are reflected in the concern with 
which individual managers view differentials between one post and another.
We also work for personal gratification. Some people find their jobs challenging, 
interesting, enjoyable for their own sake. Others work for promotion in order to 
gain greater control over their own destiny, or to get greater autonomy. Others 
find satisfaction in taking responsibility and being in control o f others. Another 
motivation might be escape. Work can provide welcome relief from family and 
social pressures. Others may find enjoyment in the company of fellow workers 
or managers that the workplace affords them. Another explanation may be found 
in the search for higher prestige or status which better jobs bring. Managers are 
motivated to aspire to higher positions to gain extra prestige and status. Status, 
however, means more than simply entitlement to a leather-topped desk, a fitted 
carpet and a key to the executive lavatory. Status is not only relative, it is part 
of one's identity. On meeting someone at a social gathering, it is quite common 
to want to know certain facts about the person in order to relate that person's 
place or position in the world to that of one's own. We must know such things 
as the name, address and what he does for a living. We feel we must know such 
things as these to have a meaningful conversation. More significantly, someone 
without a job is someone without a place in our society. Without work, one loses 
important aspects of identity.
We can see, therefore, work may be for more than bread alone. Work has a 
deeper meaning that suffuses social relationships. When people say they work for 
money, what do they mean? Money for what? For necessities, for luxury, for 
status? How often are industrial disputes caused by differentials between different
occupational groups? It was argument about the differentials between tradi­
tionally skilled and semi-skilled and unskilled groups of workers that very nearly 
killed The Times newspaper. Early in 1983, trade unions representing water 
workers in England and Wales seemed more interested in establishing parity or 
restoring claimed relativities with workers in the electricity supply industry than 
in arguing the merits of their own case by using such grounds as erosion o f pur­
chasing power by inflation or improved productivity as their justification.
To say that motivation equals money reward is much too simplistic. A demand 
for money tells us that a worker wants something, but it does not tell us what is 
demanded. We have seen industrial conflicts that are ostensibly wage disputes, in 
that they are primarily about differentials, but in reality turn out to be about the 
relative status between different occupations; money functions in this instance as 
an index of status. Money can act as a symbol in other ways, often serving as a 
substitute for other grievances to legitimise causes of disputes in a work conflict.
Theories o f  Motivation in Management Literature.
Vroom (1964) described motivation as “The process governing choices made by 
persons among alternative forms of voluntary activity.”
Early Motivation Theories: The early theories of nr Jtivation can be divided into 
three approaches commonly known as satisfaction theories, incentive theories and 
intrinsic theories.
Satisfaction Theories: These are based upon the assumption that a satisfied
worker is a productive worker. However, there is very little evidence to suggest 
that a satisfied worker actually works harder. It certainly seems quite in accord 
with common sense that a satisfied worker will tend to stay in the same 
organisation. Actions, therefore, to improve conditions at work and worker m o­
rale may reduce labour turnover and absenteeism, but will not necessarily increase 
individual productivity.
Incentive Theories: These rest on the assumption that an individual will increase 
his efforts in order to obtain a desired reward. One of the major forms of moti­
vation traditional in British industry is the use of financial incentives such a Pay­
ment by Results schemes - the object being to increase productivity by offering 
greater financial rewards: this requires a further assumption that it is possible to 
measure work accurately enough to ensure that a worker is paid according to the 
results of his efforts. A standard unit o f work is measured and a price attached to 
it, usually through time and work study.
Incentive theories can work successfully if
1. The individual perceives the increased reward to be worth the extra effort.
2. The performance can be measured and clearly attributed to the individual.
3. The individual wants that particular reward.
4. The increased performance will not become the new minimum standard.
5. Employees and management have the same concept of effort required of a job 
and the correct rate o f payment for it.
There are difficulties, though, in measuring the time taken to do a job. Workers 
may introduce additional work elements to lengthen the operation while it is being 
timed and discard these as soon as the time has been established. Thus enabling 
them to obtain a good rate and earn an easy bonus.
Consider some of the types of problem that bear upon financial incentives
•  bonus schemes that are so complex that workers do not understand them.
•  effects on the quality of products.
•  rivalry and jealously caused by differences in individual earnings.
•  difficulties in allocating work to ensure a fair distribution o f jobs among 
workers.
•  output can be limited by factors outside the workers' control such as machine 
speed.
•  loss of earnings if trade declined.
Intrinsic Theories: These are based on general assumptions about human needs 
along the lines originally advocated by Maslow (1954), who suggested that there 
is a hierarchy of human needs:
•  self-actualisation needs
•  esteem needs
•  social needs
•  safety needs
•  physiological needs
Maslow postulates that needs are only motivators when they are unsatisfied. The 
lower-order needs (I.e. physiological and safety needs) are dominant until satisfied 
whereupon the higher order needs come into operation.
McGregor (1968 ) put forward two sets of propositions and assumptions about 
man in the organisation:
Theory X says o f man that he is by nature lazy, lacks ambition, dislikes respon­
sibility and is indifferent to organisational needs. Therefore, management should 
be responsible for organising the factors of production i.e. control employees, di­
rect their efforts, motivate them, modify their behaviour to fit the needs of the 
organisation.
Theory Y says that man is not by nature resistant ':o organisational needs. They 
have become so as a result of experience in organisations. Motivation, potential 
for development are present in people and it is the responsibility of management 
to make it possible for people to develop. Management's essential task is to ar­
range the conditions and methods o f operation so that employees can achieve their 
own goals best by directing their own efforts towards organisation objectives.
Alternative Approaches
Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory: Herzberg (1966) maintains that in any work 
situation, it is possible to distinguish between the factors that dissatisfy and those
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that satisfy. These are not opposites. The dissatisfying factors are called hygiene 
factors and refer to the conditions or work; company policy and administration, 
supervision, salary, interpersonal relations, physical working conditions. These 
are necessary conditions of successful motivation. The satisfying factors are called 
the motivators and relate to: achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsi­
bility and advancement.
Expectancy Theory - The Porter-Lawler ModeT: Effort and performance are the 
two main variables in the expectancy theory o f motivation. Effort is the amount 
of energy an individual puts into performing a task. Performance is the amount 
of task accomplishment and the amount of successful role achievement.
There are two factors which determine effort:
1. Value of rewards e.g. pay, promotion, sense of achievement.
2. Probability that rewards depend on effort.
The relationship between effort and performance is influenced by abilities, i.e. in­
telligence, skills, and by role perceptions, i.e. the kinds of activities and behaviour 
in which the individual feels he should engage in order to perform his job suc­
cessfully.
Expectancy theory focuses on the perceptions o f people and implies the need to 
find out about employees7 views. It also implies that effective performance leads 
to job satisfaction, rather than that satisfaction leads to effective performance. 
Therefore, attempts to enhance satisfaction may have little direct effect o f per­
formance. Clear links should be established in the eyes of the individual between 
effort, performance and rewards.
Motivation and Payment: Although there is no single theory of motivation, what 
comes out of the different theories is that methods of payment play a significant 
part in motivating employees. Money is very important to employees, but it is
6 See Porter, L. W., and Lawler, E. E. (1968).
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not their only consideration. Offering purely financial incentives to employees 
will nQt always increase productivity: how these payments are made and the con­
ditions of the work itself are important.
What is apparent from the various theories o f motivation is that there must be a 
clear link between increased effort and increased payment. If an employee can not 
see that an increase in pay was due to extra effort on his part, then it is hardly 
likely to have any impact on motivation. This all seems to,point to the conclusion 
that financial incentive schemes such as Payment by Results are the most suc­
cessful methods of motivating employees, but as pointed out earlier, there are 
various problems associated with such schemes (e.g. rivalry, fluctuating earnings), 
and they do not tak into consideration the conditions o f the work itself.
Payment systems are methods of determining an employee's wage or salary and 
play an important part in the efficient running of an organisation and in 
employee-management relations. In the UK, ACAS7 identify seven types of 
payment system all with the basic theme o f using them as a means of motivating 
employees.
Time Rates o f  Payment: This method o f payment is the most common system 
used in the UK. Time rates are usually expressed as an hourly rate, a weekly wage 
or an annual salary.
Time rate systems are simple and easy to administer and give employees a sense 
of stability. However, they provide little motivational incentive to employees be­
cause an employee knows the salary he will receive regardless o f performance.
Individual Payment by Results (PB R ): This is the second most commonly used 
payment system in the UK. In this case, an individual's earnings are based directly 
on his or her personal performance e.g. output level achieved over a set period.
There are two types of individual PPR:
7 ACAS Advisory Booklet No. 2
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1. Piecework - the employee is paid at a specific rate (or price) per unit of out­
put.
2. Standard Time - similar to piecework, but a standard time is allowed to 
complete a particular task. The employee is paid for each task completed.
To operate an individual PBR scheme, standards o f performance must be set. 
This can be achieved by work study i.e. studying and timing employees' per­
formance, or by predetermined motion time systems i.e. a new task is broken 
down into elements that have been timed previously and then by reassembling 
these elements a standard time for the new task can be built up.
Individual PBR schemes provide a clear incentive effect on employees as they can 
recognise the relationship between their own efforts and their earnings. This fits 
in well with the Porter-Lawler model, which stresses the importance o f establish­
ing a clear link between effort, performance and rewards. However, for such 
schemes to work, certain conditions must apply:
•  work is measurable and attributable to individuals
•  employees can control the pace of work
•  a steady workflow can be maintained
•  acceptance of standards by employees and representatives
•  work is not subject to frequent changes
Group Payment by Results: In this case, a bonus pay is divided among group 
members, either equally or in an agreed ratio. It can be used where it is difficult 
to attribute performance to an individual, or in order to encourage group members 
to work as a team.
A group scheme is likely to have a positive effect if the group forms a natural work 
unit with complementary tasks. Members, however, should be compatible in 
terms of performance and all should get on with one another.
The motivation effect is similar to that of individual PBR schemes in that there 
is a relationship between effort and earnings. However, work groups can put
pressure on members and aggravate interpersonal relationships. The motivational 
effect diminishes as group size increases because individual employees are less able 
to relate changes in earnings to their own effort and performance. Also, it is dif­
ficult for a new recruit to be incorporated in the group because his or her per­
formance is unlikely to match the standard of existing group members.
Measured Daywork: This contains elements of both time and PBR systems and 
can overcome some of the problems of individual incentive schemes such as fluc­
tuating earnings and output.
An employee is paid a fixed rate, usually higher than the time rate, provided he 
or she maintains a predetermined level of output and performance. A variation 
of measured daywork is stepped measured daywork, whereby an employee can 
opt to maintain one of a series o f performance levels to which differing rates of 
pay are attached.
Measured daywork results in both stable earnings for employees and a stable level 
of output which can give the employer a greater degree of control over output 
levels and wage costs. It provides an incentive element not included in time rate 
systems but which may not be as strong as in PBR systems.
Plant and Enterprise Wide Schemes: Employees In a plant or an organisation 
share in a bonus that is linked to the level o f output, the value added by the em­
ployees' collectively or some similar formula. The attraction of this scheme is that 
the organisation as a whole benefits from increased profitability. In other systems, 
wages and labour costs may rise but the overall level o f output and profitability 
may decrease.
The motivational element is that employees can identify with the organisation and 
are encouraged not to regard themselves as isolated units. They are also made 
aware of their contribution to the well being of the organisation. All o f this may 
serve to promote better employee-management relations.
However, it is difficult for an employee to see a tangible link between his or her 
individual effort and the bonus payment. Therefore, bonus payments can become 
regarded a part of the basic pay. Also, hard working employees may have their 
efforts nullified by less hard working employees elsewhere in the organisation.
Since the bonus is linked to the performance of the organisation, factors outside 
the control of the workforce e.g. market forces, efficiency of management, in­
flation, will affect the level of bonus payments.
For such schemes to be successful, management and employees must be able to 
work together and there must be good communication channels within the 
organisation. Also, there must be accurate records o f output, sales, wages etc, over 
a representative period to enable a standard, agreed by management and employ­
ees, to be established.
Profit Sharing or Share Option Schemes: Employees receive a bonus which de­
pends on the profit made by the organisation in the previous accounting period. 
This can be in the form of cash or shares.
Profit sharing can not really be regarded as a financial incentive because an addi­
tional sum of money once a year in a worker's pay is hardly likely to motivate the 
worker to produce more. Its main objectives are to promote good employee- 
management relations and to give the employees a sense o f participation in the 
organisation.
The idea behind profit sharing is simple; motivate the employees by making them 
interested in the organisation as a whole, this would be achieved by giving them 
a share of the profits which has accrued from their efforts. However, if the 
shareout is simply superimposed on the existing wage structure, such a scheme 
would have little value as a motivator. The employees would be unable to see a 
relationship between the bonus and their own efforts, and they may come to ex­
pect a bonus whether there are any profits to share or not.
Scanlon (1948) devised a plan involving workers in profit sharing schemes and 
suggested that organisations could introduce profit sharing schemes to combat 
union organisation rather than address any particular requirement to help em­
ployees. He cited three examples of profit sharing schemes, two of which failed 
and one which was a success. In the two failures, profit sharing was introduced 
as a way of keeping the unions out and without involving the employees. The 
third case illustrated the basic requirements of a successful profit sharing scheme. 
It should involve all parties and actively promote increased efficiency and motivate 
workers to a greater productive effort. It should not be imposed by management 
as a kind of handout which the employees feel they have no responsibility to 
contribute to.
Profit sharing is not really a financial incentive, its motivating factor is achieved 
by a feeling of belonging to an organisation and a pride in its commercial success.
M erit Rating: The objective of merit rating is to reward individual contribution, 
by way of a systematic assessment of an employee in terms o f performance, 
aptitudes, and other qualities necessary for the successful carrying out of his job. 
In this system, an employee receives a bonus or a level of basic pay which is linked 
to an assessment of his or her performance and conduct.
The assessment can be made in terms of volume and quality o f output, initiative, 
aptitude, adaptability, attendance, punctuality, etc, ,/hich may be weighted to re­
flect their relative importance to a particular job. These factors are usually in­
cluded in an appraisal system which may be merged with merit rating. Merit 
rating was traditionally only used for indirect workers, but now more and more 
organisations have extended merit pay to manual workers.
There is no uniform merit rating scheme. Most organisations adapt schemes to 
fit their particular circumstances. However, in all cases the parties involved must 
understand the scheme and have confidence in it. An example o f a merit rating 
system would be:
•  graded job-evaluated pay structure
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•  salary range for each pay grade (minimum to maximum pay)
•  overall annual salary range increases in line with inflation
•  individual salary progression based on performance (using a performance
system)
Merit rating provides a way of rewarding qualities which are usually not rewarded 
by other payment systems. It also enables bonus payments to be made to em­
ployees whose work cannot easily be measured. However, performance factors 
can only be assessed subjectively by management thus making it difficult to 
maintain consistent standards. Although merit rating rewards good performance, 
the incentive effect may be small because bonus payments or changes in pay are 
made infrequetttly^-usually yearly or half-yearly.
Conclusion.
Employee motivation has always been a very complex and interesting problem 
facing industry. One might suggest that since there is no no one obvious general 
theory o f motivation, then there is no one general payment system that will suc­
cessfully motivate employees. This is a bad argument and is in fact simply 
question-begging.
The seven payment systems highlighted earlier, all have various advantages and 
disadvantages and can all affect motivation is somr way. The actual payment 
system in operation within an organisation may reflect management's view of 
motivation, i.e. do they believe McGregor's Theory X, or Herzberg, or Expect­
ancy Theory, or do they just do what they have always done - pay up and hope 
for the best.
Pay is an essential factor to most employees and so payment systems can have a 
considerable impact on the efficient running of an organisation and on the re­
lationship between worker and manager. Management and employees have dif­
ferent views on payment systems (i.e. management focus primarily on 
competitiveness and costs, whereas employees look to reward, standard of living 
and job security) and a payment system alone will not reconcile these differing
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views. The management o f people involves not only functional and financial 
considerations, but also recognition of employees as beings whose complexity goes 
beyond simplistic approaches to motivation. The relationship between each in­
dividual worker and the employing organisation has to be considered as the most 
powerful influence on motivation and pay. In fact, pay is taken for granted in the 
workplace, and workers will work for extraordinary low rates o f pay (even to the 
extent of engaging quite willingly in life-threatening activities). To fully grasp the 
complexity of the relationship between employer and employee it is necessarry to 
address the interpersonal context in which the activity of work takes place, 
namely, the business corporation. Let me therefore proceed to examine the mod­
em business corporation and some of the most pertinent issues therein which have 
a very real bearing upon the corporate member as worker and manager.
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Chapter 1. The Moral Responsibility of
Corporations
The normal state of most of us is this: to know quite well what we do not under­
stand. (Clark 1982: 47)
Managers must be made aware of the scope of the duties and responsibilities at­
tached to their occupational role and the extent to which this overlaps into the 
many social roles which constitute their social existence as citizens. For example, 
the allocation of resources within universities rests not with academics acting as 
academics but with academics acting as managers, distributing resources according 
to management objectives; thus even philosophers must become aware that they 
will, from time to time, be subject to the dictates of the managers of the 
organisations to which they belong, and may in fact have dual roles (with incom­
patible responsibility is) of teacher and manager within these organisations.
Whilst I shall argue that one's consciousness is developed by one's occupational 
role, this doesn't stifle expressions o f individuality. On this view, individuality is 
expressed in a social context, and so in the case o f the business organisation, an 
employee's individuality is not expressed in choosing one occupation over an­
other, but in how that occupational role is carried out. For example, a boss tells 
his subordinate what he is to do, but by ordering and deciding on priorities the 
subordinate decides upon how it will be done. This is the way of things throughout 
the strata of the corporate hierarchy from top to bottom, but it must be borne in 
mind that when at last a directive arrives at the manual worker's level, because of 
the lack o f complexity or richness in the content o f the task that is generally found 
at the manual labourer's level, there will be less obvious ways o f self expression
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in deciding how to do 'the task, consequently there will be limited scope for self 
management.
Furthermore, it is fundamentally important to keep in mind that in the modem  
business corporation the manager, like his subordinates and perhaps his superiors, 
is an employee. With the exception of the sole trader and the partnership, we find 
it is the case that managers have a dual status, that o f worker, and that o f agent 
of the owner or employing organisation.
Whilst it is questionable whether business management can be an academic sub­
ject, given the influence and control that managers have over citizens as workers, 
it is indeed a proper subject for philosophical inquiry. The many genuine and in­
teresting questions which could be asked of business managers have been asked 
by philosophers since the beginning of human inquiry. What is different now is 
that the relationship between corporations and their constituent members has 
been left to the other disciplines within psychology and sociology, but the lack of 
rigour in the philosophical aspects of this study has allowed the management 
theorists to fill the gap that philosophers must address. The philosopher can bring 
to bear some discipline and rigour in this very important area of human inter­
action, and not only prove this to be a fertile area for demonstrating the function 
and value of philosophical inquiry, but also show within the academic sphere of 
philosophy that the relationship between individuals and corporations is a testing 
ground for long established beliefs about society at large.
The philosopher's contribution is immediately obvious in the kind o f questioning 
that can be asked of the nature and basis of management decisions. For example, 
to what moral point of view (if any) does the business manager (consciously or 
unconsciously) subscribe? Does the manager see himself as a moral agent of any 
kind when he acts as agent o f the employing organisation? Wherein lies the hu­
manity of a human resource and does the manager as the agent o f the corporation 
conceive of human resources as primarily human and only secondarily resources? 
The philosopher can draw out and clarify the corresponding moral implications 
and ensure that the moral dimension of the workplace remains firmly within the
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consciousness o f society at large, and is not contained or hidden within the closed 
domain o f the business managers.
In asking questions of this kind, the philosopher can open up important avenues 
of inquiry. For example, the business manager may be working on the assumption 
that his employing organisation has an existence which is independent of its con­
stituent individuals.8 So that in acting as an agent of the employing corporation, 
he is not acting in a personal capacity but instead in a capacity which separates 
him completely from his personal moral responsibility. Although the manager 
may see himself as a human resource manager, he may, sadly but justly, regard 
himself as a mere company resource, standing outside the sphere o f morality as a 
non-moral function'iry, analogous to a machine, or a component of a machine; 
his self image o f non-moral agent may be consequence o f a view that either the 
organisation itself is non-moral, or the organisation is morally responsible for the 
actions of its agents. In either case, the business manager has a perception o f his 
agency being separate from his own self. What is more concerning is that this 
situation may prevail at a level o f unquestioned belief.
Considering the effects of his organisational role upon his moral sensibilities, and 
the prevalent ideological biases within the corporation, the manager may be con­
sciously or unconsciously subscribing to a particular moral code which can, and 
perhaps should, be challenged.
Although it is not the prime purpose o f this thesis to settle questions of managerial 
or employee moral responsibility, I want to keep these questions in the foreground 
throughout this chapter since a careful response to them will cast a sharp light on 
the nature of the corporation. We shall find that moral issues, the moral respon­
sibilities of corporations and their officials, can clarify difficult conceptual prob­
lems concerning the ontology o f collectives. It is o f prime importance, however,
8 It is of course a matter o f considerable debate whether the organisation is identical to its constituent 
individuals and changes as they change over time, or is independent in the sense that it has conti­
nuity beyond the specific set o f individual members at any point in time. Although it is not the prime 
purpose o f this essay, these issues will be addressed in part during the course o f my discussion.
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to question the personhood of the business corporation if one is to examine the 
nature of the relationship between employer and employee. My claim is that the 
requirement on the part of management to undertstand the nature of the worker 
and the meaning of work in the life of the individual has been ignored. This ig­
norance has resulted in an all frustrating search for a formula which the manager 
can apply to get at least that minimum o f cooperation from the worker where 
orders are obeyed, or at best to get the maximum cooperation which motivates 
the worker to a point where he does not just simply do what he is told, but that 
he wants to do what the manager wants.
Modem management and management theorists are guilty of neglecting their re­
sponsibility to seek a better understanding of the nature of the worker whilst 
turning in the very opposite direction in terms of their intellectual and academic 
efforts. With no prospect of discovering some magic formula which will yield 
more control over their staff and greater productivity, attention has gone to seek­
ing a deeper understanding of the organisation as a means of gaining knowledge 
of how to manage better. In any attempt to get to a clearer understanding o f the 
nature of the relationship between the employer and employee, or manager and 
worker, this wrong headed direction of management theorists must be addressed. 
There is no ghost in the machine! The business corporation is merely a 
motivational device and I beheve I can show this bv drawing upon John Ladd's 
excellent analysis of formal organisations. Before doing so, I shall give an account 
of Peter French's claim that the formal organisation of the business corporation 
is itself a fully fledged person in a metaphysical, legal and moral sense. What I 
shall argue against French is that his claim is mistaken, but has plausibility only 
to the extent that from an intuitive point of view, we do speak of corporations as 
though they were persons. The credibility of French's claim consists in the extent 
to which business and management theorists can be taken seriously when they 
seek a deeper understanding of the nature of business corporations at the cost o f 
neglecting their real obligation to gain a deeper understanding of the nature o f the 
individual employee.
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The pseudo theorising about just what a corporation is can and must be chal­
lenged in its own right before I attempt to present an analysis o f the nature com­
plexity of the individual as a worker and citizen of the wider community; this 
analysis is intended to provide a framework for a clearer understanding of the na­
ture of the relationship between the manager and the worker in the modem busi­
ness corporation.9
The Corporation as a Moral Person
It is hardly controversial to consider that the corporation as an employer requires 
of its members as employees that loyalty, honesty, and good practices be adopted 
as virtues to be cultivated and perhaps enforced. It is quite common to fmd press 
reports which quote the words of corporate agents of one sort or another ex­
pressing such requirements in terms of rights claims, which on closer inspection 
would seem to emanate from the notion of a corporation as person. Let me 
therefore address the notion o f the corporation as a person by exploring, in the 
first instance, the intuitive view, thereafter I shall tackle the issue o f corporate moral 
personhood by analysing other perspectives on this issue.
The Intuitive View: It has been popular in recent philosophical literature to argue 
the case that a corporation cannot be held morally responsible unless it is a per­
son. Before I tackle the question of whether a corp' ration is a moral person, let 
me bring together a number o f intuitions which suggest that we do treat it as 
similar or analogous to a human person. To obtain a simple list o f these intui­
tions, let me take as an example something with which the individual in British 
society is all too familiar; the electricity supply company, which I shall refer to as 
ESC.
If I do not pay my electricity bill by a specified date and time, someone acting on 
behalf o f ESC will call to my home to disconnect my electricity supply. In dis-
9 The term corporation will hereafter be used to refer to employing organisations, employer or Com­
pany.
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cussion with other people, there would be nothing unusual in my expressing 
concern about what ESC is doing to me. I will hold ESC responsible for the act 
of cutting off my supply, not the individuals acting on their behalf. When I write 
to ESC asking for more time to pay, I appeal to some intuition on my own part 
that there is some merciful tendency on the part o f ESC. I admit to the belief that 
ESC can decide to do other than follow a procedure for dealing with debtors. 
To speak of the ESC in this manner I may be interpreted as expressing an intui­
tive view of ESC as a decision maker, acting responsibly with a capacity for re­
flection on its actions and the possibility o f exhibiting sympathetic behaviour. 
And it is because ESC has a legal right to disconnect my supply that I appeal for 
mercy. Note alsoMiat my intuitive view extends as far as expecting that along 
with the right to take action there comes the assumption that ESC is obliged to 
act in a fair and responsible manner.
Taking the example further, if my supply was disconnected for non-payment when 
in fact I had paid my electricity bill, I would not be inclined to hold the electrician 
responsible for the mistake, but in fact ESC and if this happens frequently, it 
would not be unreasonable for me to speak of ESC as incompetent, irresponsible 
or even vindictive.
Consider the same corporation from the point o f view of citizenship. So, if ESC 
contributed to the Arts, charitable organisations or environmental improvement 
projects, it may be regarded as a good corporate citizen. ESC may then be an 
appropriate object of praise, affection and perhaps pride. On the other hand, if 
ESC sponsored foxhunting or some other blood sport, it may well be an object 
of anger, hate or resentment.
Consider the view one might have of ESC if it stopped importing fuel for elec­
tricity generating stations from a particular country because o f that country's per­
sistent violation of human rights. Action of this kind may not only merit some 
approval in its own right, but could also result in ESC being considered to have 
taken a moral decision and a moral action.
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Take, for example, a very real instance o f a corporation speaking of itself in moral 
terms. In a leaflet produced in spring 1992 by the Lexmark Company the fol­
lowing statement appeared:
We hope that all our Resellers and Customers will get involved with Lexmark's 
proactive effort to reduce the volume of waste in Europe's landfills and that you 
will participate today.10
This effort on the part of Lexmark aimed at preventing pollution (and according 
to the same brochure, it will produce work for handicapped people) may be 
viewed rather cynically by the public. It may be considered as a cheap marketing 
endeavour in its attempt to draw upon some very serious fears about the envi­
ronment. However, an alternative and morally legitimate view may well applaud 
Lexmark for displaying rectitude in environmental matters in that they are going 
beyond their legal requirement that a polluter must pay to clean up his mess and 
taking a what is, or appears to be, a moral initiative.
These examples exhibit an intuitive use o f a host of notions, concepts and terms 
that one individual person would ordinarily use about another:
•  decision
•  responsibility
•  rights
•  duties
•  praise
•  blame
•  resentment
•  moral virtuousness
•  vindictiveness
10 From a sales leaflet produced by Lexmark International Limited, Westhorpe House, 
Buckinghamshire, 1992.
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What is illuminating here is that these terms are used in a similarly ordinary way 
about a business corporation; thus emphasising the point that ascriptions o f hu­
man characteristics to formal organisations is not only quite common, but also 
quite natural in the way we speak and act. The intuitive regard for a corporation 
as some kind o f person is not only quite ordinary, but would seldom be ques­
tioned in ordinary conversation.
This discussion is focused more sharply when we consider examples o f corpo­
rations speaking of themselves as moral agents. As well as promoting advertising 
campaigns which display rectitude over environmental matters corporations also 
have community and social responsibility departments to ensure that the corpo­
rate aim of being a r ;sponsible citizen is being properly pursued. So when the IBM 
Corporation, for example, takes credit for charitable and sponsorship ventures, 
should we ask if they are being hypocritical? On the other hand, if managers get 
shareholders to accept say 1% of profit for the Arts scheme, we might consider 
that the corporation is capable of an act which would meet with approval on 
moral grounds, but whether this would warrant the attribution of moral as well 
as a legal personhood is still questionable.
We draw upon person concepts and descriptions in our behaviour towards formal 
organisations to a tremendous extent, yet we seldom feel the need to justify our­
selves, and in fact, would consider it most peculiar if we were asked for a justi­
fication. Our use of person concepts and terms oper tes at an unquestioning level, 
but is also limited in extent. We would not wonder what a business corporation 
dreams about, although we may speak of a corporate dream, belief, nightmare or 
even a love affair with another company and do so without being in the slightest 
doubt that we are using metaphorical expressions; but this does not detract from 
our intuitive notion of the corporations as a person. Nor does it imply that we 
are always and only speaking metaphorically about corporations when we speak 
of them in terms appropriate to persons.
From a legal point of view, there is no real problem in principle, corporations are 
legal persons. But when we judge a corporation from a moral point of view, we 
must address the question o f real or metaphorical reference.
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To explore the idea o f corporate moral responsibility further, an understanding 
of what could be meant by the terms agent and person might help. Consider, 
therefore, a business manager regarding himself as an agent o f the corporation. 
This is hardly controversial in itself since that is exactly his role. The question is, 
can we recognise the corporation as the bearer of responsibility for the manager 
and the other officers? Well yes. It is quite normal for the corporation to be held 
responsible for the actions of its agents or officers, but this is legal responsibility. 
When we speak of any other responsibility, it is usually on the basis o f the cor­
poration regarded as a construct or aggregate of individuals comprising the cor­
poration. In this legal sense a corporation may in fact be considered as a person; 
examples are many and as various as there are legal systems.11
My claim will be that it is neither desirable nor credible that we consider the cor­
poration as a moral person. If we afford any moral status to a corporation, we 
have not only to address issues of moral responsibility, but also whether such 
persons can have moral obligations and in what sense such an entity may be held 
responsible for its actions. Interesting though it may be to explore the metaphysics 
of corporate personhood, we can gain an understanding of whether corporations 
are in any sense moral agents regardless of whether they may in some sense be 
moral persons and we can attribute moral agency and moral responsibility to 
corporations without considering them as moral persons in any sense. The very 
reason why we should focus on the minimum or weal-est case is to establish a view 
on how the corporation ought to be treated.
Whilst I doubt whether anyone would dispute this intuitive view of the 
personhood of corporations, to argue that a corporation is a moral person of some 
kind is just simply missing the point. What is important is to gain a perspective 
on the best way to treat corporations from a moral point of view. Can we attri­
bute moral agency and moral responsibility to a corporation without having to 
ascribe moral personhood?.
11 I shall discuss below an interesting argument from Peter French that a corporation's moral re­
sponsibility follows from its being a legal and a metaphysical person.
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The intuitive view is not a trivial view. It has led to other arguments which extend 
the notion of corporate personhood from naive application o f person concepts to 
corporations to the view that a corporation is a fully fledged moral person. It is 
important therefore not so much to pass judgement upon what we may do by 
habit, custom or convention, but to ensure that our uncritical and somewhat na­
tural inclination to speak in terms of corporations as persons is not used as a 
foundation on which the personhood of corporations might be legitimised. An 
example o f this kind of extension is argued by French (1985),who addresses the 
question of corporate personhood by presenting a variation on a metaphysical 
case.
The Metaphysical View: French argues that the corporation is a moral person and 
that it is in fact a product of metaphysical personhood. Following a discussion 
on types o f collectives, he gets down to the business o f distinguishing three con­
cepts of personhood; moral, legal, and metaphysical. French states that to be a 
moral person one must meet the conditions of metaphysical personhood.
Moral community membership is essentially a premoral, a metaphysical matter.
(French 1985: vii)
Setting this as the f jundation of his requirement of moral personhood, he then 
charges most writers as having ignored this fundamental point.
French lists the above three concepts of personhood, which he quite rightly argues 
are often entangled, and points to Locke's account o f personal identity where 
person is denoted as a forensic term belonging only to intelligent agents who, be­
cause of their attributes such as consciousness and memory, can thereby become 
“concerned and accountable” (French 1985: 32).
French states that there is clear evidence of the entanglement o f the three concepts 
of personhood, and says of Locke: “he is historically correct in citing the law as 
the primary origin of the term person. But he is incorrect in maintaining that its 
legal usage entails its metaphysical sense, agency; and whether or not either sense,
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but especially the metaphysical, is interdependent on the moral sense, account­
ability, is surely controversial” (French 1985: 32).12
According to French, Locke holds an “interdependence” view of moral, 
metaphysical and juristic personhood which is correct, but wrong insofar as Locke 
roots both the moral and metaphysical in the juristic concept. The Lockean view 
has the virtue o f being clear. If it were true, then the issue o f whether a corpo­
ration can be a moral person could be settled directly. Since it can sue and can 
be sued, can inflict and suffer torts in all legal systems, that is it! But since legal 
responsibility is not the same as moral responsibility, this view is wrong. Why 
not say that a legal oerson is a metaphysical person but not a moral one?
French notes that many of those who hold what he describes as a precondition 
view of the relationship between metaphysical and moral personhood tend to 
champion the least defensible of a number of possible interpretations of the juristic 
personhood of corporations (French 1985: 33), and by virtue o f holding this po­
sition, they are allowed to systematically sidestep the question o f whether corpo­
rations can meet the conditions of metaphysical personhood.13
In essence, it is the uncritical acceptance of a legal status o f personhood which is 
the sort of artifice or construct used widely in the lit mature on corporate legal re­
sponsibility which invites the criticism from Frer ch that the real questions of 
personhood are being avoided.14
12 The term person owes its origin to the theatre; that is, persona meaning mask. French does indeed 
make this point elsewhere.
13 An example o f this is the view that the private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction 
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships.
14 This is quite correct, but an empty criticism, if the real questions (namely French's questions) con­
cern moral personhood.
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French also cites Rawls as another who is similarly guilty o f supporting an 
indefensible interpretation of the legal concept of personhood, which encourages 
an anthropocentric bias which has led to a general belief that corporations cannot 
be moral persons. French's view is that Rawls' original position produces the two 
principles of justice which amount to a rather dramatic rendering o f one version 
of the compelling but unnecessarily complex thesis that moral persons can only 
evolve out of metaphysical persons. Fie accuses Rawls of remarkable ambiguity 
in deciding who or what may qualify as a metaphysical person; as an example he 
points to the list of parties Rawls admits to his illustration of the original position 
where “associations (states, churches or other corporate bodies)” are included. 
Whilst Rawls does indeed declare that these associations are admitted to the list 
of elements o f the initial situation, he does indeed claim that they are o f course a 
variation of the “Nature of the Parties”. It is stated clearly by Rawls that “conti­
nuity of persons (family heads, or generic lines)” constitute the elements o f the 
initial situation (Rawls 1970: 146).
Whilst criticising Rawls for not discussing the corporate bodies he refers to above, 
French also accuses him of shrinking from the task of exploring the implications 
of that intuition and “retreating to the comfortable bulwarks o f the 
anthropocentric bias” but at the same point in his text, French does however 
credit Rawls with having hold o f an important intuition:
that some associations of human beings should be treated as metaphysical persons
capable, on his [Rawls* account of becoming moral persons, in and o f themselves.
(French 1985: p34)
The reason why this is an important intuition for French is that he wants to argue 
that “the concept of legal personhood under any of its popular interpretations is 
.... virtually useless for moral purposes” (French 1985: 34). He presents a rather 
weak argument against the idea of a corporate person as a convenient moral fic­
tion or as an aggregate of biological persons. Let me try to get to the essence of 
his argument to expose its weakness.
Chapter 1. T he M oral Responsibility o f  Corporations 45
Criticism o f  The Metaphysical Approach: French claims that metaphysical
personhood is a necessary condition o f legal personhood, and that metaphysical 
personhood is a necessary condition of moral personhood. This is why he spends 
the most of his efforts claiming that corporations are metaphysical persons. By 
establishing the metaphysical personhood of corporations, he believes that he will 
therefore have established both the moral and legal personhood of corporations.
I Iis fundamental error rests in the fact that legal personhood does not imply moral 
personhood, and metaphysical personhood does not imply moral personhood. 
So, when French argues that a corporation is a metaphysical person he is not 
furthering his thesis that a corporation is a moral person. The weakness o f his 
argument is implicf in his endeavour - to find a case fo r  presenting the corporation 
as a moral person.
Why must a corporation be a person in any sense for us to cast moral judgement 
upon the actions carried out in its name? Furthermore, there is a profound moral 
problem in affording the status o f metaphysical, moral and legal personhood on 
an entity such as a corporation. Holding a person morally responsible for an act 
is hardly controversial in itself. We are all subject to the moral judgement o f our 
peers. Regardless of our role, or the capacity in which we carry out a given act, 
we will still be judged by our peers. Thus, if a collective of any kind is to be 
judged from a m on i point o f view, there is nothing wrong or improper in passing 
moral judgement on the collective as though it w* re a person. In regarding a 
corporation as a person in this sense, all we mean is that the persons who acted 
on behalf of, or in the capacity of, the corporation are subject to moral judgement 
even if their individual identities are never known to their peers.
The reason we give offices and roles to the individuals who constitute a collective 
is in fact to allocate responsibility for a range o f activities. Furthermore, to afford 
the status of full fledged moral person to a corporation is to allow that corporation 
to become a peer and to judge the actions of other individuals. For example, I 
fail to grasp just how the Exxon Corporation can judge the morality of my words 
and deeds, other than certain individual officers authorised to speak on behalf of 
the corporation making judgements of my deeds, based upon certain standards
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that the corporation would wish to be judged by; but the Exxon corporation 
cannot judge me as would any individual member o f society. The worrying aspect 
of those who seek to establish moral personhood of a corporation is that their 
efforts serve to cloud the moral deliberation of each member o f the corporation.
The essence o f a person's moral deliberation is that it takes precedence over all 
other conflicting interests, otherwise there could be no moral resolution of con­
flicting motives. For example, the boss who tells her secretary to reply to the 
caller on the telephone that she (the boss) is out o f the office, when in fact this is 
not true, is instructing her employee to tell a lie. The secretary must either tell a 
lie and be moral or to be prudential and obey the boss's instructions. The moral 
deliberation of the secretary may not be brought to bear on such matters since 
lying in this way is merely considered as an occupational hazard and therefore 
never considered from a moral point of view. The point is, however, that if the 
secretary has to consider this behaviour from a moral point o f view, there is no 
moral dilemma! There may be equally strong conflicting motives, to be moral and 
to be prudential, and it may be difficult to decide what ought to do be done, but 
it is only a moral dilemma if each option is a moral option. In the secretary's case 
it is not a moral dilemma, although there is the question o f whether the decisions 
should be made on noral grounds or on prudential grounds, and this applies to 
corporate action in general. One's corporate role in following procedures may 
well coincide with moral imperatives of one sort or another, but corporate proce­
dures are founded on prudential grounds and following these procedures is not a 
moral problem. If a corporation requires a member to act in a morally wrong 
way, the problem, if any, for the actor is whether his motive is to be moral or not. 
To clarify this point, consider my position as a secretary who has promised to 
carry out the role of a secretary to the best of my ability. If I have been told to 
do something for my boss, then either I do it or break my promise. If I am told 
to say that the boss is out when in fact he is not, then I have a decision to make 
which puts me in the following position which is indeed a dilemma, the form of 
which is:
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E ith e r  p  o r  q .
I f  p th en  r .
I f  q th en  s .
> E ith e r  r  o r  s .
Now if we cash this out in terms of my secretarial role, the matter o f whether this 
is a moral dilemma can be settled more easily.
E ith e r  I t e l l  a l i e  o r  I t e l l  t h e  t r u t h .
I f  I t e l l  a l i e  I commit a m oral wrong.
I f  I t e l l  th e  t r u th  th e n  b reak  a c o n f id e n c e .
T h e r e fo r e , e i t h e r  I commit a m oral wrong o r  I b rea k  a c o n f id e n c e .
If breaking a confidence is a moral wrong then ^hen the boss asks me to tell the 
caller that he is not in, then he puts me in a very real moral dilemma, for I am 
indeed guilty of breaking a confidence if my guiding principle in my job is to 
maintain a loyalty to my boss above all else (above even the aims and objectives 
of the corporation). But my dilemma is really quite different from the above 
representation; the reality is this:
E ith e r  I t e l l  a l i e  o r  I t e l l  th e  t r u t h .
I f  I t e l l  a l i e  th en  I commit a m oral w rong.
I f  I t e l l  th e  t r u th  I g e t  p u n ish e d .
T h e r e fo r e , e i t h e r  I commit a m oral wrong o r  I g e t  p u n ish e d .
Now this may be called a moral dilemma in the sense that it involves a moral is­
sue, but the homs of the dilemma are quite different; one is moral and the other 
quite clearly prudential. My point is that there will be organisations whose re­
quirements are such that their members will from time to time face this kind of 
dilemma, but the office or role a person holds within the organisation does not 
change the fact that the moral status of each person is the same whether in role
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or not. The requirements of me as a moral person are the same no matter which 
organisation I belong to and no matter which role or office the organisation af­
fords me.
French's analysis leads one to the conclusion that his view of the corporation as 
a moral person is a solution looking for a problem:
to treat a corporation as an aggregate for any purpose is to fail to recognise crucial
and logical metaphysical differences between corporations and crowds. (French
1985: 35)
Crucial logical and metaphysical differences there may be between corporations 
and other collectives, but not crucial to moral personhood. French misses the 
point when he accuses Rawls of failing to recognise these differences. It is in fact 
French who fails to recognise the irrelevance o f the differences that may exist be­
tween corporations and crowds in moral matters.
There is some difficulty in holding a crowd morally responsible and exercising 
some sanctions upon such a collective, but there is no difficulty whatsoever in 
passing judgement on the actions of the crowd. For example, to accuse a crowd 
attending an event (gathered at the entrance of Wembley Stadium at a particular 
date and time) of a morally wrong act is simply to condemn the contribution of 
each member of the crowd to that act. We often do not (and cannot) know who 
each individual who constituted the crowd, and in fact, we need not know who 
they are. It is enough that they know what they have done and that each can 
consult their own conscience and know the wrongness of their actions in the light 
of our condemnation o f the crowd: by condemning the crown we condemn every 
prticipant (known and unknown). What if the agents of the organisation running 
the event similarly contribute to the moral wrongness of the same act? We would 
not seriously consider the corporation to be morally wrong in the way that we 
would condemn the contribution of each person in the crowd. We would however 
consider each agent of the corporation who contributed to the wrong act on the 
same moral basis as each person in the crowd but because an organisation has 
office bearers, we can seek out the responsible persons and assess their degree of
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responsibility in terms of the authority afforded by their position. This is why 
we need not condemn the collective of the formal organisation.
French is begging the question when he says that:
For a corporation to be treated as a moral person, it must be the case that some
events are describable in a way that makes certain sentences true: sentences that
\
say that some of the things a corporation does were intended by the corporation 
itself. (French 1985: 39)
By sidestepping the question o f whether one needs to assess whether the corpo­
ration can be considered a metaphysical person and fully fledged moral being, one 
is not (as French argues) closing off a potentially illuminating discussion. Rather, 
it is quite in order to take the view that in law we can regard the corporation as 
a legal person and define the limits within which we do so, thus pursuing sim­
plicity, whilst leaving out any possibility of ascribing moral personhood. We 
wisely avoid creating the conditions in which the agent o f the corporation can 
appeal to anything other than his own conscience when acting in either his occu­
pational role or in his capacity as citizen.
Whilst there may be some philosophically interesting issues arising from the ex­
ploration of the implications of a corporation as something more than an aggre­
gate of its constituents, the moral interest must sun iy be confined to the effects 
of this entity upon the consciousness of the participants.
Where French is correct, is that a corporation does generally figure in the minds 
and language of a population at large as a person. Consider again the intuitive 
view; often spoken about as though it has good and evil intentions, the Electricity 
Supply Company, for example, may not only be accused of seeking to disconnect 
my supply, or getting more profits out of its consumers, but may also have pub­
lished objectives, and in fact have policy statements expressed as basic beliefs. 
We can therefore be forgiven for ascribing human attributes to such an entity since 
instinctively it is common to speak of such collectives as kinds o f persons. In terms 
of understanding the behaviour of people in groups it may be illuminating to study
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the distinguishing features o f different types o f collectives. For example, a contrast 
between crowds and corporations may throw some light upon the psychology of 
persons in terms o f their propensity to change of mood and so on, but the 
knowledge gained will have little or no bearing on the moral status of a corpo­
ration. It is immensely valuable in understanding the psychological circumstances 
in which an individual makes choices or acts in matters moral, to consider whether 
or not and to what degree an agent is acting as an officer o f the corporation; but 
no answer to such questions can of itself present a case for ascribing moral 
personhood to a collective.
French is taking a particular stand in the individualism / holism debate. Yet, al­
though he is fundamentally mistaken in his endeavour to put the corporation on 
the same basis as the human being in terms o f moral status, it is indeed in accord 
with our intuition to speak of an organisation such as a business corporation in 
terms of moral evaluation; and as I have asked earlier, is this to ascribe personality 
in a real sense, or it is merely a means of expressing our moral judgement of the 
actions of officials? The remainder of this chapter will aim at answering this 
question.
Corporations as Structures of Rules and Roles.
7
John Ladd, in his excellent paper Morality and The Ideal o f Rationality in Formal 
Organisations,15 explores some of the moral issues emerging from the complex 
interrelationships between individuals and formal organisations in modem indus­
trial society.
Ladd examines the claim that because formal organisations are like machines, they 
cannot have moral obligations or be morally at fault. In discussing this issue Ladd 
succinctly describes the dual role created by the conflicting obligations placed on 
the officials of formal organisations:
is Published in the Monist 54,(1970:488 - 516). 
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A distinctive mark of such organisations is that they make a clear cut distinction 
between the acts and relationships o f individuals in their official capacity within the 
organisation and in their private capacity. (Ladd 1970: 488)
This is certainly the case, and it is not necessary to the argument that the dis­
tinction is always obvious to the decision maker.
Corporate Morality as a Language Came: Ladd argues that certain aspects o f the 
organisational ideal are incompatible with the ordinary principles o f morality, and 
this incompatibility generates a dilemma which is itself a source of alienation in 
contemporary industrial society.
The significance of Ladd's paper consists in the rather interesting, but open-ended 
conclusion he draws. It is in my view an excellent philosophical analysis of an 
ideological perspective on the relationship between, on the one hand, formal 
organisations, and on the other, society and the individual. The ideology pre­
supposed by organisational decision making is the focus of Ladd's attention. He 
construes Weber's analysis of bureaucracies as describing a certain language game 
and he draws upon this concept of a language game (as advanced by Wittgenstein 
and others) as a tool of analysis.
In his paper, Ladd is not concerned with empirical studies o f organisations, rather, 
he approaches the subject by way of a somewh it unusual interpretation of 
Weber's ideal-type, the starting point of Weber's classical analysis o f bureaucracy. 
Ladd interprets Weber's ideal-type of bureaucracy as representing a particular 
pattern o f thinking about actions and social relationships, in essence, a rational 
social order.
The ideal-type is a normative (non-moral) concept o f organisations, a standard 
which actual organisations approach. It is “not a description of how administra­
tors decide so much as a description of how good administrators decide.”16 And 
by drawing upon this language game Ladd has a tool of analysis which will allow
16 See Simon 1965: 62, 249 & 253.
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him to examine the way that language and action are interwoven but also how the 
organisational theorists rationally evaluate and defend what is done:
And it allows us to describe the activity without reference to moral rules (or 
norms). In other words, it provides us with a method of analysing a rational ac­
tivity without committing ourselves whether or not it is also moral. (Ladd 1970: 
491)
Pursuing the game analogy further, Ladd holds that there is a strong resemblance 
between the autonomy of the activity (and the immunity o f the rules) governing 
a game and the operations of formal organisations.17 Ladd's discussion starts by 
exploring the concept of the formal organisation as a decision structure. To this 
end he focuses on the central concept of a decision or action that is attributed to 
the organisation rather than to the individual involved in the decision process. 
He describes the theory of organisational decision making as a product of officials 
of the organisation who are themselves ethically neutral and whose values are 
most definitely not those which would guide these decision makers in their lives 
as private citizens:
When the official decides for the organisation, his aim is (or should be) to imple­
ment the objectives of the organisation impersonally. The decisions are made for 
the organisation, 'kith a view to its objectives and not on the basis o f the personal 
interests or conviction of the individual who makes Uv* decision. (Ladd 1970: 492 
- 493)
He is quick to point out that these decisions are not collective decisions, but in fact 
“Social Decisions.” The basis for the distinction lies in the notion that a social 
decision is precisely a decision (or action) that is to be attributed to the formal
17 For further insight into Ladd's use of the game model, see his Moral & Legal Obligation in J Roland 
Pennock and John W Chapman, eds., Political and Legal Obligation, Nomos, 12 (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1970). Note that with the exception of this reference, all other references to Ladd  
1970 followed by the page number refer to his paper, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in 
Formal Organisatios, cited in the Bibliography o f this essay.
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organisation and not to collectives or collections of persons. The point here is that 
in making a social decision, a person is making decisions that are not his; that is, 
not attributable to him.
The theory of social decision making which Ladd is analysing is related to a theory 
of organisational authority o f which Simon says:
A subordinate is said to accept the authority whenever he permits his behaviour 
to be guided by the decision o f a superior, without independently examining the 
decision. (Simon 1965: 11)
And given the hierarchical structure, where superiors issue commands to those 
below them, the superior exercises authority over the subordinates, thus the sub­
ordinate “holds in abeyance his own critical faculties for choosing between alter­
natives and uses the formal criterion o f the receipt of a command or signal as his 
basis for choice” (Simon 1965: 126). This principle held by Simon that 
organisational authority requires the abdication of choice, is considered by Ladd 
as part of the language game of the formal organisation; it is a logical requirement 
of the game, whether or not it is empirically true. Weber's view is that the sub­
ordinates “do not owe this obedience to the person in authority as an individual, 
but to the impersonal order” (Weber 1922: 19). Thus the superior's authority is 
itself based upon his abdication of choice in favour of the social decisions o f the 
organisation, so his decisions are (like his subordinate's) are not owned by him.
If the organisational order requires that social decisions of its officers be attributed 
to the organisation rather than to the individual decision maker(s) and the deci­
sions are to be made non-personally and in relation to an organisational purpose, 
the agents of the organisation must have a stated goal or set o f objectives. Oth­
erwise, it would not only be confusing to have social decisions made in the ab­
sence of stated goals, but it would be unintelligible in the context of the language 
game of organisations. Ladd stresses that organisations are differentiated and de­
fined by reference to their stated goals and in separating out the real goals and the
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stated goals o f an organisation, he draws upon the views of Galbraith18 who points 
out that whatever else an organisation's stated goals may be, they must aim at 
securing its own survival, autonomy and economic growth. Whilst Galbraith 
scorns the notion of maximising profits as the goal of an organisation, Ladd takes 
a less contentious and more formal stand, advocating that the real goal o f an 
organisation is that objective which is used as a basis for justifying decisions and 
actions of the organisation itself, as distinct from the actions attributable to indi­
viduals. The goal is therefore not only a specific element o f the language game 
of organisations, but also a means o f differentiating formal organisations from any 
other kinds o f social organisation in that the formal organisation is constructed 
and reconstructed to seek specific goals.
The logical function of the goal in the organisational language game is to provide 
the value premises in organisational decision making. Therefore, any consider­
ations that are not related to the aims or goals of the organisation are deemed to 
be irrelevant to the organisational process. Ladd stresses again the logical point 
that only those actions which are relevant to the goal of the organisation are to 
be attributed to the organisation; those which are irrelevant are attributed to the 
individual making the decisions or taking the actions. The widely used example 
in the literature on this subject is the naval officer who runs his ship aground. 
Such action is inconsistent with the aims of the navy, therefore the action is at­
tributed to the individual rather than the organisatiG 1, in which case the officer is 
held responsible. It is in this way that the concept of a social decision is a fun­
damental part of the notion of an organisational objective. What all this means 
is that the co-implication of action and aim implies that a decision taken in the 
name of an organisation that is not related to an organisational aim is 
unintelligible within the language game of formal organisations.
The notion of an action or decision unrelated to the goal of an organisation leads 
Ladd nicely into a discussion of the concept of the “ideal of pure rationality which
18 Galbraith (1967: 171-178) holds that growth prospects are generally more important to a business 
organisation than profit maximisation.
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is basic to the ideas and language of operations research and modem management 
sciences”.19 Within the scope of the language game as a tool for organisational 
analysis, it is clear that the rationality of formal organisations must hinge upon a 
standard of some kind. If one accepts what has been said about aims and objec­
tives, in the context o f the language game, Ladd is quite correct when he tells us 
that:
the sole standard for the evaluation of an organisation, its activities and its deci­
sions, is its effectiveness in achieving its objectives - within the framework o f ex­
isting conditions and available means. (Ladd 1970: 497)
This kind of effecti\ eness is what Ladd calls rationality, defined in terms o f means 
and ends, it is neutral as to the aims or goals achieved, but it is an incomplete or 
nonsensical term unless it is related to a goal. Ladd is also quick to point out that 
this is a technical use of rationality in the sense that it amounts to a somewhat 
persuasive definition; it is like the other ethical-emotive terms found in the 
writings of Weber and Simon which attest to an endorsement o f a certain type of 
formal organisation; one structured according to the principle o f efficiency they 
describe.
good administration is behaviour that is realistically adapted to its ends. (Simon 
1965: 62)
Ladd also stresses his view that despite their neutral presentation, these analyses 
are not value free. It is at this point we get to the heart of the matter o f morality 
in formal organisations.
Among the factual conditions to be considered in social decisions or actions there 
will be factors such as available means, costs and other relevant conditions. These 
are empirical conditions whose determination would be a subject o f empirical in­
quiry. However, there is one other class identified by Ladd as “limiting operating
19 Yehezkel (1968: 336). For a bibliography on the subject o f Operational Research, see pp 336 -340. 
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conditions” (Ladd 1970: 498); this class will include such things as legal re­
strictions, scarcity of trained personnel and factors involving company morale. 
Consider a company's demands that its sales staff must show respect both for its 
customers and competitors and must never engage in lying or any other behaviour 
which is not both honest and fair. Now one might view this as a set o f moral 
requirements, but on the analysis presented by Ladd, it is more akin to his limiting 
operating conditions. In organisational decision making these conditions must be 
taken into account as relevant data. In this respect, Ladd holds that information 
along these lines must be on a par logically with other information relevant to 
decision making. The only way that moral considerations could be relevant to the 
operations of a forn -al organisation is, says Ladd, by becoming limiting operating 
conditions; and strictly speaking, because empirical knowledge does not include 
morality, such considerations must be excluded.
Insofar as morality in the strict sense enters into practical reasoning it must do so 
as an ethical premise, not an empirical one. Hence morality as such must be ex­
cluded as irrelevant in the organisational decision making - by the rules o f the 
language game. (Ladd 1970: 498)
Morality has merely an indirect role as moral opinion, which Ladd cites as an 
example of what John Austin calls “positive morr ity.”20 In this instance, the 
positive morality expressed in the forms of laws anu customs of the wider society 
in which the organisation exists must be addressed in decision making. Just as a 
decision maker cannot ignore the religious beliefs and practices o f the community, 
he cannot exclude the prevailing laws and customs. By including them as limiting 
operating conditions he makes them part of the set of empirical considerations 
without sharing or accepting such considerations personally. On this view, Ladd 
rightly draws the conclusion that social decisions are not and cannot be governed 
by the principles of morality.
20 Austin 1954: 124.
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Decisions in private management, like decisions in public management, must take 
as their ethical premises the objectives that have been set for the organisation. 
(Simon 1965: 52)
Ethical premises are not therefore taken from the principle o f morality. We have 
no grounds for expecting formal organisations (or their agents) to be honest, 
courageous, considerate, sympathetic or to exhibit any kind o f moral integrity. 
Such terms have no place in the vocabulary of the organisational language game, 
except as rules of behaviour, backed by sanctions.
We can see why, on this view, ordinary moral standards which would prohibit 
such actions as secrecy, deception and espionage have no bearing upon the deci­
sions and activities of formal organisations. Such actions are rational if they serve 
the objectives of the organisation, and they may indeed be required. Should these 
actions be limited or prohibited by the organisation, they are only so by virtue of 
the notion of limiting operating conditions, not by moral standards. The consid­
erations that underpin organisational behaviour on this view are subject to the 
standard of rational efficiency - namely utility; whereas the actions of the individ­
ual in the capacity of citizen (rather than agent) are subject to ordinary standards 
of morality.
The analysis presented by Ladd arrives at this point with the conclusion that 
actions are subject to two entirely different and ofte;; incompatible standards:
social decisions are subject to the standard o f rational efficiency (utility) whereas 
the actions of individuals as such are subject to the ordinary standards of morality. 
(Ladd 1970: 501)
Ladd proceeds to a discussion o f the logical implications of this double standard 
for the relationship between organisations and individuals. He concludes that 
formal organisations cannot (for the reasons given above) assume a genuinely 
moral posture towards individuals. All purposive behaviour attributable to the 
organisation is a product of those principles relating to the objectives of the 
organisation. Moral principles are excluded as logically irrelevant, except where
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these principles set limiting operating conditions to the effectiveness of the 
organisation's operations or where the rights and interests o f individuals (de­
manded by morality) form part o f the organisation's goals; in the latter case it is 
not moral principle adopted by the organisation but instead the product o f moral 
principles taken as conducive to the interests of the organisation.
It would, on this language game analysis, be fatuous to consider it possible for an 
organisation to act or resist action on purely moral grounds, but it is normal to 
expect that the behaviour o f an organisation will take account o f prevailing moral 
requirements.
Let me sum up Ladd's position so far:
•  His conclusions in his paper relate only to the ideal-type, the theory o f how  
an organisation should be constructed and operated in order to accomplish 
its purpose with maximum efficiency; that is, a normative order consisting 
of a set o f non-moral rules of conduct.
•  This ideal makes demands upon the conduct o f its members.
•  Formal organisations are not moral persons and can have no moral rights 
(e.g. to freedom or autonomy).
•  There can be nothing morally wrong in exercis’ng coercion against a formal 
organisation as there would be in exercising it against the individual.
•  It would be irrational for moral persons to feel any scruples about what we 
do to organisations.21
• The individual members of the formal organisation must still be treated as 
moral persons with rights and responsibilities.
21 On this matter Ladd's is obviously ignoring the fact that my moral status may be judged not only 
by the object of my action but also the action alone. Cheating the organisation is still cheating and 
displays something about my moral status. Furthermore, if I blackmail my building society, I am 
doing something morally wrong in itself as well as doing a wrong to the investors?.
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Let me now state the problem that Ladd sees; there is a double standard of con­
duct which puts the individual in a condition referred to by Ladd as “moral 
schizophrenia”, which he characterises as a moral dilemma:
If we give up the standard of rationality e.g. o f organisational operations, then we 
surrender one of the chief conditions of civilised life and progress as well as the
hope of ever solving mankind's perennial problems of practical life ........ On the
other hand, if we give up the standards o f ordinary moral conduct, then in effect 
we destroy ourselves as moral beings. (Ladd 1970: 512).
Now, whilst Ladd recognises the sociological and psychological aspects o f the 
problem as important, he addresses himself to what he calls the “logico-ethical 
side that we cannot afford to ignore” (Ladd 1970: 512). He therefore seeks to 
pinpoint the “logical assumptions” in order to fmd an acceptable “solution o f the 
paradox - at least in its theoretical aspects”.
The origin of the dilemma rests in what Ladd calls a “causal theory o f action”. 
He states that this is a consequentialist theory which is taken for granted 
unquestioningly by many moral philosophers and is in fact “the general theory 
of action on which utilitarianism and other theories of rational behaviour are 
built.”
Ladd believes that a paradox arises from the notion uf an action that is performed 
by an individual or group of individuals but is attributed to the organisation rather 
than the individual. The connection with the causal theory o f action is through 
the idea that an action consists in causing change and the actions of formal 
organisations (social decisions) are on this view, causes o f change.
We can see, then, how the individual might lose all responsibility for the decisions 
of his organisation, if, as the causal theory supposes, moral responsibility is as­
similated to causal responsibility i.e. effectiveness. As the causal responsibility 
decreases, so does the moral responsibility. Hence, the less significant role a per­
son plays in the social process, the less moral responsibility a person has for it. 
(Ladd 1970: 514)
Chapter 1. T he M oral Responsibility o f  Corporations 60
Ladd is working on the assumption that organisational decisions are collective 
decisions; a potentially large number of social actions are collective actions there­
fore the part played by the individual “is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring 
about the change”. It is this view which leads to his conclusion that “the activities 
of the individual are simply lost in the social process”. Ladd is critical o f the as­
sumption that “the essence of an action is its producing an end state o f affairs” 
on the grounds that when this underpins the proposition that “an action is rational 
if and only if it is the best means of attaining one's objectives” , we are then 
committed to a definition o f rational behaviour in terms o f ends and means.
Essentially Ladd has applied a language game methodology as an analytical tool 
to explore the concept of the formal organisation and its relationship to its con­
stituent individuals. He demonstrates clearly that by applying his methodology 
to the ideal-type of bureaucracy that neither moral concepts nor person concepts 
are applicable to formal organisations. Whilst I find most of what he says agree­
able, I believe that Ladd has over complicated some aspects o f his analysis, and I 
shall address these now continuing the discussion in the context of the business 
corporation as a specific example of a formal organisation.
Reality Stops The game: Ladd's paper in general turns out to be a very strong 
presentation of objections to the very idea o f a corporate action and the ideal of 
rationality in formal organisations. I take issue w iti his view that acceptance of 
this concept of the organisational ideal commits one to the facets o f this concept 
which are incompatible with the ordinary principles of morality. I do not believe 
that we are forced into his “paradox” by the basic concepts o f organisational 
thinking. By going as far as he does with the ideal-type and the language game 
method of analysis, he defeats the arguments of those such as French whose 
muddled thinking carries imagination too far. But, his excellent use of the lan­
guage game as a tool of analysis is itself carried too far. Continuing with the game 
analogy, we might say that rain has stopped play! Reality interrupts this analysis, 
insofar we have to take account of the real world, namely the players. If one ac­
cepts the entire concept o f the ideal-type, then one can go the whole way with 
Ladd's argument and arrive at similar conclusions. However, I believe we need
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not go that far. When it comes to the notion of a dual role, forced on the indi­
vidual by virtue of the nature of the organisational ideal, he must drop the lan­
guage game method of analysis and permit reality to enter his reasoning. He needs 
to look a little more closely at the decision processes o f the business corporation 
for example. I intend to do that now and show that there is something missing 
which will colour the character o f the relationship between the corporation and 
the individual, and that is the role or function that the corporation plays in the 
community of its constituent members. That role is essentially a motivational 
function; it makes easier the alignment of the goals of those who direct the activ­
ities of the business enterprise, and those who are required to work toward 
achieving those goals. I shall begin with a confusion apparent in Ladd's paper.
Ladd seems to drift between his logico-ethical dilemma, (which is that we either 
have to jettison one or other of the standards of conduct), and a moral dilemma 
(in which the individual is required to act according to two standards o f conduct 
which present conflicting imperatives). Ladd says that “the dilemma arising out 
of the existence of two different standards is essentially a logical dilemma”(Ladd 
1970: 510). He identifies three propositions regarding action and responsibility 
that underpin the double standard of conduct emerging from the organisational 
language-game analysis of formal organisations, all of which depend upon the 
concept of a causal theory of action; summarized in Ladd's words, these are:-
1. A logically and ethically tenable distinction can be made between by a rep­
resentative (an actor) and the action itself, which is attributed to someone or 
something else (the author). When organisations act, the standards o f con­
duct are applied directly to the organisation, bypassing the decision-makers 
and the officers who carried out the action. The paradox arises from the idea 
of an action that is performed by an individual or group of individuals and 
is not attributed to them.
2. The decisions made by, or on behalf of, organisations are social decisions and 
may be considered as collective decisions, for the part played by any single 
official is neither necessary no sufficient to bring about change. If, as the 
causal theory of action supposes, moral responsibility is assimilated to causal
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responsibility, then moral action is understood in terms of its effectiveness. 
We can therofore see how the individual might lose all responsibility for the 
decisions of his organisation. As causal responsibility decreases, so does 
moral responsibility; thus the smaller the part one plays in a social action, the 
less responsibility will that actor bear. Only if we repudiate the causal theory 
of action and the implied assimilation of moral to causal responsibility will 
we be able to assess the actions of any particular official on their own merits.
3. An action is rational, according to the theory of social decisions, if and only 
if it is the best means of attaining one's objectives. This principle of 
rationality is based upon the assumption that the essence o f an action is its 
producing an end state o f affairs. Given the assimilation of moral responsi­
bility to causal responsibility, then moral action is subject to definition in 
terms of end and means.
The drift is evident in Ladd's description of what I believe to be a mistaken view 
of the plight of the individual. His logical dilemma arises from the double stand­
ard of conduct arising from the reasoning in the considerations listed above (rea­
soning which I believe to be flawed). The conflicting standards o f conduct Ladd 
seems to be troubled with are those moral imperatives which motivate individual 
moral action which result in the consequent attribution of responsibility (which I 
shall refer to as the individual standards) and “the standards of conduct applied to 
organisations, bypassing the individual decision-mal ers”,22 which I shall refer to 
as the rational or efficient.
Perhaps Ladd's example will make clearer just what his concern is. Consider the 
kind of action in which a number o f persons remove a table from a room by their 
joint efforts. The part played by the individual is that of a partial, contributing 
cause to the effect that defines the action. Most actions of formal organisations 
have this collective characteristic insofar as the part played by any single official 
can be lost in the complexity o f the social process and along with it . the responsi­
bility for the actions of his organisation is also lost (or diminished). Now this
22 Ladd 1970: 513.
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claim is very important to Ladd's case, but it is wrong. Responsibility is not di­
minished as a result of many hands contributing to an act. Formal organisations 
appoint responsible persons as officers (bearers of responsibility) and even where 
the act is morally reprehensible, collective action makes the actors no less re­
sponsible for what they do - they were all murderers who stabbed Ceaser.
Ladd goes on to point out that choices of decision makers are not attributed to 
the individual but instead to the organisation (or corporation); in doing so he is 
focusing on the aspect of the ideal type of formal organisation which has the un­
fortunate implication that a decision maker can resolve any dilemma posed by the 
two standards o f conduct by opting out of personal moral responsibility; the offi­
cer of the formal j. rganisation can immerse himself completely in the decision 
process o f the corporation, and become a non-moral functionary in the imper­
sonal formal organisation. Ladd's claim is that if we accept the basic concepts of 
organisational thinking, as he has elucidated in his paper, then we are forced into 
this kind of logico-ethical paradox; and on this basis he calls for a radical re­
examination of the theory of action underlying organisational thought and action.
The problem here is that if we accept the Ladd's analysis in full, or if we go all the 
way with the language game type o f analysis of formal organisations, then he is 
quite correct. However, we would be in danger o f accepting (and perhaps 
legitimising) a very questionable duality o f the decision maker in formal 
organisations.
In his paper on formal organisations, Ladd's presents an analysis which affords 
as much credibility as possible to his own interpretation of the ideal type so as to 
give himself something solid to knock down down when he criticises it later as 
generative of dual standards of conduct. The implication that this duality resents 
a dual moral role for the individual is Ladd's interpretation and not indeed a con­
sequence of accepting the validity of the ideal type as a characterisation of char­
acteristics of the formal organisation. To a very large extent his analysis exposes 
facets of the organisational ideal that most certainly accord with commonly ac­
cepted views of the nature of formal organisations in general and the business 
corporation in particular. His analysis delivers quite a devastating blow to the
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notion that a formal organisation can be a moral person. Furthermore, his anal­
ysis strengthens my argument throughout this thesis that a business corporation 
can best be described as a regulative device; a means o f relating superiors and 
subordinates in a reciprocal relationship which is designed to further the goals of 
the business corporation. The problem, with Ladd's discussion is that he goes so 
far with his game-theory method of analysis that he ends up with a quite ridicu­
lous conclusion: that the ideal type of formal organisation generates moral
schizophrenia by presenting and legitimising dual standards o f conduct. If we 
consider Ladd's discussion in terms of his objective, which is to address the in­
herent flaws in the causal theory of action (a theory which requires us to judge 
the intention of an action in terms of its outcome), then it becomes apparent that 
his discussion of the formal organisation is aimed more at scoring points against 
this consequentialist theory action more than casting light upon the nature o f the 
formal organisation.
The solution to the problem of corporate moral responsibility is hinted at in 
Ladd's flawed reasoning when he discusses the three propositions regarding action 
and responsibility that underlie the causal theory o f action. Ladd talks about of­
ficers of the organisation. By definition, officers hold office; along with office 
comes identified role with defined limits of responsibility and authority. The of­
ficer of the organisation who makes a decision which is wrong has either gone 
beyond his responsibility, or has not exercised the quality o f judgement 
commensurate with the office he holds. It is because we want to know who 
should take responsibility for particular judgements and actions that the concept 
of office is applied to organisational behaviour. By appointing officers we avoid 
the problem of individuals seeking to take a non-moral stance when deciding and 
acting on behalf of organisations. There is no dual role: it is individual persons 
who appoint officers and who are appointed as officers and these individual per­
sons are human beings. Thus, there is no problem of conflicting moral motives 
for there is no dual role.
Regarding the problem of identifying the persons responsible for an organisations 
conduct, Ladd has made a further error. He describes the organisational decision
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as a type of social decision, then classes this social decision in the same category 
as a collective decision. It is worth stressing again at this point the distinction 
between these types of decision. A collective decision has no owner and is a 
product of an informal organisation. An organisational decision has an owner 
insofar as someone has to take responsibility for organisational decisions; if no one 
has the responsibility attached to their corporate role, then at a suitable level of 
seniority in the organisation, responsibility will be taken (either to implement the 
decision or to delegate responsibility for its implementation). If organisational 
conduct is to be questioned, there is an organised allocation of offices to particular 
individuals who are responsible for providing answers. When wrong has been 
done and no respor sible officer can be found, then move up the organisational 
hierarchy because at some point the buck stops - ultimately responsibility rests at 
directors' level.
The distinction between collective and organisational decisions is indeed thrown 
into sharp focus when we look at the business corporation. Although in many 
formal organisations the offices may not be so clearly identified and allocated, in 
a formal organisation then they should be, and if not then the person who is re­
sponsible for allocating office on behalf of the organisation will be held responsible 
for that organisation's conduct. It is delegation of authority and responsibility that 
marks the characteristic difference between formal ar i informal organisations.
Let me take these criticisms further by examining Ladd's endeavour in some more 
detail but with the business corporation as an example of the formal organisation. 
Considering the “moral schizophrenia” that Ladd believes the dual standards of 
conduct would lead to, the corporate decision maker would be foolish not to pay 
heed to prevailing moral standards in the community, but corporate decisions (like 
all social decisions) are subject to the standards of rational efficiency whereas the 
ordinary standards of morality guide the actions of individuals:
An action that is right from the point of view o f one of these standards may be
wrong from the point o f view of the other. (Ladd 1970: 501)
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Ladd claims that the moral schizophrenia which this leads to will prompt the in­
dividual to retreat to the comfort and protection of the corporation to resolve the 
dilemma. The relative anonymity of the collective action allows the agent o f the 
corporation to put his moral judgement aside and make decisions or take actions 
which conform to the objectives o f the organisation. The individual deliberation 
process can, in the extreme, choose not to consult one's own conscience, but take 
as a guide the published principles or beliefs o f the corporation.
I remind my reader that whilst the secretary's situation is an example o f this, it is 
not a moral dilemma! Rather, it is simply a matter of deciding whether to do the 
morally right thing and not tell a lie, or be prudent and do what she is told. There 
is no moral dilemn.a here; there are just two possible perceptions the individual 
might have.
•  different spheres which don't conflict - moral and prudential
•  higher-ordering of one role above the other.23
There is no moral schizophrenia either, although there may well be moral myopia.
It is not characteristic of organisations in general that employees are required 
employees to behave in a morally reprehensible manner. One might point to a 
particular organisation as a example where morally wrong behaviour is required, 
but this does not validate the general point that Ladd is making. Furthermore, if 
I am a member of such an organisation and I know that it makes this requirement 
of me then there is no question that I will frequently fmd myself, as a moral per­
son, in a dilemma - do I be moral or be prudent.24 Ladd's claim that the formal 
structure of the ideal type of organisation generates a dual standard of action is just 
wrong. The standard of action in matters moral is the same within and without
23 For some, conscience is the highest-ordered role. For others, notably Hegel, the highest-ordered role 
is that of subject and citizen of the state.
24 See my earlier discussion o f the example of the secretary for the structure of the type of dilemma 
generated by organisations.
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the organisation, so there is no moral schizophrenia. If we consider the 
organisational role o f both the secretary and the boss, there is no moral dilemma 
either. The boss would be acting against the interests of the organisational inter­
ests if as a general principle he instructs people to behave in a morally wrong 
manner; nor is it in the corporate interest that the secretary's loyalty is to the boss 
rather than to the organisation as her employer. In other words, it is when the 
secretary steps out o f the organisational role that matters o f breaking a confidence 
or telling a lie function as moral matters. Whilst in their organisational roles the 
issues are clear, the bor.s will dismiss the secretary if his instructions are not carried 
out. Under these circumstances, the boss's behaviour may be morally wrong and 
is likely to contradict,business conduct guidelines, but my dilemma as secretary is 
whether to be moral or be prudent, for I am not free to make the morally right 
decision without penalty. In reality, this is the way of things in the business cor­
poration.
The formal organisation in general is a “continuous organisation o f official func­
tions bound by rules”25 and they are “planned units, deliberately structured for the 
purpose of attaining specific goals” (Etzioni 1964: 4). It is these goals that con­
stitute the foundation for decisions to be taken. In fact, if a decision or act is 
carried through without reference to these goals then the consequences will at best 
be merely contingently furthering the aims of the 01 ganisation and at worst con­
tradicting the stated corporate goals.26
Ladd is quite right when he compares corporate decision making to a game. It is 
unlike personal decision making in many ways and as will be seen below, it is 
useful to follow the line Ladd takes but with corporations as a specific example 
of the type of formal organisation he discusses.
25 Max Weber, quoted in Etzioni 1964: 53.
26 See Simon, 1965, and Blau & Scott, 1962, for an informative discussion o f the characteristics of 
formal organisations.
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The rules of decision making in a corporation exist either explicitly in a written 
code of conduct or implicitly in the corporate culture. In either case these rules, 
according to organisational theory, constitute a normative (non-moral) system of 
behaviour which also specifies the decision making process and the steps toward 
attaining the corporate goals. In other words, attaining the goal is not sufficient 
in itself as criterion of a correct decision or action, it is also necessary to observe 
and follow the process of corporate decision making. Just as a game is defined by 
its rules, the corporate endeavour is defined by its processes, procedures and goals. 
Not only can a corporate decision be judged on how it contributes to a corporate 
goal, it can also be judged on the conformity o f the decision making to the cor­
porate procedure. In which case if there is uncertainty on which decision will 
contribute most directly to the corporate goal, there can be more certainty in re­
spect of which decision in accordance with the corporate procedure. Just as one 
might change a game by changing the rules, on might change the corporation by 
changing either its procedures, or its goals, or both. The upshot o f this discussion 
is as follows.
1. The Simple View: Other people (or society) may make moral claims on the 
individual of the kinds:
a. do not infringe my rights
b. contribute to my welfare „
Business corporations cannot make moral claims of this sort upon their em­
ployees (perhaps the language of loyalty is an attempt to conceal this), al­
though they can make claims arising out of contracts.
2. The Complex View: Business corporations can make moral claims. For ex­
ample, passing secrets on to your next employer is morally as well as legally 
wrong. Also, and interestingly too, a corporation might have its own moral 
rules (for example, we are an equal opportunities employer, therefore equal 
pay, no sexual harassment etc).
Now it is quite possible to identify instances where the rules o f the corporation 
may be considered as moral rules (such as prohibitions on salesmen that they may
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not criticise their competitors) and these may well be enforced, even when they 
work against its prudential interests.
Corporate Decisions and Corporate Actions: When a decision is made by follow­
ing corporate procedure it becomes a corporate decision, and if a decision is made 
which does not conform to the procedure, then it is an individual decision. Re­
gardless of the representatives involved in the decision making process it is a cor­
porate decision if:
•  it is made with the aim of furthering the objectives of the corporation
•  it conforms to corporate procedure
•  the decision maker has the correct level o f authority
These are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a decision to qualify as a 
corporate decision.
Take a decision or action which meets the above criteria yet is later deemed as a 
wrong decision (that is to say, the corporation was seen not be benefit from that 
decision or action): what would be the consequences for ownership o f the decision? 
It would still be a corporate decision but the individual responsible within the 
corporation may be subject to a role change or even excluded from the 
organisation if the mistake were serious enough. For example, the Company 
Treasurer makes a decision to invest cash in the overnight money markets and 
loses. Although this is indeed a corporate decision (or action), it is not a good  
decision. It meets the necessary criteria, but it throws into question the capacity 
of the individual to make corporate decisions. If the outcome is serious enough 
or repeated often enough, then it could bring about the demotion or dismissal of 
the Treasurer. Consider a similar situation, but where the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of a corporate decision are not met, and the outcome actually furthers 
the goals o f the corporation, it may be the case that the corporation will take 
ownership of the decision or action after the event. Such an approval would only 
be given if the corporation could do so without risking its own existence.
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A corporate agent acting outside of his authority may well cause the corporation 
to be bound by such a decision which, though not legitimate within the corpo­
ration, is in fact legally binding on the corporation. For example, the carpet 
salesman guarantees his carpets will not stain regardless of the substances that the 
customer might spill on them. He makes this statement to ensure that he makes 
the sale, but has no authority to do so. This action on the part o f the salesman 
is not legitimate within the organisation, but the customer can make a compen­
sation claim on the company (not the salesman) if it is found not to be true. Even 
if an agent makes a decision which is subsequently found to be contrary to the 
best interests o f the corporation but is within the scope o f his authority and binds 
the corporation to that decision, the agent may be held personally responsible 
through the exercise of bad judgement (within the corporation), but the individual 
is not personally responsible for the consequences outside o f the corporation. 
Thus, it is required of the agent that the interests of the corporation take preced­
ence over his personal interests; this is a prerequisite for the acceptance o f au­
thority. If an agent accepts the authority and has no intention o f acting in the best 
interests of the corporation then the authority is undermined and his actions may 
well be illegal.
The role of the corporate decision maker is therefore considered to be impersonal 
in that the individual is acting in a representative capacity. Such decisions are 
made for the corporation with the aim of pur .aing the objectives o f the 
organisation, and not as a means of furthering personal interests.
In the business corporation, the assignment of roles and responsibilities creates an 
essential distinction between collective and corporate decision making. Consider 
Weber's view of the formal organisation quoted earlier as a “continuous 
organisation o f official functions bound by rules” On this view, the corporate 
decision is directly attributable to the corporation and, because o f the official na­
ture of functions, the individuals in their corporate role can be identified with 
corporate decisions, whereas a collective decision implies no assignment of au­
thority. A corporate decision, like that taken by an officer of a formal 
organisation, is a representative decision, it has an owner, despite our views on the
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description we might be inclined to apply to a corporation. Contrasted with an 
informal organisation, it is reasonable to consider that the collective decision has 
no owner since it is an aggregate of individual decisions.27
It is here that the notion o f agency arises again. Whilst we ordinarily consider that 
the role of the decision maker requires that he act as an agent o f the corporation, 
there is often the unstated assumption that the genuine corporate decisions he 
makes are not his, since he is not acting in his own interests but in the corporate 
interest. To ask therefore, who is the real or rightful owner o f the corporate de­
cision, consider Hobbes on authority:
....Some have the* : words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And 
then the person is the Actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the 
AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acteth by Authority....So that by Authority, 
is always understood a Right of doing any act: and done by Authority, done by 
Commission, or Licence from him whose right it is. From hence it followeth, that 
when the Actor maketh a Covenant by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, 
no less than if he had made it himself; and no less subjecteth him to all the con­
sequences of the same. (Hobbes Leviathan Ch 16).
It is in this Hobbesian sense that corporate decisions or actions are carried out. 
The wider business community may recognise the corporation as the owner o f the 
decisions or actions of the officials acting in the cap?.. :ity of official or agent o f the 
corporation, but a corporate decision may well be recognised as a decision of a 
particular individual but this is of no consequence outside the corporation. The 
corporation is bound by such decisions o f their agents acting both within and 
sometimes outwith their authority.
For an agent to act on behalf of a corporation, the agent must be able to make 
decisions or take actions after taking into account the best interests o f the corpo-
27 Now one might object that I have not explained how a corporation hires an agent, and in any case 
such an explanation is prone to criticism on the grounds o f a regress; Note that in the formation 
of a business organisation, this matter is addressed by the appointment of officers o f the company.
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ration. It is necessary therefore that the corporation spell out exactly what its aims 
and objectives are, and the procedures an agent should follow in order to act in 
its best interests.
Ladd considers that corporate decisions must take as their value premises, the 
goals and objectives set for and by the corporation. Authority to take corporate 
decisions exists only insofar as corporate interests are being served. Should an 
agent take decisions on any other basis, his authority is no longer justified. If 
decisions are taken to serve interests other than those of the corporation it is rather 
like cheating in a game. For example, if it is in the interests o f my employer that 
I seek to recruit the services of a good engineer, and I follow the necessary pro­
cedures and complete the recruitment, then I have met the requirements o f the 
office I hold. However, if it turns out that the engineer had paid me to recruit him 
then I have abused my authority by serving my own interests and only 
contingently served the corporate interests; I have in these circumstances acted 
outwith and perhaps contrary to the requirements of my authority.
In essence, the very idea of a corporate decision necessarily implies a value system 
as a reference in the deliberation process. This value system gets its expression in 
the corporate goals, objectives and procedures. A decision or action based upon 
any other values is not a corporate decision but in fact an individual decision. 
We can therefore make sense not only o f the distinction between an individual 
decision and a corporate decision, but also Understand the distinction between a 
good corporate decision and a bad one, without reference to morality.
Ladd points out that, on his interpretation of the ideal-type, the real goal o f an 
organisation is the set of objectives used as a basis for prescribing and justifying 
the actions and decisions of the organisation itself, thus distinguishing between 
corporate decisions and individual or personal decisions within the organisation.
As such, then, the goal is an essential element in the language game of a formal 
organisation's activities in somewhat the same way as the goal o f checkmating the 
king is an essential element in the game o f chess. (Ladd 1970: 495).
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Having specific goals is a distinctive characteristic of formal organisations. Com­
munities for example, do not have goals as a necessary aspect o f their existence. 
Following the reasoning here, the very idea of a corporate decision or action is 
logically inseparable from the corporate goals and objectives. Consequently, 
action and aim are inseparable to the extent that a corporate decision or action 
not related to the corporate aims makes no sense. It is an unintelligible notion 
within language-game of formal organisations.
On this account a corporate decision is good
1. if the decision process is in accordance with that laid down by the corpo­
ration; and
2. is within the scope of authority o f the decision maker; and
3. it contributes to the goals o f the corporation.
the sole standard for the evaluation o f an organisation, its activities and its deci­
sions is its effectiveness in achieving its objectives within the framework o f existing 
conditions and available means. (Ladd 1970: 497)
Applied to the business corporation and using the language o f modem manage­
ment literature, the effectiveness is often described as rationality. Corporate deci­
sions and actions are rational in terms o f conseque ices. The term rationality as 
applied to corporate decisions requires reference to a corporate goal, otherwise it 
is not an intelligible concept. A rational decision is one which is efficient in pur­
suing a corporate goal, but it is neutral in terms o f the particular nature o f the goal.
Behaviour....is rational insofar as it selects alternatives which are conducive to the 
achievement of previously selected goals. (Simon 1965: 5)
Whilst this account of rationality is simply stated, there is no doubt that the con­
cept of rationality used here is not ethically neutral. In fact there is little to be 
gained, and perhaps much confusion created in the use of the term at all when 
applied in this sense to corporations:
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To a philosopher it is clear that the technical use of rationality as it is found in 
social theory, for example, in the writings o f Weber and Simon, amounts to a 
persuasive definition. Like the other terms used in these analyses that carry 
ethical-emotive meanings, for example, good  and should, they attest to a covert 
endorsement of a certain kind of formal organisation, one structured according 
to the principle of efficiency they set forth. Despite asservations to the contrary 
they are not value free. (Ladd 1970: 497 - 498 )
Continuing with I .add's theme of the organisational language-game, we can say 
that in deliberation about corporate decisions only those considerations related to 
the achievement of the corporate goals are relevant. But Ladd is fundamentally 
wrong when he uses the technical term language-game as used by philosophers to 
charcterise the processes of justification employed within a corporation in such a 
way as to isolate corporate activities from outside (the language-game) criticism. 
In doing so he ends up with a line of argument which runs as follows:
•  Weber's ideal-type can be formulated as a way of representing a kind o f ra­
tional moral order and it can also be construed as describing a certain lan­
guage game.
•  The language game as advanced by Wittgenstein and others, is a useful tool 
of analysis; it can enable us to describe an activity by reference to a set of rules 
that determine not only what should or should not be done but also how  
what is done is to be rationally evaluated and defended and does so without 
committing ourselves to whether or not the evaluation and/or defence is 
moral evaluation (or defence).
•  Morality can only enter into practical reasoning as an ethical premise, so 
organisational decisions must take as their ethical premises the objectives that 
have been set for the organisation.
•  Social decisions and organisational decisions are not and cannot be governed 
by the principles of morality, therefore we cannot expect formal 
organisations, or their representatives acting in their official capacities, to be 
honest, courageous, sympathetic, considerate or to have any kind of moral 
integrity.
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Now, Ladd does not of course agree with this concept of organisations that he is 
attacking. But given that he construed the organisational ideal in terms of a 
language-game, and it was he who advocates the use of the Wittgensteinian model 
of language game analysis to analyse the Weberian ideal-type, what else can we 
make of his endeavour when he also complains that:
Certain facets o f the organisational ideal are incompatible with the ordinary prin­
ciples o f morality. (Ladd 1970: 488)
I think that Ladd has in fact gone a long way toward building his conclusion into 
the premises of his argument. It is he, Ladd, who cleverly uses the language-game 
method of analysis to examine one formulation o f the formal organisation (the 
ideal-type) which lends itself well to that method. It is certainly not surprising that 
he draws his logico-ethical conclusion that the individual has two criteria of right 
action, the rational and the moral. What is surprising is that Ladd does not seem 
to recognise that this is not a moral dilemma. As I have indicated earlier; if cir­
cumstances require that as member of the organisation to decide on action X, 
whilst I consider that from a moral point of view I ought to choose action Y, then 
there is no moral dilemma. The position is clear. I have only one moral option. 
There is the possibility o f a moral dilemma if I consider that following corporate 
procedures, or pursuing corporate objectives, is moral and this moral imperative 
exists alongside a completely a different but equally valid and compelling moral 
imperative in my private life as an individual outside the corporation. However, 
such a dilemma will only prevail if at the level o f assumptions, I accept that fol­
lowing corporate procedures is a moral alternative to my status as a moral being 
in my own right. The paradox which Ladd believes we are forced into by ac­
cepting the basic concepts of organisational thinking is at a deeper level. He 
claims that the basic concepts o f organisational thinking forces us into two stand­
ards o f  conduct; the ordinary standards o f  individual action and the standards o f  
corporate action. My counter claim is that Ladd has built the grounds of this, 
claim into his analysis and when the organisational ideal is fully understood, the 
ordinary standards of individual moral conduct prevail: there are no conflicting or 
competing standards o f organisational conduct beyond the law itself
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The individual, remains a moral agent whether he is a member of one or many 
formal or informal organisations. The moral status of the moral agent does not 
change with a visible or invisible uniform. For example, when the law is broken, 
the State will hold responsible the individual or the corporation depending upon 
how that law is framed. It makes little difference whether we can find the actual 
decision maker when we want to hold someone responsible for a corporate deci­
sion; if we cannot, fmd the right person in the particular department, then the boss 
will do! If we cannot find the department boss, then his boss will do! That is the 
basis upon which responsibility is allocated in formal organisations. Along with 
the level of authority that an individual member enjoys in his corporate appoint­
ment, comes the corresponding level of responsibility. If as a senior manager, I 
am responsible for the safety of the whole factory, then I have the authority to 
stop production if I need to do so on grounds o f safety, regardless o f the demands 
of my superiors. If I am over-ruled, then not only is my authority undermined, 
but my responsibility will also be seen to be diminished, and if I were to be held 
to account in a court of law, then the course o f justice will show this to be the 
case. Furthermore, if in the lowly position o f a shop floor worker, I am respon­
sible for my own safety and that of the colleagues working with me, I will inherit 
the corresponding level of responsibility.
The law is enforced throughout the formal organisation through offices and roles; 
authority and responsibility is regulated in the same manner. If an individual de­
cides to follow a course of action dictated by corporate objectives and procedures, 
and this conflicts with the law of the society in which the corporation operates, 
then the individual is held responsible and the corporation as a legal entity (or le­
gal person) may also be held responsible, but when this individual was at the de­
liberation stage, he had no legal dilemma. He might have had the choice to do 
what is legal or to follow corporate procedures and break the law, but this is not 
a dilemma; his corporation does not stand apart from society with its own legal 
system. Corporate procedures and objectives are framed within the context o f a 
legal system. If they are illegal, then the corporation runs foul o f the law, and if 
the corporate member pursues these procedures and objectives, he joins in the
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illegality of the corporation. What he cannot do is stand back and say that the 
corporation is responsible and he is not.
My claim is that in these respects of legal responsibility (considerations o f strict 
liability, perhaps aside), the principles of law follow the principles employed in 
assigning moral responsibility, that there is no problem in recognising that the 
ordinary principles of morality prevail within and without the corporation. If a 
member of the corporation behaves in a morally reprehensible way, not only will 
the wider community recognise and judge his moral behaviour as his, but so ought 
the population of the corporation, even if his behaviour met with all the standards 
of rational action from the corporate point o f view. If a corporation has proce­
dures and objecth es which the wider community judge to be morally 
reprehensible, then we would be right to condemn it as though it were a person. 
If we cannot identify decision makers when a corporation acts, then we simply 
condemn the corporation, and hold responsible the most appropriate senior 
member in the chain of command.
From a moral point of view, we can find the best way to treat a corporation 
without having to engage in the intellectually tortuous task of applying person 
concepts. Just as there is no legal schizophrenia and no legal dilemma, there is 
no moral schizophrenia and no moral dilemma. Other than our intuitive treat­
ment of the corporation as a person, there is no moral concept of person appli­
cable to a corporation.
The individuals constituting a corporation are also moral agents constituting so­
ciety and must be treated as such, unless a case can be made to the contrary.
What then is the nature of the relationship between the corporation and its con­
stituent individuals? One answer to this is that the corporation as an entity has 
no relation to the individuals, but instead, the corporation is the relation between 
each individual member and nothing more. Now it might be thought that my 
dismissal of the the notion of a corporation as a full fledged member of the moral 
community commits me to the other popular view of corporations and commu­
nity in general; that of individualism. I do not believe it does, and I shall try to
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show this by way of a discussion o f a very successful management method, or 
practice, which has taken many forms, but is popularly known and identified as 
management by objectives.
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Chapter 2. Individualism and Management.
I shall now discuss the context in which individuals relate to one another in the 
modem business corporation in terms of a typical example o f how the corporation 
is managed, namely, management by objectives,28 If the corporation is nothing more 
than the relationship between each o f the constituent members, whether that be 
mediated through groups and sub-groups within the corporation, it should be 
possible to draw upon the explanatory power of individualism by way of an 
understanding of MBO. Let me begin with some well worn remarks on 
individualism.
The principle of individualism (or methodological individualism as it is often 
called) can be expressed as follows:
Individual persons constitute the social world; the psychological dispositions o f the 
individual, together with his understanding of his situation form the basis o f his 
actions; every complex social situation or event is the result o f a particular con­
figuration of individuals, their dispositions, beliefs and situations. (Hayeck 1964: 
54-55)
Note that an elaboration of criteria for acceptable social explanation is not con­
cerned with the logical or structural features of explanation; that is, the logical re­
lation holding between explanans and explanandum. Rather, individualism 
requires a material criterion; that is, the content of a social explanans must be 
psychological, which is to say that it must be stated in terms of situations, dispo­
sitions and beliefs.
28 Hereafter referred to as MBO.
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The relation between the individual and the collectives of which he is a constituent 
member, is a highly complex matter which gives rise to two diametrically opposed 
views about the nature of social groupings and processes, individualism and 
holism. Although one can identify this very general distinction in differing social 
analyses, it would be wrong to imply that if one is not an individualist then he 
must be a holist (and vice versa). Rather, these should be seen as crude terms 
which express a tendency to one or other end of a continuum which at one ex­
treme is ontological individualism, the view that social entities have no reality over 
and above the composite individuals and at the other, ontological holism, 
epitomised by Durkheim's view that:
society is not a mere sum of individuals. Rather, the system formed by their as­
sociation represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics ........  The
collective being is a being in its own right  Collective ways of acting or thinking
have a reality outside of the individuals who, at every moment o f time, conform 
to them. These ways of thinking and acting exist in their own right. The individual 
finds them completely formed and he cannot evade or change them.29
Consider, then, the individualism/holism debate in the context o f a business cor­
poration.30 The terms individualistic and individualism will suffice as expressions 
for the view that social entities have no reality over a d above the individuals who 
constitute them; all social phenomena can, in principle, be fully explained in terms 
of the psychological (or dispositional) and situational characteristics o f the indi­
viduals involved.
29 Durkheim 1964: 103 and 124 lvi.
30 In doing so, it will be more productive to drop the term methodological individualism since it is 
rather long winded, mysterious and a positive barrier to a clear understanding o f the issues to be 
discussed.
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Situational Characteristics
Let me now outline the situational characteristics of the social process generated 
by the management of the labour force of a business corporation.
As a function of human resource management, labour relations31 are o f the utmost 
importance as a determinant of the productivity o f a firm's employees. Thus, the 
method of business management forms the basis o f the extractive skills o f the 
organisation. With this in mind, consider the practice o f MBO, where the 
extractive skills of management form an intrinsic part of the relationship between 
the manager as agent of the organisation and the employee as a seemingly separate 
entity.
Stated briefly, MBO is a method of management requiring a very high degree of 
employee participation; it is effected by each manager, acting as an agent o f the 
company or business enterprise, negotiating and agreeing upon a set o f objectives 
to be achieved by the individual employee within a given time frame. The agreed 
objectives constitute the performance criteria against which the individual's con­
tribution to the goals of the company can be assessed. The assessment merits a 
rating which determines the occupational future of the employee in terms o f salary 
level, promotion, demotion and ultimately dismissal. Thus where MBO is 
practised in conjunction with a classical hierarchical structure o f management, and 
applied throughout the company, it is obvious that at every level o f the manage­
ment structure, each manager32 is both an agent of the organisation negotiating 
objectives to be met by his subordinates, and at the same time a subordinate in­
dividual employee in his own right, attempting to meet the objectives that he has
31 In order to keep this discussion within the context of the business corporation, I work on the as­
sumption that there is little or no controversy in citing the labour relations o f a business corporation 
as an appropriate example of a social process in action.
32 Note that the manager is at all times in a complex role, having the role o f agent o f the employer 
acting as a superior with power and influence over one or more subordinates, but at the same time, 
an individual employee subordinate to one or more superiors.
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negotiated with his superior. Characterised in this way it is difficult to see an 
organisation such as the business enterprise as anything other than aggregate or 
configuration of actions, attitudes and circumstances of the constituent individ­
uals.
The above situational characteristics entail an explanation o f the company's per­
formance purely in terms of the extent to which the individuals achieve their 
agreed objectives.
Dispositional Characteristics
The dispositional a pect of this social process, consists in the aims, beliefs and 
attitudes of each individual interacting in the man/manager relationship.
Given that objectives must be agreed, what can be the parameters o f agreement? 
The answer to such a question must rest upon at least one basic assumption; that 
the enterprise, whatever else it does, must have objectives which will secure its 
present and future existence in the most efficient and effective manner. A typical 
expression of corporate goals could be as follows.33
•  Increase Profit
•  Increase Market Share
•  Grow with the Industry
•  Be a Low Cost Producer
•  Pursue a Sustainable Competitive Advantage
In order that the corporation realise its goals, there must be an efficient and ef­
fective exploitation of resources, which of course includes human resources (the 
labour pool). An efficient exploitation of resources may be expressed in simplistic 
fashion as a measure calculated on the basis of the relationship o f output to input, 
of yield to investment and so on, but an effective exploitation o f resources may
33 It has been argued, in contrast, that securing autonomy, economic growth and survival are the real 
goals of the corporation; see Galbraith 1967: 171 - 178.
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be quite different. For example, if I wanted to produce motor vehicles, a simple 
calculation might show that an assembly line method where there is one man to 
each task, is the most efficient exploitation o f all resources. However, if it is also 
my aim to stay in business as long as possible and not go for a quick profit and 
run, it would be prudent to ensure that my workers' motivation is high. This 
could be by way of job enrichment as a useful motivational device, in which case 
my production methods might vary to the extent that 1 would sacrifice a measure 
of productivity to gain a relatively high, yet sustainable performance from the 
workforce. Therefore, a lower level of efficiency than the optimum will suffice. 
In such a situation, an effective exploitation of resources will be the context in 
which efficiency will be pursued. Efficiency will, in this instance, consist in ob­
taining a maximum output from a minimum input over the longest possible time 
period, where sustainable productivity levels take priority over maximising output 
in anything other than a loss-making situation.
In short, an efficient and effective exploitation of resources will ensure the maxi­
mum possible return for the minimum of input over the longest possible time 
period. In other words, a break-even performance over a very long time period 
will often be considered as better than a quick profit which is likely to render the 
corporation inoperable. The point being stressed here is that since otherwise ir­
relevant factors in an efficiency calculation may have to be taken into account, a 
more complex criterion of efficiency than a simple input/output relationship may 
be needed to assess a company's performance.
However, in the light of the above economic assumption of longevity as a goal 
of the corporation, the parameters of agreement in the negotiation o f employee 
objectives can now be expressed in terms o f the expectations or motives of the 
MBO participants.
Continuing with the analysis of MBO from the perspective now of the individual 
employee, self interest will lead to the following:
•  the rational individual, acting for himself, will seek to obtain agreement on 
those objectives which yield the maximum reward for the minimum of effort.
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In other words, he will try to set objectives that he knows he can achieve with 
sufficient ease to enable him to continue working as long as it is physically 
possible; that is, the maximum of reward for minimum effort over the longest 
possible time frame without endangering his continued employment.
•  the manager as agent of the organisation, will seek agreement with his sub­
ordinate on those objectives which yield the maximum output for the mini­
mum of reward to the subordinate, which is in line with the aims o f the 
organisation.
On the individualistic assumption that it is in the nature o f the worker to be ra­
tional and self interested, it is these two considerations which form the parameters 
of agreement between the parties.
From the viewpoint of the participant employee, the aim in this social process of 
agreeing objectives is the pursuit of his self interest. From the point of view of the 
manager, we may say that his motivation is no less a pursuit o f self interest since 
the greater the contribution of each member of his department against a limited 
reward, the greater will be his contribution to the goals of the corporation: bearing 
in mind of course that the department's contribution to these goals will form the 
basis of the department manager's objectives agreed between himself and his su­
perior. However, in the manager's role o f subordim e agreeing objectives with his 
own superior, the manager can be expected to pursue agreement on those objec­
tives which will yield maximum reward for a minimum of effort on his -part.
In summary, the dispositional characteristics o f the members of the corporation 
are characterised as systematic pursuit o f reward and avoidance o f punishment of 
the individual. All of this is based upon assumptions that the employee is a ra­
tional and self interested, reward orientated being, a view which is somewhat ob­
vious, given my discussion o f Motivation and Payment in the Introduction to this 
essay.
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Motivation and Management By Objectives
Having described the situational and dispositional characteristics o f a represen­
tative man, or typical employee, from the point of view of individualism, there is 
a lot still to be explained. Let me, therefore, review the account of MBO from the 
perspective of the participant. If we suppose that the success o f this social process 
(produced by the interaction of the individuals negotiating and pursuing their ob­
jectives) does not amount to anything more than the individuals and their hopes, 
fears, beliefs, desires and actions, then we are left with a problem: how to explain 
away confounding consequences, such as the unbridled competition in search of 
an ever-increasing value of reward, which would be known by the rational partic­
ipants to be an umealistic pursuit in a situation of finite resources. MBO as a 
system of managing people, assumes and requires that each employee will not only 
compete for a share from the wages pot but also seek to maximise that share.
Consider again the individualist account of self interest as a motivator; there is 
some ground for revision o f the view we have taken of the manager's intentions. 
It would appear that both in his management and subordinate roles, he will pursue 
his self interest, and in doing so, then it is only coincidental that he pursues the 
corporation's interests when negotiating objectives with his subordinate. By pur­
suing his own interests, he contingently pursues the corporation's end, that is, the 
extraction of a maximum of effort for a minimurr o f reward over the longest 
possible time frame, thereby promoting his own ead. To say that an employee 
who consistently fails to perform to the standards required by his objectives will, 
ultimately be dismissed, is not to explain his motivation to identify with and ac­
tively pursue the corporation's interests. Such an explanation merely accounts for 
the minimum of effort from an unwilling participant. The totally self interested 
rational participant would want to maximise the pay-off for the minimum of effort 
over the longest possible time period. His efficiency criterion would be no differ­
ent from that of the corporation but directed towards his own interests it could 
be only contingently in the interests of the corporation, but perhaps contrary (in 
some instances) to the corporation's interests. If his motive in participation was 
to avoid dismissal, he would seek agreement on those objectives which would
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ensure the minimum contribution to the goals of the corporation which would at 
the same time secure his continued employment. He would then settle for the best 
pay-off that such a strategy would yield. As long as he was interested in staying 
with the corporation, he would avoid risk taking where the cost would be the loss 
of his job. Under such circumstances, the participant could not be described as 
attempting to maximise his share o f the wages pot.
It is no more adequate to explain self interest as a motivator in terms o f reward, 
since, it would be obvious to the participants that not every employee can receive 
a reward to match their expectations in a situation of finite resources. It is ques­
tionable whether everyone would compete, since the prospect o f a modest reward 
for modest effort wculd tend to be more attractive to a significant portion of the 
population. But this would merely reduce the number of competitors but not the 
ferocity and selfish nature of the competition for reward among those who decided 
to have a go\ it would diminish the hunger but not the greed. Fierce competition 
would predominate in working life and the whole social process o f the business 
activity, to the extent that it would be counterproductive since it would rule out 
the cooperation required for the corporation to pursue its goals. Cooperation is 
at the heart of MBO, and I would suggest that any management method must, 
by its nature, seek to organise productive endeavour and to do so cooperation is 
the basis upon which a competitive environment must be structured. This is not 
to say that competition is always a destructive influe ice; rather, the point is that, 
in general, competition without cooperation has no limit and no direction, and 
this individualistic account o f MBO leaves no room for the cooperation which is 
at the heart of this*management method. There are examples from game theory 
which support this view of the connection between competition and 
cooperation.34
Consider for example, the well known and much abused example of a prisoner s 
dilemma, where a prosecutor detains two accused persons, (person A and person 
B), in solitary confinement with no means o f communication. Each prisoner is
34 See Rapoport 1970, also Axelrod 1981 and 1985. 
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then presented with an option o f confessing or not confessing to the crime with 
which they are charged. They are then informed that on condition that they both 
confess, each will get a ten year sentence for a much less severe charge of being 
present at the scene of a crime by persons unknown. If one confesses and the 
other does not, then the confessant will receive only one year in jail whilst the 
accomplice will get a twenty year sentence for both the crime and obstructing 
justice. They both know that if both stay silent they will get only a minor sen­
tence of about two years due to insufficient evidence. Now it can be seen that 
each prisoner has two strategies, confess or stay silent. The pay-offs can be written 
in a matrix to represent a non-zero- sum game as shown below.
A/B B Stays Silent B Confesses
A Stays Silent 2, 2 20, 1
A Confesses 1, 20 10, 10
The confess strategy for A and for B is better if they do not trust each other (1 is 
better than 2, and 10 is better than 20). Suppose, however, that the accused are 
permitted to consider their decision together, and decide to cooperate, they would 
reason as follows. If both confess they get 10 years each; if both stay silent they 
get 2 years each; the best strategy for both therefore s to stay silent. On the other 
hand, if they decide to compete for the best possible outcome with no cooperation 
with each other, then it is in the best interests each to confess immediately. The 
dilemma is now apparent, trust or not trust.
It is obvious that the 10, 10 outcome is a “reasonable”35 outcome for each indi­
vidual seeking to avoid the 20 year sentence, but it is clearly undesirable for the 
players as a group. If they trusted each other, the total pay-off to their group
35 It is of course common to use this example in support o f particular views on rationality. I do not 
believe a discussion of rationality will contribute to the point I am trying to make here about the 
connection between cooperation and competition.
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would be greater, since they would choose the strategy of mutual silence. Thus 
the strategy pair (A = confess, B = confess) is rational from the individual 
prisoner's point o f view, whereas the rational collective strategy pair is (A = silent, 
B = silent). The outcome of this consideration is used here to support the point 
that competition among individuals who disregard the interests o f the collective 
leads to a socially destructive pay-off even though it may be rational for the indi­
vidual to choose the non-cooperative confess strategy.
In discussions o f this nature the prisoner's dilemma, as a device to help clarify 
conflict and cooperation, can be seen to operate at three levels.
•  between corporations
•  between manager and worker
•  between workers
The behaviour of business corporations in a competitive marketplace (for exam­
ple, whether to keep within the informal agreements or break a trust in matters 
of price fixing) can be explored, in part, by drawing upon the lessons that this 
model can yield. Of direct relevance to this paper is the extent to which the pris­
oner's dilemma helps to clarify the behaviour between workers and between 
manager and worker. Taking the scenario that wo ild prevail between manager 
and worker first, the dilemma could be restated in terms of worker A  and manager
B. If we make the egoistic assumption that the participants are self interested,
we can state their objectives as follows: the worker gives minimum effort and 
seeks maximum reward, whilst the manager seeks maximum effort from the 
worker for minimum reward. In essence they have the same but conflicting ob­
jectives along the dimensions of effort and reward - maximum output for mini­
mum input. In the scenario below, the numbers represent the utility of the 
outcome for the individuals.
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A/B B Co-operate B Compete
A Co-operate 10, 10 1, 20
A Compete 20, 1 2 ,2
Here we see that the 10, 10 outcome is a situation of cooperation between the 
manager and worker, whilst the 2,2 outcome is a stand-off (no co-operation). The 
20, 1 outcome is quite simply the worker maximising his egoistic objective (or just 
simply cheating) whereas the 1, 20 outcome is the manager maximising his egoistic 
objective (or perhaps we might just call this exploitation). If we tranlated the 
above scenario to the conflict and co-operation that would emerge between fellow 
workers subscribing to the same egoistic objectives, then it would be little different 
except that the rule which one should follow is don't be suckered. One might 
object that repeated tries of this scenario would yield a different outcome. Fur­
thermore, if there were unceratainty on the part of the participants about the 
number of tries that would be made in this situation of choice, then end-game 
effects would distort the outcome; so too would deception and unforgivingness. 
Whilst I would agree that one should not read too much into abstractions such 
as the prisoner's dilemma, I do hold that it is instructive to a degree. In my view, 
the lesson is clear, MBO may well be a management method which relies upon 
competition but it proceeds from unstated assumptions of a necessary cooperation 
between workers and between manager and worker. On the above account, 
unbridled self interest would be totally destructive in the context o f MBO.
Although the theory o f games is perhaps much too abstract to support a fertile 
definition of rationality my use o f the example is to illustrate the socially destruc­
tive tendency of non-cooperation. Competition without cooperation is like play­
ing a game without rules. Worse still, competition without cooperation or trust 
is more like playing a game in which the rules keep changing without notice: the 
result being no basis for trust should the players feel so inclined. In the game 
without rules, fairness and unfairness have no meaning, whereas in the game where 
the rules keep changing, fairness and unfairness are incalculable and selfishness,
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deceit and mistrust form the only basis for participation. The absence of trust 
rules out the possibility of the development o f strategic bonds, but the presence 
of trust forms the basis upon which strategic bonds can develop. In which case, 
the move from non-cooperation to cooperation has no firm foundation, but the 
move from cooperation to greater cooperation is quite straightforward, so too is 
the move from cooperation to constructive competition.
Cooperation is the context in which competition can be productive. Without 
cooperation, competition has no limitation, no direction and makes no sense. 
How then might the individualist explanation of the social process o f management 
by objectives account for the success of a corporation in the face o f such destruc­
tive competition generated by each individual pursuing his or her own interest? 
The individualist might respond by arguing that the competition generated by 
MBO is not destructive: this is obvious by virtue o f the success o f MBO. The 
competition is merely a case of each individual quite legitimately pursuing his own 
ends and the success of this activity is the natural consequence. A  response o f this 
kind amounts to little more than invoking an invisible hand type o f explanation36 
which is often used as a very persuasive attempt to account for the unintentional 
emergence of some pattern or design which appears to have been, but is not in 
fact, an intentional outcome of the beliefs and desires of some individual(s). 
Variations on this theme have provided a foundation of sorts for the advocates 
of market forces as a regulator of economic activity m particular and the political 
regulation of society in general.37
There is the danger of undermining his own case if the individualist invoked this 
response. By invoking the invisible hand explanation, he is in fact introducing a 
somewhat mystical concept which cannot be shown to be reducible to the beliefs
36 For an interesting discussion and summary of “invisible hand” types o f explanation, see Nozick 
1974: 18 - 22.
37 Hayek, 1964, has places much emphasis on the invisible hand theme in a number o f papers in his 
publication.
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and desires o f the participating individuals, which is the very idea he arguing 
against. To satisfy his own criteria for an acceptable social explanation, the indi­
vidualist must show the connection between each pursuing his own interests and 
the socially desirable consequence; this he cannot do. What then can he say that 
will count as a satisfactory explanation of the success o f MBO despite the fierce 
competition that must be engendered (according to the individualist's account) 
by this management system?
He might claim that it is in the individual's self interest to negotiate objectives 
which are achievable in the full knowledge o f the competitiveness o f his situation 
- the competitive el* ment being tempered by each recognising that it would be in 
the interests of all to consider the aims of the enterprise as their own. But this still 
falls far short of motivating the individual to give maximum effort, or enthusiastic 
support to the corporation's goals. An explanation is required that can account 
for the success o f MBO as a management method for securing the corporation's 
goals over sustained period of time during which the population of the 
organisation will undergo change.
To this end, the individualist might claim that cooperation is, in the long term, a 
rational strategy to adopt, therefore, the explanation in terms of a rational self in­
terested representative man can accommodate the need for cooperation and com­
petition. This will not do. In a situation where every individual pursues his own 
interests regardless of the interests of others, it is by no means rational for the 
representative man to make anything more than the minimum effort to achieve 
whatever goals he adopts; therefore, at worst he will be in competition with the 
goals of the organisation (as long as self interest is his motivation), and at best, 
only contingently in line with the organisation's goals. As indicated above, the 
rational self interested man cannot invest in trust as a strategy. Trust is the 
foundation of strategy and is in a totally different category from the concepts of 
self interest and competition; trust is a term referred to in the language o f self in­
terest, to give sense to the terms of competition.
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The question remains as to whether there can be any kind o f competition prior 
to cooperation. In my view, there cannot be, since competition has meaning only 
in the context o f cooperation.
Perhaps one might point to Hobbes' Leviathan to cite an example of competitive 
situation which precedes a cooperation. The state o f nature depicted by Hobbes 
could be interpreted as a state of unbridled competition which renders life of man 
“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short”. This hypothetical situation is a prod­
uct of a' situation where “men live without other security, than what their own 
strength, and their own invention shall furnish”, yet from this condition Hobbes 
shows how cooperation will emerge to enable each to secure his own life.38
The fear of death will generate conditions of cooperation to the extent that each 
can serve his own interests by seeking to cooperate with every other party who is 
willing to do likewise. In fact, Hobbes not only shows how bonds o f cooperation 
can arise out of the conditions of the state o f nature, but also develops the hy­
pothesis to the extent that he shows how a moral theory might emerge. What 
becomes then of the view that cooperation cannot arise from competition when 
Hobbes shows us that it can? Three responses can be made to this question.
First, the scenario Hobbes presents is founded on the assumption that all persons 
are moved by fear of death, and this above all is the key to an understanding of 
the Ilobbesian man. If one agrees with Hobbes then one is committed to this 
assumption. However, a valid objection to this is that fear o f death is relative to 
one's culture, and therefore not the prime mover of human beings. For example, 
it may be a non-controversial assumption in northern European cultures that the 
prime mover of man is fear of death. That life is valued above all else is generally 
true, but one need look no further than the Islamic fundamentalist cultures to see 
that there may be no such fear. The prime mover in the Islamic case is the 
pleasing of one's god. Fear o f a god is therefore also a key to understanding 
mankind. The problem therefore is not whether such an exception can fit with
38 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch 13: 186.
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Hobbes arguments as another assumption, rather, it shows that there is no single 
motivator at all. If there is one exception, there can be more, and Hobbes' hy­
pothesis is prone to this criticism. His explanation of fear o f death as the prime 
mover of human kind is incomplete and is weak on its own terms.
The second response is that even if the Hobbesian account o f the emergence of 
society were true, it does not lend itself to the very structured situation of MBO. 
It would be stretching the analogy too far to compare the state of nature scenario 
to the business corporation.
A third and fundamental response is that there is no competition in the state of 
nature. Although each is seeking the common end, security, there is no compe­
tition for security. Competition only emerges when one seeks a victory of sorts 
over another, or others. What is being sought in the Hobbesian scenario is self 
security; there is no competition for this.
What the above responses amount to is that competition in its true sense only 
emerges when the hypothetical situation develops from an extremely abstract 
notion and some content is assumed. Thus we are back where we started. Com­
petition gets its meaning in the context of an understanding of the limits and scope 
of the endeavour of the competitors and this understanding is itself, cooperation.
Returning then to MBO, it becomes apparent that the individual's willingness to 
put maximum effort into his contribution to the goals of the enterprise seems to 
run contrary to the self interest of individualism. Individualism fails to show how 
self interest, as a motivator of a reward-punishment machine, can generate strate­
gic bonds o f cooperation. Furthermore, if the individualist could show self interest 
to be such a motivator, then an account of how strategic bonds can be trans­
formed into bonds of sentiment would be required since it is human sentiment 
which provides the key to an understanding of the source of the required consci­
entious acceptance, on the part of the employee, o f the organisation's goals as his 
own.
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My purpose here is to show that the social process emergent from management 
by objectives (which seems to be tailor-made for an individualistic explanation) 
produces the paradoxical result that individualism fails to yield a complete expla­
nation. I have argued that the individualist account shows management by ob­
jectives to function as divisive and perhaps threatening to each participant, whilst 
systematically offering reward to only a few. Furthermore, by showing self interest 
to be a less than satisfying account of the representative individual's motivation, 
I have thereby made the charge that individualism is bereft o f an adequate account 
of the most central characteristic o f the social process o f MBO (the recruitment 
of the participant's sentiment, that very thing which would ensure maximum effort 
for realistic reward in a situation of competition which is limited only by a spirit 
of cooperation) thai characteristic which brings the aims o f the individual in line 
with with the goals of the organisation: not simply to behave as if  the goals of the 
organisation were the employee's own goal, but to actually share these goals.
Employee Participation
I will argue that the very success of this social process in pursuing the goals o f the 
organisation rests upon the presumption that by recruiting the willing partic­
ipation of the individual, the organisation is drawing on something which is 
complex and has greater explanatory force than self interest: this complex thing is, 
in my opinion, recognition. Grasping the demands of the self conscious subject 
as worker and subordinate is necessary if the relationship between superior and 
subordinate is to be fully understood. In later chapters I shall address this notion 
by way of a survey o f the complexity and significance of recognition in the world 
of work. Before doing so, let me clarify the conditions o f willing participation in 
the pursuit of both the individual and corporate goals and objectives.
The requirements of the participatory element of management by objectives can 
be outlined as follows. First, in order that the individual can participate in the 
setting of his own objectives he must be afforded an extensive degree o f freedom 
from authority. This means that since objectives are to be agreed, then the indi­
vidual must have the capacity to negotiate on his own behalf, and have the right
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to disagree without fear o f jeopardising his status or association with the 
organisation. Otherwise the imposition of work objectives would be a mere issue 
of instructions or orders under another name. Furthermore, negotiating objectives 
requires that each party be enlightened as to his capacity for negotiation and, 
where necessary each party should be given adequate help (and training if neces­
sary) to develop the ability to engage in this area o f interpersonal activity. Special 
emphasis must be given to the training and monitoring of the superior of the 
parties in order to ensure that his position o f authority should not be be used to 
intimidate the subordinate.
Second; in order for the individual to achieve his objectives he is required to co­
operate with his. cSHeagues. But, if the individual is to achieve the maximum 
possible reward, he will want to (in fact, he must) compete with his colleagues. 
Therefore, he must also be enlightened as to the benefits to himself, his colleagues 
and the organisation of cooperation and the destructiveness of unbridled compe­
tition. To clarify this point, I must emphasise that where cooperation is a neces­
sity, then competition cannot function as the foundation or context for 
cooperation. Where competition takes priority over cooperation then anything 
resembling cooperation will be merely accidental, and organisation, management 
and control will have been undermined, but most important of all is that compe­
tition bereft of its context, will have lost its very meaning. Constructive compe­
tition must therefore be founded upon cooperation and not the other way around.
Third, for the goals of the whole business enterprise to be achieved, an environ­
ment is required which will encourage each individual to adopt the organisation's 
goals as part o f his own and motivate him to invest maximum effort without im­
pairing his physical and mental health, over the longest possible time period.
How can all this be achieved? The answer, in my view, rests in the way in which 
the corporation, as an employer, can respond to key aspects o f the worker, as 
employee, citizen and self conscious individual. The employing organisation must 
afford the participant recognition as an autonomous agent and as a member o f the 
corporate body of the business company or enterprise. Typically this would in­
clude the following:
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•  Equality of status within the organisation (e.g. a single status company).
•  A guaranteed minimum reward of such amount that the individual is afforded 
sufficient wealth that financial coercion will not be effective as a substitute for 
financial incentives.
•  An assurance of political access - perhaps in the form of a grievance procedure 
which will allow access to the highest level of management the individual 
chooses to address his concerns (up to the policy making level o f the com­
pany if necessary).
This membership would resemble a pact which will give the individual 
organisational freedom to pursue his objectives, rather than pursue the whims and 
passions of self intv. rest, thus elevating his instinctive wants into reasoned judge­
ments about what can be achieved. This is effected (Rousseau fashion) by re­
placing the dependence of one individual upon another, by the dependence of each 
upon all: “each man, in giving to all, gives himself to nobody” (Rousseau: 174).
In this way there is no other member over whom the individual does not acquire 
the same rights as he yields others over himself. The individual gains an equiv­
alent for everything he loses and consolidates everything he has, by giving himself 
to all.39
Rousseau is writing in the context o f State sovereignty, but it is clearly possible 
to use his ideas o f contract and association in the u. dustrial and business context 
to explain the participatory aspect of business orgaiiisations. But the point I wish 
to stress here is that by the realisation on the part o f the individual that, in his 
intentional promotion of the goals of the corporation, he will be seen to be pro­
moting something other than crude self interest, he will at the same time be con­
tributing to the recognition o f the kind of self he wishes to portray.
Let me now sum up the points covered so far in this discussion o f individualism 
and management.
39 The measure of this transaction in the working life o f an employee is not simply in the form of 
wages, as I will show in later stages of this thesis.
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In summary, it has been shown that a purely individualistic account of the success
tf
of MBO is not as illuminating as one might at first have thought. Whereas the 
individualist account posits self interest as the motive force behind the willing 
participation o f the individual, I see this explanation as unsatisfactory on the fol­
lowing grounds. Self interest is seen to be counterproductive in that it destroys 
the basis of trust in the social context of the business enterprise and it characterises 
the individual as competing or at odds with the corporate body of which he is a 
member. This is paradoxical since the MBO is intended to bring into line the aims 
of the corporation and the aims o f each employee. This paradox exposes a con­
fusion; if MBO is a construction o f individualism, it should be fully explicable in 
terms of a philosophy of individualism, but this is not so! The philosophy of 
individualism fails to yield a satisfactory explanation. It would seem that we must 
draw upon assumptions of something more rich in explanatory force than the 
rather impoverished rhetoric of individualism.
To get to the essence of the problem, I intend to contrast two concepts of self; the 
simple (unanalysable) concept o f self underpinning the deontological liberal phi­
losophy whose focus is on the rights of individuals, and a very different, richer, 
concept which depicts self as a product of interpersonal relations.
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Chapter 3. The Self of Individualism
Watkins' renowned paper on Ideal types and Historical Explanation® is the 
epitome of an individualistic explanation o f society where everything that can be 
said of a social process can be stated in terms of the psychological dispositions of 
the constituent individuals and their situations. Social unity, on this account, is 
reducible to strategic bonds arising out of the pursuit o f self interest. Watkins is 
employing self interest to present a motivational account of society41 and he argues 
that all social concepts are, in principle, reducible to the concepts and terms of 
individualism, and any explanation which employs social concepts is incomplete. 
It would seem that Watkins is suffering from too much of Hobbes. His excellent 
book on Hobbes is evident everywhere in his philosophy.42
The Simple (unanalysable) Concept of Self.
The philosophy of individualism is founded upon theories o f self interest which, 
in turn, yield some profound conclusions about tb i world and its inhabitants. 
The profundity of these conclusions is not matched by their power. A profound 
conclusion can also be a powerful conclusion if it is derived from arguments which 
rest upon weak (non-controversial) assumptions. The major problem with the
40 J W N Watkins Ideal Types and Historical Explanation in The Philosophy o f Social Explanation, 
ed by Alan Ryan Oxford University Press 1973.
41 Note that self interest may be employed in a genetic account which could lead to entirely different 
conclusions.
41 J W N  Watkins 1956.
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philosophy of individualism is that the concept of self, upon which it is founded 
is a rather powerful assumption, consequently, conclusions arising from arguments 
based on the theories of self interest tend to be very profound but lacking in 
power. Furthermore, the absence of analyses of the concept o f self in the philos­
ophy of individualism is not only an embarrassing weakness, but is also a funda­
mental requirement of the deontological ethic which it underpins.
On the simplistic view of the individualist, self interest tends to remain at the in­
tuitive level as an uninterpreted concept, the assumption being that since we all 
know what self means, we therefore know what self interest is, thus we have no 
need for an analysis of self. Now there is indeed a sense in which we all know 
what self is, even tnough we may have difficulty in articulating this knowledge. 
We know in an intuitive sense which allows us to use the term in common prac­
tice in everyday life and even when the writers on management theory use such 
terms as self, they seldom get beyond this intuitive level.43
It is to the philosopher that we would defer in matters of conceptual analysis, 
whilst trusting in our intuitive grasp of these concepts when incorporating them 
into ordinary verbal and written communication. Those management theorists 
who subscribe to, or demonstrate, uncritical acceptance o f the values and concepts 
of individualist philosophy are required to go beyond intuitive knowledge in their 
use of such concepts but seldom is this in evidence!
Self is not simple; on the contrary, it is complex and therefore analysable. This 
thesis challenges the assumption of an intuitive knowledge of self, not by denying 
that we all know what self means, but by insisting that by its lack of analysis of 
self, the philosophy of individualism rests upon an insubstantial foundation; the 
literature on management practices which advocates a wealth o f theories explain­
ing how to control and motivate the worker, is based upon the foundations of 
individualism and is therefore similarly flawed.
43 In fact, it is common to find in management literature concepts such as justice, responsibility, virtue, 
and so on being used without question o f definition in a similarly intuitive manner.
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I shall present an analytic account of the complexity of the concept of self, which 
will show that self arises out of a collective context and I shall draw largely upon 
ideas arising out o f my reading o f Hegel.
I want to contrast the crude or simple concept of self with another sense which 
may be described as sophisticated or complex. The distinction drawn between 
these two depicts the complex concept as transcending the other in that it draws 
upon the capacity of a being to order its desires: a capacity which makes possible 
other orderings and creates the discipline which forms the structure o f free will.
It is of the essence o f self interest that it be expressed in terms o f goals and ob­
jectives but in the simple sense, there cannot be a statement o f particular interests. 
Such a statement can only occur in a concept o f self which is complex and there­
fore analysable. Let me first lay my charge of emptiness of the rights rhetoric, then 
in the next chapter I shall defend a view of self consciousness as a product of 
interpersonal interaction, a product of community.
The Interests of a Self.
The content of interests are goals, the objects o f intent. In order to entertain the 
idea of goal-directed or purposive activity, it is necessary to distinguish it from 
non- purposive activity. An action of an organism which can be described as a 
purposive action involves the organism's identification of a goal and a disposition 
to the extent that the organism will modify its action in response to changes in the 
conditions of the goal, and will persist in pursuing the goal. This falls short of a 
definition in that it begs the question of the nature of intent. However, it will 
suffice for me to stress that purposive action should be clearly distinguished from 
functional action.
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The function of an organ44 or a behaviour pattern is that consequence without 
which whose general occurrence the organ or behaviour would not have been se­
lected. (Clark 1982: 10)
Whereas non-purposeful action (a function) is not necessarily goal-directed but is 
necessarily established as the condition o f another thing such as an organ or 
behaviour pattern, purposeful action is described in terms of intentional action and 
ends; the achievement of the ends being irrelevant.
For example, an object such as a heat-seeking missile exhibits functional activity 
insofar as it will detect energy in a target, at or above a critical temperature, as long 
as it has the energy to propel itself. It has the behavioural appearance o f purposive 
activity in so far it changes direction and speed according to changes in its detected 
conditions o f the target. Note, however, that the target has been identified by the 
person who launched the missile; his goal is to strike the target with the missile 
but the missile has no goal as such; it is merely programmed to seek heat, that is 
its function, that is why it was selected. Thus if the target discharges a decoy of 
the right speed, direction and temperature near to the heat-seeking missile then the 
decoy may well be struck instead of the target. The missile will have performed 
its function yet the goal of the operator who launched the missile has not been 
achieved. The point is that the missile had no goal, it had no intention, it merely 
had a function which was served. But we might say 4hat in one sense its function 
was to destroy the target of the operator who launched the missile, but in the real, 
or physical sense, its function was merely to explode on contact with an object 
of a given energy level. There is o f course no question of the missile having an 
interest or intention of destroying anything.
The discussion of interests raises many questions about how interests come to be 
in the world; about the nature o f the life-systems which are bearers o f interests; 
and about whether human beings have interests in everything with which they are 
involved. Identifying the provenance of interests can only be mere conjecture, but
44 I take Clarke's use of the term organ as synonymous with the term organism. 
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(without committing the neo-Darwinian sin of seeing function everywhere) it 
might be fruitful to draw upon the theory of evolution involving natural selection, 
to clarify this point.
A species might evolve whose inherited biological propensity to avoid untimely 
death will function as an aid to its continued existence. Now it may be claimed 
that this species of organism will generate another species which will be even more 
effective in avoiding destruction and will eventually come to demonstrate apparent 
expertise in this field. This action of avoidance is barely functional at this stage 
and is far removed from purposive. At what stage in the development process 
does the transition from functional to purposive behaviour occur? The answer is 
when the organism can make consistent responses to varying stimuli - it is this 
move from tropistic behaviour which may be described as forming the beginnings 
of purposive action. It is one task o f the evolutionary biologist to find out just 
when, in the development o f a species, this transition happens.
The embryologists and geneticists study the science o f development and 
inheritance, two aspects of the same fundamental biological phenomenon. 
Inheritance is the mechanism of transmitting biological information from one 
generation to another; development is the utilisation of this information to 
produce a completely different or new individual. An embryo has a complete set 
of hereditary instructions and only the most meagn- supply of materials to work 
with but it has an unfailing ability to carry them out. For example, a fertilised egg 
functions to divide itself into hundreds or thousands o f smaller cells and then re­
organises these cells into parts of the new adult. The process is fast, precise and 
so small in scale that it is awe inspiring. But the most awesome aspect for the 
biologists is the problem of differentiation (where a cell o f one type, or its de­
scendants, changes into a cell of a different type). Herein lies the problem of 
whether an organism of one type gives rise to another which which has, or can 
develop within its own lifetime, the capacity for identifying interests. Is it to bi­
ology that we should look to find the provenance o f interests? Whilst my intuition 
tells me that there is a biological foundation to the development of the capacity 
of a being to have interests, I do not believe that biologists can ever provide a full
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explanation. As long as one works from the assumption of natural selection then 
the origin of interests will remain a matter o f conjecture; such theories must 
therefore allow for the possibility o f the continued creation o f new organisms or 
sudden modifications of existing organisms. Alternatives rtiight be to look to 
theology or perhaps mysticism for the solution. But given what I have said about 
the distinction between function and purpose, I would want to add that the 
complex interplay between these two concepts makes it difficult to draw a clear 
line between functional activity and purposive activity in living things. Men and 
higher animals present clear and distinct examples o f both kinds o f activity as well 
as signs of combined purpose and function. Descriptions o f such activity are 
limited by the problem of identifying the point where a difference in degree be­
comes a difference in kind; the point being that an action may fit more than one 
description. However, I consider that purposive behaviour is limited to 
organisms; that is, only a life form can be capable o f purposive behaviour. Al­
though those life forms which exhibit purposiveness are beyond clear identifica­
tion, there can be no doubt that human beings and higher animals are the prime 
examples.
Whether human beings are self interested in everything with which they are in­
volved is a difficult question. Depending upon whether one's definition o f self 
interest has an ethical or a psychological base, the motive for action is not the 
same; that is, one should only act on the basis o f sc f  interest (ethically speaking) 
or one does only act on the basis of self interest (psychologically speaking). There 
is no doubt that human beings do have interests in every intentional act, but it is 
questionable whether this is on ethical or psychological grounds. Using the term 
interests in the ethical and the psychological sense, one can distinguish intentional 
or purposive from non-purposive or functional behaviour and perhaps differen­
tiate one kind o f action from another (and perhaps one kind o f being from an­
other).
Creatures that have no conception o f themselves as beings in the world, sur­
rounded by other beings with whom they have social relationships, cannot be 
selfish or unselfish. (Clark 1982: 55)
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On this account, a concept of self as a prerequisite for the birth and development 
of interests, would, in my view, make no sense. Clark is stating that the concept 
of self is a product of the social interaction of a material world, rather than a 
prerequisite. Also, the nature o f life systems that can be bearers of interests are 
those which have a conception of their own good. Only those life systems which 
can value things or conditions are capable o f having interests. How sophisticated 
that capability is, will of course depend upon the stage of (and capacity for) de­
velopment of the organism's value systems and its sensitivity to external stimuli. 
Considering persons, we may choose one option rather than another, but as a 
consequence of choosing, we might gain an external perspective on ourselves and 
want to revise that choice. This notion of revising our choices would, in my view, 
necessarily include a Rawlsian notion of a plan o f life which is “designed to permit 
the harmonious satisfaction of .... interests” (Rawls 1972: 93).
But Rawls is among a number o f powerful advocates o f liberal philosophy who, 
by virtue of the core idea which gives liberalism its appeal, could not subscribe to 
the notion that interests, desires and social relationships are in any way 
constitutive o f self. Looking at the often incompatible variety o f liberal theories 
that abound it is notable that they are not classified together on the basis of their 
conception of liberty. To find out what they have in common, one must look to 
the metaphysical picture of the self that liberalism portrays; herein lies the strength 
and the weakness of liberalism; the strength is the purity o f the concept o f self 
interest and the weakness is in the fact that this purity is gained at the cost of 
emptiness of the concept.
The Emptiness o f  the Rights Rhetoric.
The simple sense of self must be given content, thus an analysis o f self which im­
plies a theory of interests is required to show that self has content (interests and 
goals), but due to its simplicity the self interest of individualism has no possibility 
of a statement of particular interests. It can be pronounced only in terms of gen­
eralities which get their expression in prohibitive statements about formal limita­
tions on free action; for example, the inviolability of the rights o f other persons,
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has produced a foundation for the rights based morality expressed by Nozick 
(1974).
This is an inherent problem with a rights based morality in that it is a morality 
of emptiness, a prohibitive morality expressed in terms of side constraints on free 
action. But since side constraints cannot reveal interests or even generate them, 
the simple concept of self cannot generate the complex concept. They remain 
distinctly separate, not on the extremes of a continuum but in different categories.
More than any other philosopher, Kant perceived the importance and necessary 
dependence o f liberal ideas on the metaphysics of the first person. And in terms 
of the moral emptiness o f liberalism, consider Kant's Critique o f Practical Reason, 
where he states the “Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason” as follows:
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a prin­
ciple establishing universal law (Kant 1788: 30)
Kant's formula requires us to adopt and act upon only those maxims that every­
one else could and would adopt; this would tell us what principles would count 
as moral principles. But there is a problem in that whatever else it does, it does 
not really tell us what principles we should adopt. I cite this as an example of 
moral aim which has form but no content. However, drawing on the deontology 
of Kant, Nozick has presented a sketch o f a theory cTthe moral basis o f individual 
rights which can be cited as a modem example o f a prohibitive morality which 
(unlike the individualistic philosophy of Kant) seeks its justification in self interest. 
Note the similarity in tone between the “Law of Pure Practical Reason” and the 
following:
What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do 
through the apparatus of the state, or do to establish a state. (Nozick 1974: 6)
Just as Kant is often accused of omitting to tell us what moral principles to adopt, 
Nozick in fact omits to tell us what persons may and may not do to one another, 
thus we remain in the domain of moral emptiness. Nozick does give us one very
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general but strict principle which limits all other principles we may care to adopt, 
which is that the rights of others must not be violated. The rights of others de­
termine the constraints upon one's actions, and the actions o f the state, but this 
side constraint morality leaves unanswered the questions o f what rights an indi­
vidual has, and to what extent the rights o f animals and other life forms are 
sacrosanct. It is problems of this nature that arise from basing morality on a 
concept of self which is assumed to be simple, and therefore unanalysable, conse­
quently there is no possibility of a corresponding theory o f interests.
Furthermore, by its very nature, the rights based theories cannot accept a theory 
of self which is constitutive of any element o f the external world; liberalism re­
quires that the right be prior to the good, a requirement which has very profound 
implications for the metaphysics of the self.
The Right and The Good: To get to the heart of the charge o f emptiness of the 
rights rhetoric, it is necessary to look at the argument of liberalism for the primacy 
of justice. I shall contrast the liberal positions o f both Kant and Mill to show that 
an argument for the primacy o f the subject must succeed if the claims o f liberalism 
for the primacy of justice is to succeed. The difficulty for the Kantian argument 
is that the necessary presupposition of a subject outwith the empirical world im­
plies a disembodied self. This metaphysical conception of the self, which gets its 
fullest expression in Rawl's Theory of Justice, exposes the liberal individualist 
rights advocates to the charge of emptiness.
Kant's arguments underpin the liberal emphasis on justice, where human rights 
are the fundamental goal or objective of social order. Liberalism esteems choice 
above all else, and regards justice (the securing o f rights) as the process which 
harmonises or reconciles the freedom of each individual with the freedom of all. 
These concepts o f freedom and rights are intertwined to the extent that freedom 
exists in the ability to assert one's rights and true human rights are those necessi­
tated by freedom.
Now given that it is the liberal conception o f the self that I am attempting to 
elucidate, my reference to the arguments o f Kant and other liberals in this chapter
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will stop short o f a thoroughgoing analysis of liberalism but will in fact be limited 
to grasping the reasoning behind the primacy of the subject, for this will yield an 
understanding of the weakness of liberalism in general and of the liberal concept 
of self in particular. It is to this end that I shall spend some time discussing the 
contrast between two different kinds of liberalism, that of Kant and that of Mill.
Justice as the highest of all social virtues is the one that must be met before the 
claims of the others can be made. If the happiness of society could be advanced 
by unjust means alone, justice would still prevail over happiness. Justice is pri­
mary in the sense that the demands of justice outweigh all other moral and poli­
tical interests, regardless of how important or pressing these other interests may 
be. In this moral sense of the primacy of justice, even the general welfare cannot 
take precedence over individual rights.
To have a right, then, is, 1 conceive, to have something which society ought to 
defend in me the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can 
give him no other reason than general utility. (Mill 1863: 50)
The essence of Mill's statemeht is that general utility being his justification then 
the right is secondary to the good, since it is the good (i.e. general utility) which 
is the justification for the sanctity of right. Although Mill was firmly in the liberal 
tradition, he could hardly be described as a deontological liberal in the strict sense. 
Mill represents a view of liberalism which advocates the primacy o f justice in a 
moral sense, but this primacy unlike that of Kantian liberalism is not based on 
principles independently derived.
The Kantian, strict deontological, position not only subscribes to a view which 
describes the primacy of justice as a moral priority, but also holds that the priority 
of rights is justified in a way that does not depend on any particular conception 
of the good. It is to Kant one must turn to get to the fundamental reason for the 
priority o f Right. The independent status o f the rights sets the very parameters 
of the good.
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... the concept of good and evil is not defined prior to the moral law, to which, it 
would seem, the former would have to serve as foundation; rather the concept 
of good and evil must be defined after and by means o f the law.(Kant 1788: 65)
Whereas for Mill the sense of primacy is in fact of a first order moral nature, Kant 
distinguishes a second order, foundational sense, where the virtue o f the moral law 
consists not in promoting some goal, or end, but is an end in itself, prior to all 
other ends and regulative in nature.
By primacy between two or more things connected by reason, I understand the 
prerogative o f one by virtue of which it is the prime ground of determination of the 
combination with the others. In a narrower practical sense it refers to the pre­
rogative of the interest of one so far as the interest of the others is subordinated 
to it and is not itself inferior to any other. (Kant 1788: 124)
Of the two kinds of liberalism being contrasted here, Kant's foundational sense 
stands opposed to teleology insofar as it describes a form of justification in which 
the derivation of first principles neither depends upon, nor presupposes, any ulti­
mate human purposes or ends and has no recognition of any determinate con­
ception of human good. This deontology opposes consequentialism in describing 
an ethic of the first order containing imperatives and prohibitions which take 
precedence (without qualification) over other morai concerns.
Mill is prominent among those liberals who believed that one could defend the 
latter kind of liberalism without recourse to the former. In fact he thought it 
necessary to separate the two and argued so. His argument for sanctity of right 
is essentially based upon sentiment which is composed not only o f a
rational element, but also an animal element, the thirst for retaliation....this thirst 
derives its intensity, as well as its moral justification, from extraordinary important 
and impressive kind of utility which is concerned.... The interest is that o f security 
to every one's feelings the most vital o f all interests (Mill 1863:50)
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Mill's reasoning is that the security is required by each and every individual to give 
us the immunity from evil, and the full value of the good. Without it, we would 
only live for the passing moment and
nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us if we could 
be deprived of anything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger 
than ourselves. (Mill 1863: 50)
This feeling of right and wrong is so powerful and we count so assuredly on this 
feeling being reciprocated:
that ought and sh >uld grow into must and recognised indispensability becomes a 
moral necessity. (Mill 1863: 51)
Herein lies Mill's argument for the ground of right. And so Kantian liberalism 
must stand opposed to consequentialism for nothing is more fundamental to the 
very groundwork of our existence than securing our rights. No other justification 
is required.
Contrasted with the utilitarian view, liberalism in a strict deontological sense relies 
not upon the importance of right to utility for it has no concern with Mill's 
teleological foundation and psychological assumptions. Instead deontological 
liberalism is linked to the extent that Kant argued ag’iinst the possibility of having 
one without the other, and his arguments come from two standpoints; his ethics 
and his metaphysics.
From a Kantian viewpoint utilitarianism is unreliable insofar as no empirical 
foundation can secure the priority of justice and the sanctity o f rights. A powerful 
objection to utilitarianism and any other empirical foundation is that any princi­
ple, which relies for its validity upon certain desires and dispositions is conditional 
to no less an extent than the desires themselves. This Kantian criticism holds that 
since the desires and the means o f satisfying them will vary both as a function of 
time and of specific individuals, then any principle depending upon them must 
be equally contingent. Therefore:
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All practical principles which presuppose an object (material) o f the faculty of 
desire as the determining ground o f the will are without exception empirical and 
can furnish no practical laws. (Kant 1788: 19).
There is no way to avoid the charge that a justification o f right grounded in utility 
(or any other empirical foundation) must, at least in principle, admit cases where 
justice is overruled by the general utility. And it is well quoted in the literature 
on liberal philosophy that Mill admits this:
though particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important, 
as to overtake any one of general maxims o f justice. (Mill 1863: 59).
Kantian liberalism, because of the special nature o f its justification of the priority 
of right, can not accept such a qualification, even in the interests of human hap­
piness. Only an absolute affirmation of the primacy of justice can avoid the slip­
pery path toward coercion and unfairness. Anything less than the absolute 
priority would admit empiricism. This would allow for differing conceptions of 
the primacy of justice and for any of these conceptions to be considered as 
regulative, would impose on some the conceptions of others and therefore deny 
or inhibit to some the freedom to be regulated by their own conception.
Men have differing views on the empirical end o f happiness and what it consists 
of, so that as far as happiness is concerned, their will c innot be brought under any 
common principle nor thus under any external law harmonising with the freedom 
of everyone. (Kant 1793: 73)
Utilitarianism would, on the Kantian view, create the situation where the values 
of some were determined or influenced by others through unfairness and coercion, 
rather than a society where the ends of all persons were in harmony with the needs 
of each individual.
The priority of right has to have its foundation in a source which is prior to all 
empirical ends. Kant states that the priority o f right is “derived entirely from the 
concept of freedom in the mutual external relationships of human beings and has
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nothing to do with the end which all men have by nature (i.e. the aim of achieving 
happiness) or with the recognised means of attaining this end” (Kant 1793: 73). 
The foundation must be prior to all ends so that I am governed by principles 
which have no presupposed or particular ends, for in this way my pursuit o f my 
own ends is consistent with a similar freedom for all.
By establishing this second order, or foundational, priority o f justice, the moral 
priority is not only made possible, but is seen to be necessary. The independently 
derived principle of justice puts it into a different category o f values, justice 
therefore has a privileged position with respect to the good in that it constrains it 
and sets its bounds.
Now this is where the entire notion of the priority of the right over the good gets 
very interesting. If the foundation o f rights is not to be found in the purposes and 
ends of human nature, then to where must we look? The strict demands o f the 
deontological ethic points to no material source, for this would undermine the 
priority o f right. Kant's answer is that the foundation of the priority o f right is in 
fact in the priority of the subject; look not to the object of practical reason but 
to the subject.
Of duty, Kant asks:
what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to t < found the root o f thy noble
descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations....? (Kant 1788: 89).
The origin is a subject capable of an autonomous will. The deontological view 
places ultimate importance not on the ends we choose but our very capacity to 
choose and this capacity resides in the subject, prior to any particular end. Con­
cerning the supremacy of the principles o f morals, Kant says that philosophers 
have been in confusion “For they sought an object of the will in order to make 
it into the material and the foundation of a law....; instead, they should have 
looked for a law which directly determined the will a priori and only then sought 
the object suitable to it.” ( Kant 1788: 66). If they had followed this line o f rea­
soning, a foundation of rights independent o f any particular object would have
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been obvious from the distinction between a subject and object o f practical rea­
soning. It is therefore clear that the claim for the priority of right, in the context 
of the moral and foundational senses distinguished earlier, requires an argument 
for the priority of the subject, which cannot be claimed on empirical grounds 
otherwise it cannot contribute to the work of the deontological ethic.
The Priority o f  The Subject.
Kant's claim for the priority of the subject, can be understood by reviewing his 
epistemological argument in support of his conception of the subject. He takes 
what he believes to be indispensable characteristics of our experience and seeks 
out the presuppositions they give rise to. Kant starts from the idea that to know 
everything there is to know about myself, my introspection is limited to the 
product of my senses. As a sentient being I can know myself only as as object 
of experience. This self knowledge can amount to no more than an understanding 
of myself as a bearer of desires, inclinations and other dispositions o f this kind. 
Kant says that man cannot know what he is in himself by inner sensation 
(introspection); the stream of appearances cannot allow man. to get behind them 
to see what they are experiences of! We must therefore presume something fur­
ther.
Yet beyond this character of himself as a subject, nv'de up, as it is, o f mere ap­
pearances he must suppose there to be something else which is its ground - namely, 
his Ego as this may be constituted in itself; and thus as regards mere perception 
and the capacity of receiving sensations he must count himself as belonging to the 
sensible world , but as regards whatever there may be in him of pure activity 
(whatever comes into consciousness, not through affection of the senses, but im­
mediately) he must count himself as belonging to the intellectual world, o f which, 
however, he knows nothing further. (Kant 1785: 107).
This argument of Kant's that there is something beyond or behind our empirical 
knowledge provides the principle of unity of our self perceptions; this o f course 
is the subject itself, the single consciousness which binds together the stream of
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perceptions and ever changing representations of the sensible world. It is because 
we cannot grasp this principle empirically that we must presume its validity.
The thought that the representations given in intuition are and all belong to me, 
is therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite them in one self consciousness, 
or can at least so unite them; and although this thought is not itself the con­
sciousness o f the synthesis o f the representations, it presupposes the possibility of 
that synthesis. In other words, in so far as I can grasp the manifold o f the re­
presentations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine. (Kant 1787:
54).
Considered merely a s an object of experience, I am part of the sensible world and 
my actions are subject to, and determined by, the laws of nature. It is by virtue 
of my status as subject that I am at the same time free and independent o f the laws 
of nature with the capacity for acting autonomously.
If I were solely a member o f the intelligible world, all my actions would be in 
perfect conformity with the principle o f the autonomy of a pure will; if I were 
solely a part of the sensible world, they would have to be taken as in complete 
conformity with the law of nature governing desires and inclinations. (Kant 1785: 
110).
It is only from the intelligible world standpoint that I can consider myself as free 
and not driven by desire for ends which govern my action. My will therefore is a 
first cause and not a consequence o f some end or other. However, the essential 
point of Kant's argument is the concept o f the subject independent o f and prior 
to experience:
the intelligible world contains the ground o f the sensible world and therefore also 
of its laws (Kant 1785: 111).
This priority is not only a necessary presupposition of the possibility o f self 
knowledge and freedom, but also fundamental to the independence o f the subject.
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The Kantian position clearly rests upon the priority o f rights, which in turn rests 
upon the priority of the subject. In this ordering, the principles governing society 
do not presuppose any particular conception of the good and persons are re­
spected as subjects and as end in themselves.
The Kantian foundation of the strict deontological liberal philosophy which es­
teems choice above all, is popularly held to be immune from the type o f dispute 
which renders vulnerable those political theories which rest upon assumptions of 
human nature and conceptions o f the good. Because this liberalism assumes no 
particular conception of human motivation nor any special theory o f personality 
it enjoys this immunity. M J Sandel in his Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice 
puts the problem of deontological ethics in sharp focus by a thorough analysis of 
the use made of it by Rawls. Sandel's endeavour is to point to where the 
deontological theory of the person goes wrong and how its shortcomings under­
mine the primacy of justice. In taking this approach, he presents a very clear and 
persuasive argument that we cannot understand ourselves as independent o f the 
empirical world as required, and that it is in the partiality of the self image we 
have, that the limits of justice can be found.
The relevance of Sandel's work to this thesis is that he has gone straight to the 
foundation o f the Kantian argument for the priority o f the self and demonstrated 
just how empty that concept of self is; consequent he has provided the ground 
for the charge of the emptiness o f the rights rhetoric. In so doing, his attention 
is directed to the most imaginative exponent of the Kantian position, Rawls and 
his Theory o f Justice. For Rawls, the securing o f rights (justice) is the procedure 
whereby each person's freedom is reconciled with that o f his neighbours. A  well 
ordered society must have as its first and foremost concern the guarantee of justice, 
since this is the condition in which each person can flourish according to his na­
ture. Freeing the idea of rights from any conception of the good, is for Rawls, the 
task of a liberal theory of justice, thereby each individual can be able to develop 
in the way that best suits his nature and circumstance. Our rights would therefore 
be free from intrusion by moralists advocating that they know best or have the 
only legitimate conception of the good. Rawls holds that a well ordered society
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will also assure good government, compatible with the plurality of human pur­
poses.
The abstract statement of rights is intended to reflect no more than one funda­
mental requirement, which is that justice is the guarantee of freedom and it is re­
spect for freedom itself which is the origin of the law, and the measure o f a 
government's goodness is the extent to which it protects basic human rights from 
intrusion.
Now regardless o f those liberal arguments one might bring forth from Mill to 
criticise the radical separation of rights and values, there is a deeper concern which 
Sandel addresses: beneath this clinically clean abstract idea of freedom and justice 
lies a similarly abstract idea of the individual person. Rawls declares “the self is 
prior to the ends which are affirmed by it” (Rawls 1971: 560). This priority re­
quirement of the deontological ethic poses a special challenge for Rawls' project 
as it rules out a self that achieves its priority by inhabiting a noumenal realm. In 
Rawl's view, any account of self and ends must tell us not one thing, but two; 
how the self is distinguished from its ends and also how the self is connected to 
its ends. Without the first we are left with a radically situated subject; without 
the second, a radically disembodied subject.
Rawl's solution, which is implicit in the design of his 'original position' is to es­
tablish a conception of the self as a subject of posses ion. On this view our values 
and aims do not constitute our nature, but are variable circumstances; as 'pos­
sessions' they make for the variety and multiplicity o f the human condition and 
cannot be considered by any universally applied theory of justice. However, 
Sandel shows in detail that no liberal theory can avoid a similar conclusion. A  
single universal standard of justice must achieve the standard by abstraction; by 
chipping away the characteristics which individuate or distinguish one self from 
another. This process, adopted by Rawls, where he strips away everything that 
matters to a person is of the essence what he means by fairness; he puts his idea 
of choice to individuals abstracted not only from their privileges but also their 
conception o f their needs. The self that remains, after Rawls has peeled away all 
distinguishing attributes, is a chooser occupying Rawls' 'original position' and is
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still a self, who retains whatever is necessary to freely enter a social contract with 
similar disprivileged selves.
Now the notion of a self as a subject of possession can be located in the assump­
tion which says that the parties or persons take no interest in the interests of each 
other. This appears at first sight as a psychological claim, but as Sandel points 
out, “given its place in the original position it works as an epistemological claim, 
as a claim about the forms of self knowledge o f which we are capable” (Sandel 
1982: 54).
The importance of this is that Rawls can coherently hold that the assumption of 
mutual disinterest v  “the main motivational condition o f the original position” 
and yet “involve no particular theory o f human motivations”45 This is an as­
sumption about the nature of the self and how it is constituted (i.e. as a subject 
who possess motivation in general) and not about the content of interests and 
ends, and it is intended to do the work of distinguishing the subject of interests 
from the content of interests. Just as Kant argued that all experience must be the 
experience of some subject, Rawls' assumption of mutual disinterest maintains 
that all interests must be the interests of some subject:
although the interests advanced by these plans are not assumed to be interests in 
the self, they are imerests o f a self that regards its conception o f the good as worthy 
of recognition. (Rawls 1971:127)
As Rawls peels away these things that matters to a person, his theory o f the person 
becomes clearer.
It should be noted that I make no restrictive assumptions about the parties con­
ception of the good except that they are rational long term plans. While these 
plans determine the aims and interests o f a self, the aims and interests are. not as­
sumed to be egoistic or selfish. Whether this is the case depends upon the kinds 
of ends a person pursues. If wealth, position and influence and the accolades of
«  See Rawls 1971: 189 and 130.
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social prestige are a person's final purposes, then surely his conception of the good 
is egoistic. His dominant interests are in himself, not merely, as they must always 
be, interests of a self. (Rawls 1971:129)
In putting his theory of the person to work Rawls presents the notion of the self 
as a subject o f possession, whose bounds as a self are fixed prior to experience. 
My identity as a deontological self, is given independently of my interests and my 
ends and my relations with other persons.
The question to be asked of Rawls, and the advocates of the deontological subject, 
is that in the stripping away of the aims and values, is the remaining abstract 
subject really left with the capacity for rational choice? I think that Sandel has 
shown that Rawls' discounting o f everything that matters to a person has also 
robbed the abstract subject of his self.
Sandel takes his very pointed criticism further by arguing that the very idea o f the 
empty self is incoherent. To derive the duties from the idea o f rational choice 
alone is to remove the empirical conditions o f the agent; we respect reason in 
ourselves only by respecting reason in other persons. Sandel highlights the diffi­
culty of stopping short of the idea o f the moral subject as a transcendental self 
existing always on the unknowable periphery o f his world. Like Kant, Sandel sees 
the difficulty facing ihe strict deontologist, the abstracted self ceases to be an actor 
in the world and becomes a perspective on the wor d; the transcendental subject 
has no individuating characteristics, it is created by abstraction and deprived of self 
identity. Sandel has drwan upon this widely used objection to strike what seems 
like a mortal blow against Rawls' idea of the original position. However, Rawls 
has responded by saying of the original position that:46
When, in this way, we simulate being in this position, our reasoning no more 
commits us to a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self than our playing
46 In Rawls' response to this criticism he makes direct reference to Sandel in a footnote of his paper, 
“Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical” published in Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
Summer 1985, Vol 14, No 3, pages 223 - 251.
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a game of Monopoly commits us to thinking that we are all landlords engaged in 
a desperate rivalry, winner take all. (Rawls 1985: 240)
Although Rawls can respond to Sandel that the original position is not a 
metaphysical statement of the nature persons, this does not completely undermine 
the general criticism that Sandel has articulated so well against the liberal idea of 
the subject.
Whereas Kant considered the presupposition o f the transcendental self as incom­
prehensible in the terms we employ to describe experience o f the phenomenal 
world, Sandel rejects the liberal idea of the subject as incoherent. For Kant, it lies 
at the limit o f human understanding, which can never bring forth a description 
of the transcendental perspective, but merely point to it and cite it as a necessary 
idea of reason. To do justice to Kant's view one must not only draw upon his 
arguments which led him to postulate the existence of the transcendental self, but 
also recognise the metaphysical concerns Kant had about the self which can be 
found in The Critique o f Pure Reason. Sandel's criticism of Rawls, however, is 
quite profound in that he gets to the heart of the matter o f the transcendental self, 
a concept which troubles not the Kantians in their rights rhetoric as it troubled 
Kant.
Sandel's powerful claim, that the self is not prior to b it the product of community 
is in my opinion correct, but it is not argued for in his destruction o f the 
deontological presupposition of the self. In conclusion he says o f liberalism that 
“it makes human agency an article of faith rather than an object of continuing 
attention and concern” (Sandel 1982: 183).
The deontological self is a subject so abstracted that it is either simple or empty. 
If it is simple (unanalysable) then it is indeed an article o f faith, and if on the other 
hand it is empty, it will not do the work that is intended to do for the liberal 
theory of the person. Alternatively, a concept of self which is the product of 
community will stand in stark contrast to the liberal idea, and when argued for, 
it will be seen to be a very complex concept, rich in explanatory force when
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brought to bear upon an understanding of the relationship between the corpo­
ration and its constituent members.
I shall go on to the next chapter and present an account of self as a product of 
community. In the following Chapter I shall use this conception o f the person to 
explain the relationship between the superior and the subordinate (or worker and 
boss) in the modem business corporation, which is of course, the world of work.
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Chapter 4. Self as Product of Society.
The Contribution of Experience.
In what way do a person's experiences in the world contribute to self under­
standing?
Before enlightenment, cutting wood and drawing water; after enlightenment, cut­
ting wood and drawing water. It may turn out in the end that our particular form 
of consciousness is only a particular way of life. Selfhood may be a social construct 
after all. (Clark 1982: 48)
This interesting thesis that forms of consciousness are actually particular ways of 
life, is presented by Clark in the context of his discussion o f the moral status of 
animals, where he also states that selves are beings who are obligated by rules, with 
hidden capacities and the ability to inspect their own desires. Furthermore, he 
says that consciousness of one's existence as a being in the world depends upon 
both internal and external factors, all o f which centre around the concept o f re­
cognition.
The analytic account of the concept of self given here shall draw largely on ideas 
issuing from my reading of Hegel. I will present an uncritical reconstruction of 
his notion of self as an artefact, the product of interpersonal existence, which 
Hegel bases upon the thesis that recognition is the key to understanding the de­
velopment of a consciousness of self. I shall now discuss the essential elements 
of consciousness of self with a view to assessing the contribution o f experience. 
This account of the conceptual development of self will be explicated by way of
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an examination of the concept o f desire and the role it plays in recognition and 
the consequent development of consciousness.
At a primitive level, self understanding begins with a conception o f ourselves as 
animals motivated by desire. For example, the desire to take and consume a na­
tural object such as food gives man the knowledge of a distinction between the 
world as it is and the world as he wants it to be. Thus desire differentiates the 
known from the knower, the desired object from the desiring subject. Desire 
transforms man and his world from simply being into a complexity of objects re­
vealed to a subject. But the contribution to self understanding is not in the sat­
isfaction or dissipation of desire, but instead in the having o f desire, for this is the 
condition in which man can “leave behind the colourful show of the sensuous 
here-and-now” (PS 177).47
In coming to know of this distinction between subject and object, man will at the 
same time, come to know of the desire as his; he will have a consciousness (how­
ever fleeting) of his desire and glimpse self.
With th^t first moment, self consciousness is in the form of consciousness, and the 
whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it, but at the same time only 
as connected with the second moment, the unity of consciousness with itself; and 
hence the sensuous world is for it an enduring existence which, however, is only 
appearance, or a difference which, in itself, is no difte ence. (PS 167)
There is a fleeting sense of separation in which man moves from simply being to 
a knowing being, this is what constitutes man as I, but in minimal sense. The 
separation o f desiring subject from desired object is a precursor to the separation 
of self from one's desires. Note that a desiring creature is forced to separate him­
self in thought from the objects of his contemplation, whereas man absorbed in 
pure reflection cannot make such a distinction. However, the continuity o f his 
conception of self has its source in his conception of otherness being preserved,
47 Hegel, G W F (1807) Phenomenology o f Spirit, hereafter referred to as PS. Quotations from this text 
will be referred to by PS followed by the Section Number in the Miller edition.
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and this preservation is not in the form of a passive reflection of objects but in­
stead consists in the negation o f otherness through satisfaction or dissipation of 
desire. In due course, I shall discuss the separation of the desiring subject and 
desired object and connect it up to the separation of the desire and the desiring 
creature, and in doing so, make perspicuous the advance in self consciousness 
which constitutes man as /  in the fullest sense.
It is desire that creates the first separation pertaining to the development of con­
sciousness man from his world; it also creates the First relationship man to the 
world. Desire separates man from his world and relates him to the world, and as 
a key to the understanding of the development of self consciousness, desire func­
tions as the synderesis of consciousness in that it reveals a mere glimpse o f the 
otherness of the objects of man's thought but sufficient only to constitute a mere 
sentiment o f  self. Although desire directed toward a natural object is the vital 
spark of consciousness, at this level desire is natural and transient since it is created 
and subsequently dissipated in the presence and consumption o f its object.
In its satisfaction desire destroys the object as it was and annihilates itself in the 
process. The object's otherness is replaced by its identity with the subject through 
the dissipation of the desire. Prior to desire, man and his world are not distin­
guished in any way within anything resembling consciousness. The emergence of 
desire creates the distinction between man and the world; the satisfaction (or dis­
sipation) of the desire removes the awareness o f the distinction and man is simply 
being (at one with his world). The satisfaction of desire is the wilful annihilation 
of desire whose end result is the same as the dissipation o f an unsatisfied desire, 
which is unity, in thought, o f man and the objects of his contemplation. In this, 
man, like the beast, experiences consciousness. But Hegel reminds us that:
consciousness, as self consciousness, has a double object: one is the immediate 
object, that o f sense certainty and perception, which however for self consciousness 
has the character o f a negative; and the second, viz. itself which is the true essence 
and is presented in the first instance only as opposed to the first object. (PS 167)
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The desire discussed so far is natural in that it has the same nature as that to which 
it is directed; meaning that the sensuous world appears as phenomena whose being 
lies in me after negating its other; that being is the being o f self consciousness (the 
nature of the object is assimilated by the desire and the desire therefore becomes 
one with the particular natural object). Prior to the satisfaction of the desire, the 
object is a thing separate or other than the desire; on the satisfaction or the dissi­
pation of the desire the object loses its otherness and becomes one with the sub­
ject. This is an animalistic subject - object interaction which indicates that man 
is first and foremost animal motivated by desire. Despite the fact that some ani­
mals have a sense o f self developed beyond this level, the point to bear in mind 
here is that if the n ture o f the beast is articulated by its desires, then at this level, 
man is no exception. But note that there are some things a man will desire 
whatever else he desires: this very thin theory of the good directs us to those things 
which are necessary to a self-determined existence for human kind.48
Having characterised the desire of a natural object as animal desire, a question 
remains as to wherein lies the secret of man's humanity in the context of this 
explication of consciousness and self? This primitive model of desire cannot make 
any significant advance in the understanding o f the way in which a person's ex­
perience of the world contributes to his self understanding. It cannot yield more 
than the most rudimentary conception o f self, a cc iception which is lacking in 
continuity and totally inadequate for self understanding. Nor can it contribute to 
an understanding of the two modes of desire:49
1. which of the medley of desires do I satisfy first and;
2. how, or in what way do I satisfy my desire.
48 cf Rawls (1971: 395 - 399) Thin theory of the good
49 See Hegel's Philosophy of Right Trans T M Knox (Oxford 1952), para 12; hereafter referred to as 
PR. Where quotations from this text are used, they will be referred to by PR followed by the par­
agraph number.
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We now tread upon the territory o f the will. Herein lies the stuff of free action: 
the ordered will.
How can we account for the development of human self consciousness? The an­
swer lies in the capacity o f man's desire to transcend the natural: that is, to desire 
a non-natural object which cannot be assimilated but instead has a permanent 
otherness, and in doing so, abstract from the urgency of the desire and reflect on 
it; perhaps by relating to a plan o f life or ordering it along with others according 
to his interests. Thus the simple (inadequate) model o f primitive desire requires 
to be supplemented by an account of essentially human desire, the desire for re­
cognition by another desiring consciousness.
What self consciousness distinguishes from itself as having being, also has in it, so 
far as it is positioned as being, not merely the character o f sense-certainty and 
perception, but it is being that is reflected into itself, and the object o f immediate 
desire is a living thing. (PS 168)
Man will recognise his own self when he desires the desire o f another desirer, and 
achieves a permanent conception of his self through the desire o f an object which 
has the status of permanent 'other', that is, a non-natural object which exists in 
the form of the desire of another being.
To want to be desired by another is to desire oneself to be recognised as an object 
of desire as well as a desiring subject; and, at the f ame time, to be recognised is 
also to be recognised as a somebody in some particular way. But note that in this 
reflection into oneself, one can recognise oneself in the recognition of the other. 
To desire the desire of another is to see Oneself as self and other, and in obtaining 
the recognition o f other, one recognises his own particular self.
Now, this movement of self consciousness in relation to another self consciousness 
has in this way been represented as the action of one self consciousness, but this 
action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and 
the action of the other as well. For the other is equally independent and self 
contained, and there is nothing in it o f which it is not itself the origin. The first 
does not have the object before it merely as it exists primarily for desire, but as
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something that has an independent existence o f its own, which, therefore it cannot 
utilise for its own purposes, if that object does not o f its own accord do what the 
first does to it. Thus the movement is simply the double movement o f two self 
consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what 
it demands o f the other, and therefore does what it does only in so far as the other 
does the same  They recognise themselves as mutually recognising one an­
other. (PS 182 & 184)
Within the model of desire under discussion it is apparent that interpersonal 
interaction is a fundamentally necessary condition of the development o f con­
sciousness. To want the desire o f another is to transcend the natural by wanting 
something that has^an independent existence o f its own. Unlike a natural object, 
the desire of another self cannot be consumed. It cannot be utilised as an object 
of desire unless the other self makes itself an object of desire and this it will do 
only when it desires to be desired; it must do what the first does to it.
Each sees the other do the same as it does namely, the self seeks recognition as 
an object of desire as well as a desiring subject, and, in doing so, each does itself 
what it demands of the other. At the same time, being recognised as an object 
of desire is to be recognised in some particular way, and being recognised as a 
desiring subject is to be recognised as a particular person. People are known in 
no small measure b\ what they desire, and by whom they are desired; reflecting 
on his desire, a person will become conscious o f hirr.self and by reflecting on the 
content of his desires a person can discover the kind of self that he is. But note 
that all of this requires the application to oneself of concepts which serve to dif­
ferentiate man from all other beings and objects in the world. These concepts get 
their expression not in isolated contemplation, but in interpersonal interaction and 
appear as the structural forms of relationships which are otherwise described as the 
social.
In this transcendent desire people relate to each other through recognition; they 
recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another. In this activity, the 
developing consciousness creates a second relationship that o f self to other self. 
But this second relationship is at the same time the first permanent relationship
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and it renders the first (transient) relationship (desiring subject to desired object) 
as the second permanent relationship, between self and other, through the stability 
now afforded by transcendent desire. In other words the subject/object relation­
ship is made permanent only under the conditions of an interpersonal relationship 
which can afford a consciousness of self. There is an order o f priority to be 
stressed at this point: man must have the capacity to abstract from the urgency 
of his desire in order to see himself as distinct from the objects o f the world; then, 
man must desire those things which will afford a permanence to his sense o f self 
as a desiring creature, thus the desire of a non-natural object is required. But prior 
to these there is the condition of it all, the interpersonal context. This is a crucially 
important point in the transition from first-order to second-order desire: objects 
are afforded their reality within an ontology in which the self is real.
Second Order Desires and the Ordered Will.
There is a gap between the primitive and second order models o f desire which begs 
the question of how second order desires can emerge. It is the motivation of man 
to step back from the urgency of desires which requires explanation. On the ac­
count given so far, a simple push/pull mechanism of desire seems to emerge if one 
cannot show how and why man will reflect on his desires.
The capacity for reflection on desires is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
of the emergence of transcendent desire, but it is the multiplicity of desires inter­
acting in mutual demand for satisfaction which begs the question o f the source 
of the motivation to step back from the urgency of desire and create for the desirer 
an order o f satisfaction.50 Principles of resolution in conflicting desires are fur­
nished by conceptions of one's present and future self, in which case one would 
be prudent to recognise not only preferred prospects, but also one's likely pros­
pects in life. My conception of future self must take account of my conception 
of present self and likely future prospects. Plans of life must be realistic if they 
are to be more significant than dreams; they are a real expression o f the will.
50 This source of the motivation will be addressed below in the discussion of the ordered will.
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In analysing the concept of self determination, Frankfurt's interesting paper Free­
dom o f the Will and the Concept o f  a Persont51 draws on the idea o f caring about 
one's desires as a means of distinguishing first and second order desires. The basis 
for Frankfurt's distinction rests on whether a person with conflicting desires cares 
about which of the desires wins the conflict and would motivate his subsequent 
action when or if he acts at all. Caring in this instance is a species o f second-order 
desire, that is, a desire to act in a specified way. He says that a second order 
volition is a desire that a certain one of the conflicting first order desires (desires 
to act one way or another) be the desire that moves a person all the way to action 
by governing what he actually does. Thus, a second-order desire, is a second order 
volition when someone wants a certain desire to be his will.
It is having second-order volitions, and not having second order desires generally, 
that I regard as essential to being a person (Frankfurt 1971: 10)
To illustrate this, Frankfurt describes as a wanton an agent who has first order 
desires and who may also have second order desires, but who does not have 
second-order volitions. He illustrates the distinction between a person and a 
wanton by his chief example of the difference between two drug addicts. An un­
willing addict has, say, two conflicting first order desires which amount to wanting 
to take the drug and wanting also to refrain from taking it. The unwillingness is 
considered by Frankfurt to be a volition of the se( ond order, in that the latter 
desire should constitute his will. The willing addict ;s moved only by circumstance 
and the relative strength of his first order desires. He has neither the capacity nor 
the concern for volition of the second order; and should the wanton have con­
flicting desires, he has a mindless indifference as to which desire constitutes his 
will. Frankfurt says that:
when a person acts, the desire by which he is moved is either the will he wants or 
a will he wants to be without. When a wanton acts it is neither. (Frankfurt 1971:
14)
5i Frankfurt 1971.
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Frankfurt holds that an account of motivation which included only first order 
desires would not allow for an explanation of how a desire can move an agent to 
act against his will and how the agent can oppose and be motivated to intervene 
against this desire; Frankfurt's account of second order volitions is intended to 
provide the solution. A problem arises when we consider that if second order 
volition is ordinarily considered to be wholly derivative from the corresponding 
first order desire this adds no new motivation o f its own. Despite this problem, 
there is something to the idea that it is distinctive of persons that they have the 
capacity to indicate the kinds o f persons they choose to be by stepping back from 
the immediacy of some of their desires and assessing them from a dispassionate 
. point of view.
The will is analysed by Hegel in his Introduction to the PR where he describes the 
first element o f the will as follows:
the element o f pure indeterminacy or that pure reflection o f the ego into itself 
which involves the dissipation of every restriction and every content either imme­
diately presented by nature, by needs, desires and impulses, or given and deter­
mined by any means whatever. This is the unrestricted infinity o f absolute 
abstraction or universality, the pure thought o f oneself. (PR 5)
This is what Hegel goes on to describe as negative freedom which knows itself in 
destruction. In man this freedom is entirely abstrac in that it excludes reference 
to the self as embodiment of will but refers only to thought, pure and simple. 
Man can free himself from everything, abandon every aim and abstract from ev­
erything. It is this element of the will in which expression is given to man as a 
thinking being who has the power to give himself universality, that is, to extin­
guish all particularity, all determinacy.
Hegel gives us an example of this kind o f freedom, in Brahmanism52 where per­
sistence in the bare knowledge o f self identity is achieved through meditation, a
52 See Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History, translated by J B Sibree, London 1857. PP 
140-1, 148-51, and 156-8.
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consciousness devoid of all content: an abstract self consciousness in the extreme. 
But one would question whether there is any greater degree o f self consciousness 
in this than in the primitive model o f desire where a being is at one with his world 
until moved to differentiation of self by the onset of desire. This is the second 
element of the will in its particularity:
At the same time, the ego is also the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy 
to the differentiation, determination and positing o f a detefminacy as a content and 
object .... Through this positing of itself as something determinate, the ego steps 
in principle into determinate existence. This is the .... particularisation of the ego 
(PR 6)
This is the second moment of the will in that it was already there in the first m o­
ment of abstract universality, a view arising from Hegel's acceptance o f the general 
rule that the particular is contained in the universal. But this second element is 
an abstraction also in that volition is determined by the particular and is therefore 
restricted by it. The will, however, is required to restrict itself, that is to say that 
the will is only a will in the mode of self determination. Hegel tells us that the 
will proper is a unity of both universality and particularity:
The will is the unity of both these moments it is particularity reflected into itself
and so brought b? Ck to universality, ie. it is individuality .......  It determines itself
and yet at the same time binds itself together with tself .......  Every self con­
sciousness knows itself (i) as universal, as the potentiality of abstracting from ev­
erything determinate, and (ii) as particular with a determinate object, content and 
aim. (PR 7)
It is in self determination (the restriction of itself) that the moments of the will 
come together as the 'concrete concept of freedom'. Hegel tells us that we already 
possess this freedom in the form of feeling, and it is instantiated in friendship and 
love.53 As an example to illustrate the process of the coming together of the ele­
ments o f the will in the mode o f self determination, I shall develop the instance
53 See PR 7A.
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of feelings occurring in the the context o f friendship and love, by way o f a first 
person account of an episode in the life o f a fictitional person, Cecil Parkinspace.
As I set off to my usual restaurant for lunch each day I occasionally but quite 
coincidentally meet my female colleagues who seem to welcome my company. I 
begin to find that I look forward to meeting these colleagues and therefore make 
it appear that our occasional meetings are coincidental. I have a growing aware­
ness that I have developed a stronger feeling than friendship with one particular 
colleague, Sarah. My routine activities in the office have been reorganised to make 
more opportunity for contact with her. I begin to see myself as lusting after her 
and contemplating the risks involved. I get confused and wonder whether it is 
simply lust. I have responsibilities and a loving relationship with my wife which 
I desire to maintain. I am aware of the risks involved if I do not change my 
behaviour: I might lose my wife, I might lose Sarah as my friend, but these risks, 
weighed against the benefit of gaining Sarah as a lover, make clearer the options 
open to me. I can stop going to lunch, or reschedule my lunchtime in order that 
I can avoid the presence of Sarah, and demonstrate to myself that my desires can 
be changed in order of priority. In other words, as I develop and evaluate the self 
that I have become, I also develop my awareness that I can manipulate my desires! 
I recognise various elements o f deceit and cunning in my behaviour, I also 
recognise myself as a rational person who can want to want the association or re­
lationship with this person. I can see that my desires can be different, I can want 
not to want such desires. The point is that my desires can be o f a different order, 
despite their urgency. I can abstract from these desires and observe myself as a 
desiring creature.
The whole of this content, as we light upon it in its immediacy in the will, is there 
only as a medley and multiplicity o f impulses, each of which is merely 'my desire' 
but exists alongside other desires which are likewise all 'mine', and each o f which 
is at the same time something universal and indeterminate, aimed at all kinds of 
objects and satiable in all kinds o f ways. (PR 12).
To expand on Hegel's point about indeterminacy let me again refer to the above 
example. It is characteristic of desire that it has two modalities. Which desire do
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I satisfy; and how do I satisfy it? I have a medley of desires which conflict in 
mutual demand for satisfaction. If I want to do my duty to my spouse, I may 
simply appear to her, and the rest of the world, as the ideal husband and father 
to the children whilst at the same time, nurse a secret passion for Sarah. Or I may 
be both a husband and a lover; that is, I may want to do my duty to my wife and 
be the lover of Sarah. There again, if my desire is simply to be both a husband 
and a lover, I could be both without risking my marriage. I could do my duty and 
more, I could be my wife's lover also and eliminate from thought, any desire for 
Sarah. The point is of course that I need to separate the two modes of desire and 
eliminate any indeterminacy which prevails.
I may desire to be faithful husband; a husband and lover; simply a lover; or a 
lover of specific females. But I can satisfy these desires only when I have removed 
the indeterminacy of which desire gets satisfied and since there are many ways of 
satisfying most of these desires, I must determine how I satisfy my ordered desires.
When in this kind of twofold indeterminacy, the will gives itself the form of indi­
viduality, this constitutes the resolution of the will and it is only in so far as it re­
solves that the will is an actual will at all. (PR 12)
Principles of resolution in conflicting desires are furnished by conceptions o f the 
self, and it is in seeing myself as this or that kind o f self that I can order my desires. 
It is not in satisfying my desire that I exercise free will, rather it is in deciding 
which desire to satisfy and which to suppress or eliminate that I exercise my will, 
since in deciding, I am also deciding on the sort of self I want to be. A decision 
such as this will be based on past, present and future conceptions of my self, to­
gether with present and future prospects in life. This is where individuality has its 
beginning.
But I cannot see myself as ordering my desires whatever they be unless I see myself 
as a self among others. The development o f an ordering of desires requires a being 
to defer satisfaction of some desires he now has. The objects of these deferred 
desires may be the objects of the desires of other beings (or, perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that they are potential objects of the desires o f others) and one
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must take this into account. The decision process will involve deliberation on 
long term goals. A plan for life, however crude (and however short), is required 
as a context in which deliberation can take place; either to permit the harmonious 
satisfaction o f one's interests, or to identify one's interests and the means of their 
achievement. But in all this I need to seek recognition as the sort o f person I want 
to be.
To have my plan of life recognised by others is to be recognised as having a claim 
on certain objects o f desire. Thus one would want to see oneself as others see 
oneself seeing oneself, in order that one can know that the plan of life is being 
communicated to others. The value inherent in a plan of life is, to a large extent, 
determindd~hy,the .recognition given to it by other people (just as recognising an­
other person's claim on goods is to some extent, valuing or adding value to them).
Recognition, when given, does not completely satisfy a desire since a self requires 
recognition, not just for the moment, but for continued existence as a self.
Referring again to my example of love and feelings, should I choose to be the 
husband of my wife whilst being the lover of Sarah, I may have to sacrifice op­
portunities for promotion to a more responsible position in my employment, since 
my behaviour may be viewed by my employer as indicative o f irresponsibility and 
unreliability on my part, in which case, I would circumscribe my future occupa­
tional prospects: my selection as candidate for the top job would be seriously 
questioned. Although I hope to avoid being discovered as an adulterer, I have to 
take account of the self I will be seen to be should I fail to be discreet. Further­
more, I cannot escape from the fact that my choice to satisfy my desire for Sarah 
would make me an adulterous individual, and in making this choice I would be 
adding to my life experience by doing something which, though I could subse­
quently stop doing, I could not undo: adulterous behaviour would form part of 
my conception of myself and determine, in no small measure, my consciousness 
of my self.
The choices I make are based upon knowing myself and knowing the self I want 
to be. I may have a distorted view of myself, a view which has no basis in reality,
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nevertheless, it is on this (perhaps unreal) basis that I make decisions about the 
self I choose to be. And, my choices are further determined by my capacity for 
ordering my desires. This point is o f utmost importance in this model of desire 
since it is necessary to stress that the process is much more complex than a simple 
push/pull mechanism of desire. By contrast, Hobbesian desire is the precipitation 
of action, bodily movement, a movement which is toward or away from a thing: 
this he describes as appetite when it is toward a thing and aversion when it is 
movement away from a thing. Consciousness is, in this instance, consciousness 
of appetite and/or aversion and the experience o f consciousness is merely the 
manifestation in the mind of bodily motion. Hobbes' materialistic view of desire 
characterises the will as the physiological motion (endeavour) which immediately 
precedes an action, provided that there has been a process o f deliberation over the 
inclinations to one thing and the inclinations to another. Thus, for Hobbes, the 
will is merely another facet of human action as matter in motion. The will is 
simply the result o f a balance of forces, a thorough-going determinism, and the 
principles of resolution in conflicting desires are mechanical principles: thus for 
Hobbes, there are no problems of ordering desires.
Recognition.
Hegel's rather famous passage in the PS describes the forms o f desire and their 
function in the transition from man's animal nature to a proper self consciousness 
able to articulate those concepts which serve to differentiate man, as animal, from 
the rest of natural creation. In this functional pathology o f history, Hegel maps 
out the emergence of the categories of self ascription; those categories are 
scrutinised by Hegel in the PR as person, autonomous (moral) subject, member 
of family, worker and citizen of a State.
Focusing on the category o f person, the transition described in the PS moves from 
the life and death struggle o f a state o f nature condition to the realisation and ac­
ceptance of a universal moral law. It is depicted in the language o f lordship and 
bondage (master and slave) where one party succeeds in overcoming and enslaving
the other as a means to his ends. The master becomes distanced from reality in
1his life o f leisure and consumption whilst the slave through his work in servitude 
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has his desires ordered for him, hence, paradoxically he can can see that his desires 
can be staved off, he can see himself as an ordered will in a way that is not possible 
for the master in his life of consumption. Here Hegel shows the essential dis­
tinction between work and consumption, which is that work involves discipline. 
The importance o f this should be stressed, in that discipline, service and obedi­
ence, all products of fear, are also those aspects o f life which, in the slave, will 
invoke that higher ordering o f desires essential to the development o f an ordered 
will.
The reconstruction of Hegel's ideas are used here to do two things: (i) to argue 
against the simple (unanalysable) concept o f self advanced in various degrees of 
sophistication by the rights rhetoricians and the advocates o f individualism; and 
(ii) to produce an outcome which will show that those who argue in similar rhet­
orical style that a corporation is not only a legal and metaphysical person, but also 
a moral person, have a fundamental misconception o f the nature o f work, the 
consciousness of the worker and the function o f the corporation in the relationship 
between employee and employer (or worker and master).
The Struggle: Man knows his own self through his perceptions o f other people's 
reports of their perceptions of him. This, coupled with man's desire to be seen 
as this or that kind of self puts man in a condition of reflective equilibrium. Here 
and there a person will adjust his behaviour or plan o f life in order to be 
recognised as the kind of self he wants to be: on reflection he may find it more 
appropriate to adjust his perception of himself rather than his plan or behaviour. 
It is more realistic to assume that he will keep his behaviour, plan and self­
perception in balance by adjusting one or another, depending upon the reports 
he receives.
Hegel says that persons “recognise themselves as mutually recognising one 
another” (PS 184). To understand what it means to 'recognise' one another, 
consider again Hegel's use o f the general rule that the particular is contained in the 
universal. To say that a particular with its specific difference is to be related to a 
universal, does not imply that in each case the relation can be effected by merely
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subsuming the particular under the universal. With regard to consciousness, in 
order that the universal accommodates the specific features o f the particular, it is 
more a matter o f integrating_human experience. Understanding what it means to 
recognise one another is to understand what it is that mediates between one per­
son and another, between the individual consciousnesses. This consists in modes 
of being; being for self and being for other.
Hegel's explanation o f the mediation between the individual and his culture is 
contained in his discussion of independence and dependence in the PS, where he 
points out that although the individual has the ability to integrate his capabilities 
and experience, the capacity is only realised in an interpersonal context. In relat­
ing the individuaUyid the social, Hegel's move from individual capabilities to so­
cial reality is not direct. The mediation takes the form of a process o f recognition 
and it is this that relates individual consciousnesses. The process o f recognition 
is illustrated by way o f the master and slave relation o f Lordship and Bondage, 
where Hegel says that “the relation o f the two self-conscious individuals is such 
that they prove themselves and each other through a life and death struggle” (PS 
187). Here we can construct the simplest and most primitive model o f the devel­
opment o f the consciousness of self arising out of human interaction: a model 
which yields a more complete sense o f self than the model of desire for such things 
as, for example, objects of consumption. Whereas desire for objects o f consump­
tion dissipates upo^l satisfaction, the desire for human interaction does not; it is a 
desire which bears upon the desires of another desiring being and yields a perma­
nent rather than a fleeting sense o f self.
To develop this model further, let me draw upon Hegel's depiction of two self 
consciousnesses, existing as two opposed shapes o f consciousness.
Just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the other's death, for it values 
the other no more than itself; its essential being is present to it in the form of an 
'other', it is outside itself and must rid itself o f its self-externality. (PS 187)
The moment one's life is staked nothing else matters. All desire is suspended and 
one is free from all wants.
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As shapes of consciousness they have not yet exposed themselves to each other 
as self consciousnesses, but only as mere objects. Each consciousness must seek 
the confirmation of its own truth through the self certainty o f the other:
this is possible only when each is for the other what the other is for it, only when 
each in its own self through its own action and again through the action of the 
other, achieves this pure abstraction of being-for-self. (PS 186).
At first, however, for each the other is merely an object, a means to the achieve­
ment of self consciousness. Development from this mode o f existence as objects 
consists in seeing consciousness as not attached to any specific existence as such, 
that it is not attached to life. For each this requires action (a) on the part o f the 
other, where each seeks the death of the other; and (b) on its own part, where each 
stakes its own life.
This model of human interaction may be reconstructed as follows. Recognition 
involves mutual awareness, on the part o f at least two individuals, of individuating 
characteristics apparent in the context of general recognisable similarities. In see­
ing the other, each sees himself in the other insofar as there are general similarities 
which yield the recognition that they are two of a kind. Each discovers not only 
that he is similar to the other, but also that their similarity transcends his 
particularity and has the form of a common nature. This discovery precedes 
individuation since it is only through an awareness of the universality of a com­
mon nature that one has the context and conditions for recognising individuality. 
In becoming conscious of this similarity they each become aware o f their partic­
ular differences, and the consequent struggle is the struggle o f each to gain his 
sense of individuality lost in the awareness of their common nature.
In the struggle for recognition between individual self consciousnesses, “This trial 
by death” (PS 188), each puts his life at risk and in doing so puts everything in 
the balance, desire is suspended and the sense o f self retained. But why engage in 
the struggle?
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They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for 
themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case. And it is 
only through staking one's life that freedom is won; (PS 187)
The parties treat each other as competitors, yet Hegel gives no clear statement 
about the source of the competition. The mistake commonly made about com­
petition is that it is predicated on scarce resources. Hobbes, on the other hand, 
presents a very compelling argument that it is part of our nature to be competitive 
through the pursuit of power (a zero-sum commodity). But to cite competition 
as an attribute of either o f these categories would be a mistake. Hegel has pre­
sented a situation which is quite unique, it is neither scarce resources nor pursuit 
of power which generates the struggle. What then is the source o f the struggle?
The one would want what the other wants; recognition of his status as human. 
This mode of desire is built up reciprocally to a point where both parties seek a 
given self status through full recognition as human, and although they can give this 
to each other, elimination of the other is essential to the uniqueness o f each.
In striving for recognition, each is struggling to be recognised as something - not 
just as a human being, but as an individual human being with specific, though 
contingent, properties. In the struggle, each attempts to gain a sense o f uniqueness 
by eliminating the other consciousness.
Status and Human Interaction In the case o f the struggle between equals, we are 
being asked to consider not merely aspects o f life or attributes of particular indi­
viduals but the very idea of human nature itself. Thus, the basis upon which 
status is afforded is that which bears upon humanity itself, namely being fo r  self 
and being for other. Full recognition in this case would be full human recognition, 
but full recognition can only be given by someone of similar status as oneself or 
by one whose recognition is valued by the other. For example, to be recognised 
as an expert mountaineer by the general public affords a recognition o f less value 
and completeness than the same recognition by one's fellow mountaineers. In the 
former case one has the status of an expert but there is an incompleteness about 
it if one's peers do not subscribe to that view; yet if they do recognise the expertise,
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this affords full recognition of expert status, even if their view is not endorsed by 
the general public. The recognition o f expert status can only be afforded, in the 
full sense, by those whose opinions and judgements carry some authority.
In the case of the struggle between equals, the similarity consists in both affording 
each other the status o f a developing human consciousness. It is important to 
note therefore that full recognition as human is not the same as recognition as a 
fully developed human being. The importance o f this point is that in achieving 
recognition as a fully developed human being the ideal would come about where 
they are no longer adversaries, but this utopian or idyllic situation would be a halt 
to the development. They would have no reason or motivation to struggle, for 
there would be nothing further into which each could develop, they would con­
clude that they are as good as each other regardless o f attributes. They would 
therefore be indifferent to each other, thus they would lose their attributes, but in 
doing so they would also lose each his nature, which is that of a developing con­
sciousness.
And so, even in recognition there must be something more, otherwise there would 
be no way forward out of the struggle. Some propulsion, some kind o f motive 
force must come from both. Completeness must not result in the condition of 
rest. The recognition desired must be a recognition which entails that there is al­
ways more to come. Within the scheme of things t- us far considered, the nature 
of a human being must not be perfection, but striving for a fully articulated self 
consciousness. Therefore full recognition is not recognition as a fully developed 
human being.
If the struggle ends in death, as it does, then there would be no development, 
neither would realise his nature as human. Neither the vanquished who suffers 
death nor the conqueror whose opponent no longer affords him the recognition 
he seeks. If the struggle resulted in full human recognition between the two indi­
viduals there would be harmony between the parties; this would be complete 
stagnation, and it would present an equilibrium which has to be overcome if there 
is to be further development.
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The trial by death, however, does away with the self certainty which it was in­
tended to achieve. In death, the embodiment of the consciousness is eliminated 
and with it the consciousness itself. The struggle yields a more substantial sense 
of self than that which is generated by desire for such things as objects of con­
sumption. Schematically (i.e. within the model being developed here), in putting 
life at risk, one's conception o f self is enhanced by seeing that one is not subject 
to nature. This is the advance in consciousness produced by the struggle, but the 
enhanced sense of self is equally transient because it vanishes on the death of the 
other.
Dominance and Submission: In this animal life of the participants the model of 
the struggle shows how there can be an enhancement of the sense o f self through 
human interaction with another. What it does not do is explain the permanence 
in a conception of self. To this extent, the model is inadequate. However, con­
sidered in human terms, the model may be transformed by the consideration that 
the victor will preserve the life of the other as soon as he sees that he no longer 
has the sense of self afforded by the other. A natural strategy for the victor to 
adopt is to preserve the life of the other as the permanent recognition o f his own 
consciousness. Whereas in animal life the model of the struggle ends in death, in 
human life the model is transformed into a master and slave relationship.
Recognition of humanity is recognising one's nature in others; a natural equality. 
What happens from this point?
They never recognise each other as more than potentials; that is, as beings in the 
process of developing a fully articulated self consciousness. Thus the base line of 
the struggle must not be re-achieved or the development will cease. Since recog­
nition as human is never complete, then there is never an end point. What each 
has recognised in the other is his own developing consciousness; they are equal 
as potentials. Attributes (contingent properties) come into play when the devel­
oping consciousness of the victor and that of the vanquished have to be realised, 
which they do in a complex but non-reciprocal interplay between desire, attributes 
and actions. To this end, one consciousness becomes master and the other, slave.
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one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the 
other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to 
be for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman. (PS 189)
The master, as “the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for 
itself’, in desiring recognition as human, would desire recognition as “being for 
other” as well as being for self. The slave at this point has experienced the fear of 
death and “has trembled in every fibre of its being”. The consequent respect for 
the lord has shaken the slave out of his narrow self interests and self identifications. 
He knows himself as a someone who is nothing, a pure negative consciousness.54
Each consciousness sees that mode o f being which is essential to its nature as 
human being present to it in the form of another. Whilst the master would want 
to be for the other in order to achieve a more complete sense o f self as human, 
he would see no display of the two modes of being in the slave so long as the slave 
desires life above recognition. But the motive force in this development o f self 
consciousness is desire for recognition which contains an element o f paradox: re­
cognition as human can only be afforded freely, yet the slave is not free to 
recognise the master. Furthermore, the slave is not seeking freedom. He can 
recognise the master's dominance but recognising a contingent property is far from 
freely recognising the master's self consciousness. The struggle ends in an empty 
victory for the master, in that his recognition is novr afforded by someone who, 
because of his subjection in defeat, has lost his conception o f himself as a self 
conscious being.
To be recognised as essentially human, they must transcend their contingent 
properties. Their sameness of nature is thickly veiled by their roles and position. 
In the eyes o f the master, the status of the slave is that of a mere object. The self 
consciousness of the master is no longer related in reciprocal struggle and com­
petition with another. On the contrary, it is related to this other in asymmetrical 
terms of conformity and subjection. The slave does not struggle or compete, but
54 PS 149.
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merely responds to punishment and reward arid is shaped (to some extent) by the 
master's desire for consumption. The master's desires and actions are essentially 
self-centred, whilst the slave exists entirely for the master as a mere means to the 
enjoyment of things and as a means to things he has the status of things.
Bearing in mind that the recognition sought can only be had from someone of 
similar status as oneself, the slave, who has the status o f an object, cannot give the 
recognition that the master's self consciousness desires. In seeing the master as 
his master he must see himself as slave: a degraded human being. Thus, what the 
master sees in the slave is a source of permanence in the recognition o f self con­
sciousness, ensured by the slave's absolute dependence, and what the slave sees in 
the master is indepc ndence. But what they see in each other is not what each sees 
in himself.
The truth o f the independent consciousness is, accordingly, the servile conscious­
ness o f the bondsman. (PS 193)
Paradoxically, the master's desire to retain his independence depends upon the self 
consciousness of the slave. But in subjecting the slave to his will the master has 
distorted the consciousness of the slave and denied himself recognition of inde­
pendence. But the slave's capacity and skill in producing the master's objects of 
consumption are now virtually indispensable, thus the master as a mere consumer 
of the slave's labour becomes dependent upon the ‘ tave . Since each conscious­
ness recognises that it is subject to recognition by the other, the slave recognises 
himself as mere provider to the master. From here the dominant consciousness 
cannot develop further. The master has become contemptuous in the eyes o f the 
slave.
The master's desire is that the slave freely recognise him as human, but he has 
blocked his own way forward since he is totally dependent upon the slave for re­
cognition. But the slave's developing consciousness consists in the formative ac­
tivity of his productions. Servitude will draw into itself and transform into truly 
independent consciousness. Through his servitude the slave rids himself o f purely 
natural existence.
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This conflict has many forms in the actual modes of social existence. Again I re­
mind my reader that in my uncritical reconstruction (and usurping) of Hegel's 
ideas, these relations are merely formal, an elucidation o f the function of inter­
personal conflict in the formal emergence o f the human consciousness. And 
whilst Hegel's endeavour is the elucidation of their general function for self con­
scious growth, my use of the formal aspects of Hegel's ideas is to seek a framework 
for exploring the nature of the manager/worker relationship which will have more 
explanatory force than the self interested representative man o f the liberalist tradi­
tion.
Work as Desire Held in Check: Whereas desires of the master are satisfied in the 
consumption of objects, the desires of the slave are, by virtue o f his work, sus­
pended.
Work, ...... is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off"; in other words, work
forms and shapes the th in g ,  the formative activity is at the same time the in­
dividuality or pure being-for-self o f consciousness which now, in the work outside 
of it, acquires an element of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that con­
sciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being (of the object) its 
own independence". (PS 195)
The slave's servile position provides the conditions for his desire to transcend mere 
consumption o f objects (his natural existence) and y :eld a sense of self more sub­
stantial than that of the master. This is brought about by the realisation that the 
self consciousness achieved in opposition to otherness (which resulted in the 
struggle) can now be rediscovered and developed in the otherness o f his pro­
ductions. The slave, in working on objects not for his own consumption sees, 
through the discipline of servitude, that his own desires can be ordered; initially 
ordered for him he then comes to the point o f imposing an ordering o f his own 
will in this production. His ordered will is what a person sees when he sees himself 
in his work.
The slave cannot satisfy his desires and eventually learns not only can he defer 
satisfaction o f his desires but can decide not to have this or that desire. He has
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freed himself from the urgency of his desires in a very sophisticated sense, in that 
he can (in a Kantian sense) free himself from his animal nature. The master and 
slave relationship is a model o f the second realisation of such a freedom: this is 
freedom in the Rousseauian sense which implies that in doing what one feels in­
clined to do one is not free but, instead, merely subject to nature. This contrasts 
sharply with the Hobbesian sense where freedom consists in doing what one wants 
to do.
The model has depicted the master as locked into the consumption of the slave's 
provisions with no prospect of development into anything other than a slave of 
his own desires. In this respect, the master has regressed to the most primitive 
(infantile) stage in this odyssey o f consciousness, whilst in the slave, the model has 
produced a means of recognising a more substantial sense o f self than other 
models of self interested desire. What the model gives us is the connection be­
tween the ordered will and second order desires, where one can desire to have or 
not have certain desires. The connection consists in labour as the imposition of 
an ordered will on the external world. In labouring for another, the desires o f the 
worker are ordered for him. In being the subject o f discipline and obedience he 
can see his will as capable of being ordered and learns to order his will for himself. 
The master, as consumer, does not know himself in this way and until he does, 
he is trapped in consumption and is no more than ? mere function of his animal 
nature. The slave as provider is liberated from his desires for consumption and 
his consequent inner freedom  increases with the inner bondage o f his master.
The search for recognition is a desire for reciprocal recognition which can only 
be possible in an interpersonal context; recognition gets its fullest expression in the 
institutions of society which form community. This is what the activity o f the 
desiring consciousness is moving toward, even though this destination is not at 
first obvious. In a crude or primitive form the desire is, at first, a desire for one 
sided recognition for oneself, consequently it is crude in its expression and its
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purpose and is self defeating. But since the developmental nature o f the desire is 
not altered by the inadequate understanding of the seeker, its real end is society.55
The nature of the master's dominance is such that he wants to win over the heart 
and mind of the slave in so far as he desires that the slave freely recognise his ex­
istence as master and the slave's own existence as slave; but by virtue o f his op­
pressed condition, the slave cannot give this recognition. The form this interaction 
takes is that the slave continues in his bondage to make his imprint upon the 
world, the mark of his individual will. As producer, he is able to acquire a con­
sciousness of himself as agent, and a grasp o f the world as containing ends as well 
as means. The master's retiral into his life of leisure and consumption increases 
his distance from ivality and he loses that consciousness o f himself as agent and 
at the same time diminishes his sense of the ends of his existence.
The inner freedom  of the slave grows with the inner bondage o f the master, until 
the slave is in a position to rise up and bind his oppressor, thus beginning the 
process again with a reversal of roles. Reciprocal recognition is the only way out 
of this moment of consciousness. The advance to the higher moment in which 
each party sees the Other as end and not merely as means resolves the to and fro 
of dominance and submission. The question remains as to how this advance is 
made, and the answer is in the transition from labour for oneself to work for an­
other.
The problem with slavery is that it recognises might but not necessarily right, 
which is to say that it is very difficult to legitimise slavery. A slave is someone 
who is in fact owned by another (person or entity) and has no rights against the 
owner, except perhaps to secure his own life, or to exercise those rights which the 
owner has granted. But the essential problem with slavery is that it draws upon 
those rights normally associated with private property (rights o f use) and these are
55 I refer to the notion of a developing consciousness since we have to consider that, in addition to the 
phenomenological perspective we also have to take account of the internal motivation of the par­
ticipants - what the individuals see themselves doing: developing a fully articulated self conscious­
ness makes more sense than competing for scarce resources.
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legal rights. Whether there ought to be property rights is a question which goes 
beyond the scope of this essay, but it is reasonable to assume that arguments for 
the existence of property rights would not readily include the ownership rights of 
exclusive use and transfer o f persons.
Society is the only possible outcome of this quest for recognition, since relation­
ships will be defined and mediated by law, and in recognising them as subjects of 
right, the relationship will be binding on the parties. Thus the master and slave 
relation will be subject to the formality of law, and law must by its nature stand 
above the parties and any relationships which bind them. If one accepts that the 
underlying purpose of law is to serve the need o f social existence, then the unfet­
tered ownership of a person by another person contradicts the basic assumptions 
upon which law is founded (the promotion of justice and the maintaining of order 
in the sphere o f human interest). Law will from time to time transcend, and be 
transcended by, changes in relationships of dominion and right. It is the building 
and maintenance of the institutions necessary to sustain the relationships of 
dominion which ensures the systematic change in social relations. In ensuring 
dominion by the institutional complexities of society the system of slavery changes 
from bondsman to wage slave: this systematic transformation o f slavery occurs at 
each attempt to enshrine the relationship in law.56 As the system of wage labour 
is developed out of the the system of slavery, there will be a consequent change 
in the self consciousness of the participants o f that s stem.
Labour is the primary means by which a being relates to the world. A  being can 
labour upon things and shape the world to conform to his own desires, and can 
see in these shapes the reflection of his own existence; just as we can know an 
artist by his creations, a person can know more of his self by reflecting on the 
products of his own labours. Labour not only creates and changes relationships 
but can relate one generation to another in that labouring skills and methods are
56 A more satisfying understanding of slavery is developed by the generation of a more sophisticated 
practice of slavery. Consider Nozick's use of the Tale of the Slave as an example depicting an at­
tempt to enshrine a master /  slave relationship in a complex of rules (Nozick 1974: 290).
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copied and improved upon by subsequent generations, thereby extending and 
transforming experience over time. Herein lie the foundations of family life and 
property relationships. It is consistent with Hegel's account o f the development 
of consciousness that there is a need for formal relationships within which a man 
will fmd his own powers and capacities recognised by another o f the same species. 
Thus we can see the foundations o f family and marriage; including the need to 
secure the possessions necessary for family's continued existence.
But it is in this move to wage labour that the very nature o f labour itself changes: 
labour becomes work! Work may be roughly defined as an activity which would 
not be undertaken voluntarily without some kind of reward. Whereas labour may 
be defined in terms o f its expressive activity as constitutive of the very essence of 
self consciousness, by contrast, work is the instrumental aspect o f labour.
Work, as a form of labour, brings to modem society many of those aspects of the 
self expressive nature of labour insofar as it is what a person is paid to do which 
defines his task, job or endeavour, but it is how he does his job which exhibits the 
expressive aspect of his labour. The importance of this distinction is to show how  
the transition from the to and fro of dominance and submission can move to that 
higher moment of reciprocal recognition o f each as something more than means 
but as ends as well. Consider therefore, moral reciprocity; doing to others as one 
would have them do to oneself and giving an equal re um for the benefits received. 
This is closely linked to impartiality, for to be impartial between oneself and 
someone else would mean doing nothing to profit at his expense - I will ac­
knowledge your superiority, if you will acknowledge in my subordination my 
value to you. From this instrumental aspect of labour follow ideas such as a fair 
wage and with it a wage structure in which types of work are roughly graded ac­
cording to notions of levels o f skill and responsibility. This recognition o f value 
of each to the other as means and as ends is, according to my line of discussion 
so far, a product of the ordered will, and it brings with it the notion o f value for 
the discipline o f work as an end in itself. Idleness is disapproved of as a deviation 
from a human norm: this is the foundation of the work ethic. The work ethic 
involves not only a disposition to judge everyone in terms of his employment but
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also an intuitive belief that we are created through our employments to the extent 
that the questions, 'Who are you?' and 'What do you do?' come to mean the same 
thing.
Within the business enterprise such as the large corporation, each employee will 
recognise himself at a point on a continuum which at one extreme, has the lowest 
grade o f worker (which may be referred to in emotive terms as the wage slave), 
and at the other the boss (who in similar terms may be considered as the profes­
sional exploiter). Whilst one's peers may not agree with one's self assessment or 
placing in the hierarchy of the corporation, potentially, all will be able to recognise 
that the corporation, o f which they are all members, regulates the relationship 
each has with his peers, subordinates and superiors, whether it be a relationship 
of varying degrees o f wage slavery or otherwise. Furthermore, whilst labour by 
its nature will function as a source of differentiation, distancing one from another, 
there will be other aspects of social integration which will emerge, such as mar­
riage, property, and relations of family to family.
While we ordinarily think that the moral revolution which disallowed the punish­
ment of any other than the single guilty person, not that person's family, was an 
acknowledgement that the individual was the real thing, it may instead be that 'the 
individual' was created then. (Clark 1982 p48).
On the account of the development o f self consciousness I have described, the 
concept of self is seen to be acquired and not a given. It can be contrasted with 
the unanalysable concept of self prevalent in the rights rhetoric. An understanding 
of the motivation of the worker from the point o f view of the self interest of 
individualism falls far short of illuminative and is seriously lacking in explanatory 
force, but as can be seen from the point of view in this chapter, a much more 
fertile and powerful concept of self is arrived at from very weak assumptions of 
desire. Having shown the inadequacy o f individualism from a philosophical point 
of view, I have also shown, by implication, that to apply holistic concepts of 
person to corporations makes no sense. Corporations cannot be regarded, from 
a moral point o f view, as anything more than the sum of its constituent members. 
But its members are people; each a self among other selves, they are persons, de­
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fined by their relationships, their desires and their labours; they are workers in 
varying degrees of subordination. Corporations cannot be regarded as something 
inclusive of human persons, rather it is identical with them. To change the char­
acter of a corporation, simply change the way the people do things or change the 
people.
What, then, is the function o f the corporation? My answer to this is that con­
sistent with my account above o f the nature of the development o f consciousness 
of self, the corpoiation is a functional device. It has no .se^’but a corporation 
functions as a regulator o f relationships between superiors, peers and subordinates 
by providing context in which wage labour is carried out without connotations 
of slavery. In a mediating role, reciprocal recognition o f each other as selves can 
be afforded without loss of dignity: when I recognise you as my boss, I am not 
being servile since you are only in a particular role, and when you recognise me 
as your subordinate, you do so in the knowledge that my lowly position is merely 
a role. I can still work and decide on how to do what you tell me to do; I can do 
it my way because the way I do my job is a reflection o f the kind o f self that I 
want to be seen as. These are the damands of the self conscious subject that I am.
On this view, the only legitimacy in matters of control of the worker by the boss 
is not in him as a person, but in the position afforded to him by virtue o f his 
corporate role. The function o f the corporation is to regulate relationships and in 
so doing, it will provide a framework for motivating "he workforce. It is the failure 
to understand this function of the corporation that leads management to resort to 
the practices of mill-owner capitalism and all the accompanying archaic industrial 
practices when they do not get the desired response from applying this or that 
particular method. In other words, method alone is only applicable when man­
agement want the worker to behave as if  he shares the corporate goals, but if the 
worker is to genuinely pursue the corporate goals as identical to his own, then an 
understanding of the consciousness of the worker is required.
In the next chapter I shall analyse and evaluate a specific example o f management 
by objectives in the light of what has been said in this chapter and show how the 
as if  approach is tantamount to treating people in a way which does not recognise
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the demands o f the worker as a self conscious subject, but in fact is akin to treating 
a worker as a resource (or more crudely, merely as a means to achieveing the 
manager's goals).
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Chapter 5. Manager and Worker
Recruiting the sentiment o f the worker is one way o f expressing the task o f a 
manager in the modem business corporation. Despite the many definitions and 
descriptions o f what a manager actually does, aligning the goals o f their subordi­
nates with those of the corporation is what all managers are seeking to do. It is 
not the task of the manager to determine the corporate strategy, that is left to the 
directors. The manager in the business corporation is there to engage the prob­
lems o f increasing the productivity of his workforce, whilst taking every opportu­
nity to cut the costs of doing so. The issues that management must address with 
regard to recruiting the enthusiastic participation of the worker in pursuing the 
corporate goals are arrived at by considering how one might distinguish between 
approaches which:
1. motivate the worker to behave as if  he shares the corporate goals.
2. motivate workers to actually share the goals of the productive enterprise, re­
cruiting their sentiment, enthusiasm etc.
This final chapter will address itself to these issues by drawing out the implications 
of each. The first issue can be addressed in a quite non-controversial manner by 
pointing to management's constant revision of production methodologies aimed 
at regimenting the worker to the extent that his freedom of choice of how he does 
his job is severely circumscribed. He is boxed into a method of production which 
by its very nature minimises wasted effort. But whilst this approach may improve 
efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the company's goals, there is no guarantee 
that it will maximise the efficiency. But there is no doubt that if management 
choose not to explore the productive contribution of a willingness on the part of
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a worker to participate in the corporate endeavour, then the motivational aspect 
of work is being ignored, and the conception o f the worker is impoverished. Such 
ignorance is fairly common in methods of management and it seems to also imply 
that the worker has no contribution to make, beyond doing what he must do to 
get his pay.
The task of aligning the efforts o f the workers with the corporate aims must in­
clude an understanding o f the worker as a self conscious subject and what work 
means to him. By addressing the meaning of work to the subordinate manage­
ment might be able to address the fundamentals o f employee motivation. The 
route to this understanding o f the employee is blocked by a failure o f management 
to address the real issue o f motivation. Is it enough to get the employee to behave 
as if  the goals o f the organisation are shared, or must the employee actually share 
those goals? This question goes to the heart of the issue of motivation, insofar 
as it tackles both the sincerity of management and the adequacy of the method­
ologies employed to channel the efforts of employees. If in fact if the as i f  ap­
proach is insufficient as a framework for the working relationship between 
superior and subordinate, then production and personnel management techniques 
cannot by themselves produce the goods. Only those measures which enable the 
workers to share in or partly constitute the enterprise and allow them a degree of 
ownership and control will systematically recruit the sentiment of the worker in 
making the goals of the organisation his own. This e cplains why share ownership 
schemes, for example, are not only attractive variations on payment systems, but 
are also necessary where management are incapable or not willing to develop a 
relationship with the worker which affords a recognition of the subordinate as 
more than a mere resource. One might do well to reflect on the fact that it seems 
rather odd that since the ownership structure o f large modem corporations has 
moved so far from the model of owner and workers (with all o f us as dummy 
shareholders through pensions and insurance schemes), that managers have sought 
to perpetuate the structure o f mill-owner capitalism. Since even Ernest Saunders 
can get sacked, it must be hidden assumptions about functional identities that lead 
management to behave as though they were extractive owners, even to the extent 
where they resist shared ownership and control schemes which could be more ef­
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ficient. It gives one the sense that management practice, let alone management 
theory, is still in its infancy.
Assuming that management have been seriously trying to motivate their workforce 
rather than pursuing the as if  option, it would seem that recruiting the enthusiastic 
participation of the workforce is, and has always been, a difficult task throughout 
the history of organised labour.
A cynic might argae that being human the worker struggles to be treated as hu­
man, despite experience to the contrary. The history of the world o f work would 
lead one to believe that employers and employing organisations function in a 
manner that would suggest that, within the business corporation, only those who 
manage others are worthy of respect. Sometimes managers behave like masters, 
sometimes crudely so, whilst at other times a high degree of subtlety is brought 
to bear on this role. Workers are in a subordinate relationship which, from time 
to time will be painted by management as autonomous in one sense or another. 
Often, however, autonomy is valued and encouraged in the business corporation. 
But this cynical view of workplace suggests that over the years of development of 
the extractive skills of management, working conditions have changed for reasons 
more akin to the benefit of the employer than those o f the worker or the wider 
community. The narrow, dull, repetitive nature of work appears as a manifesta­
tion of the limited abilities of engineering scientists who continue to struggle with 
the very interesting and challenging task of fully automating industry; a view which 
contrasts sharply with the task of making the nature o f work more interesting and 
challenging for the worker. Thus we might ask, to what extent does the worker 
function merely as a machine tool rather than the machine being a tool o f the 
worker?
It is hardly surprising that, when we look closely at the relationship between em­
ployer and employee, we might wonder whether the days o f the dark satanic mills 
have gone completely. In fact one could be forgiven for asking if the brighter and 
more comfortable surroundings of the modem work place merely divert attention 
from the very real issues of dominance and submission; issues older than wage 
labour itself.
Chapter 5. M anager  and W orker 153
Given that the primary if not exclusive goal o f management o f business corpo­
rations is to increase productivity whilst controlling cost, this cynical view has no 
small measure o f credibility. The productivity drive has accelerated the historical 
progression toward fully automated production processes, to the extent that de­
velopment of mechanisation and robotics has increased, whereas the need to un­
derstand the consciousness of the worker has almost been ignored. In general, the 
worker is excluded from the decision making process of industrial society: this has 
always been the case and there is no reason to believe that things will be different 
in the future. Despite the wealth o f research literature on decision making and 
adaptation in business organisations, most seem to ignore the evidence that 
participatory structures are very effective models for the management o f the 
worker.57
Yet management is, and will continue to be, o f crucial importance in any process 
of change. This is so, not only in the social processes o f industry, but also in so­
ciety in general. Thus, one would expect that the training and education of 
managers would include or even focus upon the complexities o f the worker as a 
person, as much as it has on the context in which the struggle to extract a surplus 
takes place.
To educate and train the managers o f industry, is to take on the responsibility that 
goes with being a fundamental agent of change in both industry and society in 
general. Managers and the teachers of managers must endeavour to bring to bear 
upon their productive efforts, a commitment to respect the individuals who will 
work with them as subordinates; they must entertain the idea that in general the 
worker not only works to live but also lives to work.
57 For a useful overview of participatory structures in management, see the following - Blumberg P, 
1968 Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation, London. Also, Marrow A J, 1975 
Management by Participation, Man and Work in Society, edited by L Cass & F G Zimmer, pp 33 
- 48; and Kahn R L, 1975 In Search of The Hawthorne Effect: Man and Work in Society pp 49 - 
63 in the same publication.
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When we are asked who we are, we may reply by giving a name, but more often 
than not, we state who we are in functional terms; in general, we are what we do. 
We often reply to the inquirer by saying, for example, the plumber, the baker, the 
bank manager etc. Even though we may do many other things, it is our occupa­
tion that yields the descriptions of our personhood. Can we therefore expect 
managers to be conscious o f their social responsibility and demonstrate a sensi­
tivity to the moral consequences of management influence? Sadly, I think not.
f
It is my charge that management consistently behave as though a functional 
statement of our identity entails a regard for workers as mere resources, but given 
that we do identify ourselves with what we do, are we being unreasonable if we 
expect the manager to treat the worker as anything more than a mere functionary? 
The answer to this may be found by analogy with Aristotle's view of the natural­
ness of slavery:
wherever there is the same wide discrepancy between two sets o f human beings 
as there is between mind and body or between man and beast, then the inferior 
of the two sets, those whose condition is such that their function is the use o f their 
bodies and nothing better can be expected o f them, those, I say, are Slaves by
nature. It is better for them .......  to be thus ruled and subject. (Aristotle: 33 -
34)58
His arguments from analogy do not prove the naturalness o f slavery, but they 
express a powerful ideology which supports the view that there is a natural order 
of some sort among the human kind. This ideology comes in and out o f fashion 
from time to time, but has never gone away, nor is there any prospect that it ever 
will. The relevance of this point to management is that management teaching and 
management practice gives grounds to suggest that with some exceptions, workers 
are regarded as natural subordinates and should be treated as such.
It is clear from the explorations of value changes and the relative importance of 
work in people's lives that if they are to be fully engaged in ihe endeavour of the
58 Aristotle, The Politics: Book I, ch 5, Translation by T.A. Sinclair. 
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business enterprise, they must be given more involvement in the design and rede­
sign o f their jobs, on an on-going basis.59 In essence, this is a demand for recog­
nition, which goes beyong being recognised as a mere resource. Consider the 
model of dominance and submission that I have constructed as central to this es­
say. If it is to be taken as credible, then I am bound to address the somewhat 
astonishing fact that not only are the demands for recognition not being met, but 
are being responded to by an application of that most crude psychology 
behaviourism. Firmly ensconced in some of the most modem management 
teaching one can find explicit examples of the application of Skinnerian psychol­
ogy to the workplace, going far beyond the commonly applied combinations of 
rewards and punishments (or penalties) in various measures designed to generate 
increases in productivity.
Management have adopted many and varied strategies to convince the worker that 
the subordinate role is not really o f a lower status. History has shown, however, 
that attempts to change the self consciousness of the worker arise not only from 
respect for the employee, but also from the notion that the employee might prove 
to be a more productive worker. However, strategies which seek only to afford 
respect in return for productivity advantages are founded upon insincerity and are 
doomed to fail, for two reasons, each insufficient in its own right. First, it is only 
a matter of time before the worker realises the insincerity inherent in the manager's 
endeavour (that is, co be seen to be affording respect), then the worker reacts in 
such a way as to confound what is merely manipulation. Second, when the eco­
nomic realities o f the business begin press upon the manager and to the extent that 
cost cutting measures are required, the respect which is afforded merely as a means 
of improving productivity will be subject to the same considerations as any other 
cost. Under such circumstances, the incorporation of respect for workers as per­
sons will be considered as a cost and prone to cost cutting endeavours along with 
other costs. When viewed in the light of my development of Hegel's account of 
the self conscious subject, the as if  approach to recruiting the sentiment o f the 
worker in the pursuit of the corporate goals simply fails to meet the demands of
«  See White, 1981: pp 179 - 191. 
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recognition. The as if  approaches can be viewed from two standpoints (although 
seldom will such a distinction be obvious in practice):
1. situational - where production methods are structured to secure goal align­
ment, and
2. psychological - where managment techniques are utilized to shape the 
behaviour of the worker.
Production Methods and Goal Alignment.
Let us examine a management strategy, popular during the nineteen eighties, 
which aims not to directly change the hearts and minds of the workforce, but to 
take an indirect approach to get the workers to behave as i f  they shared the cor­
porate goals. This is done by way of a change in the situational characteristics of 
the workplace. An example of this is the Just in Time (JIT) method of pro­
duction.
In order to demonstrate the relevance of this important development in the man­
agement of the workplace, let me take some time to present an outline of the JIT 
method. The aim of JIT is to organise the manufacturing production process in 
such a way as to secure high volume output at the lowest unit cost. JIT is an 
operating principle which has as its basic objective the elimination o f waste. We 
should not consider waste as simply reject or scrapped material. Waste is anything 
other than the minimum amount of equipment, materials, parts, space and 
workers' time necessary to add value to the product; and this principle leads to the 
popular management principle 'if it cannot be used now, then do not make it 
now'. This requires a profoundly different attitude to that which has prevailed in 
industry over centuries. JIT requires that the rate of production must be matched 
to the rate o f sales, over as short a time period as possible. If sales, or despatches, 
occur daily, then the required quantity to be built should be calculated on a daily 
basis (known as the uniform plant load) and not averaged out over a week or 
month, as often happens. This is particularly significant with regard to sub- 
assemblies and components which are typically made in larger batch sizes, in ad­
vance o f when they are needed in a non JIT environment. In this way, the
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producer reduces 'work in progress' levels significantly and can enjoy the benefits 
of consequent cost reduction and a reduction in space required.
The exact quantity and uniform quality o f raw materials, parts and sub-assemblies 
are produced and delivered just in time for the next stage o f production. Time 
between materials intake and goods dispatch is kept to a minimum through ar­
rangements that eliminate the build up o f inventories and reduce the need for 
'buffer stock'. Reorganisation of the factory layout is required to minimise the 
physical distance between the work stations and to prevent the accumulation of 
stocks, thus enabling the firm to economise on storage and materials handling 
costs.
The aims o f JIT have implications for employees because to achieve them requires 
radical changes in the organisation of production. A company may invest in 
multi-purpose machinery which results in quick changes and allows the firm to 
produce the same end products every day. There is a uniform flow of production 
and uniform demand for parts and sub assemblies in all preceding processes. This 
flow of production is controlled by a pull through system of production scheduling, 
known as KANBAN.  Each stage produces only the amount o f parts necessary to 
complete the next production process.
JIT is a production control system but it also challenges traditional relationships 
with suppliers, work organisation and employment practices.- It is associated with 
a distinctive set of working practices which underpin the central objective, which 
is the reduction of waste, including o f course all inefficiently employed labour and 
machine capacity.
Contrast JIT with conventional mass production where maximum labour 
utilisation is achieved by horizontal division o f labour and fragmentation o f tasks. 
Jobs are task specific and employees perform a narrowly defined operation repet­
itively. Quality is tested separately and large buffer stocks are maintained to en­
sure the continuity of production. Stoppages tend to occur because of the rigidity 
of the system, e.g. if a machine breaks down production is stopped. JIT is in­
tended to eliminate this wasted time by applying the principle of no buffer stocks
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to labour utilisation: the working practices of JIT are intended to minimise the 
need for buffer personnel.
The main aspects of JIT are:-
•  widely drawn job descriptions
•  multi-machining
•  relocation o f certain indirect tasks to production workers, e.g routine main­
tenance, accountability for quality, etc.
Quality control is built into the system because with reduced buffer stocks any 
defective parts would bring production to a standstill. Production workers are 
responsible for detecting and resolving faults and so the company can save on in­
direct personnel whilst ensuring the maximum utilisation of the direct production 
workforce.
JIT demands worker flexibility - workers are required to do what is necessary to 
keep production going. The implication here is that employees are expected to 
move between activities as workload dictates rather than on the instruction of 
supervisors. Whilst this aspect of teamwork is extolled as some kind o f virtuous 
activity, it must also be pointed out that with reduced buffer stocks workers are 
left with no option but to cooperate; to use their initiative, and not simply wait 
to be directed, to keep production going.
Effective JIT is dependent on more than changes to the factory layout. Compa­
nies will inevitably become involved in training or personnel programmes that 
entail more than a simple redefinition of job content; they must address the ability 
of the employee to perform such jobs. Management must develop the requisite 
employee relations, work environment and skills to secure a disciplined workforce, 
motivated at least to the extent that they do not inhibit the effective working of 
the system.
The introduction o f JIT usually begins by addressing the problems o f production 
and inventory planning. This leads to the wider issues o f grading, supervision, and
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payment systems. Changing from a functional or process based production style 
to JIT can entail grouping machines with different functions together to produce 
a series of product assembly lines. Components are tested at the end of the 
product line with supervisors now responsible for a product rather.than a process. 
Multi-machine manning on new product lines can be achieved by reducing the 
number of basic grades of employees. Employees are expected to be conversant 
with a number of machine processes to cover for the reduced staffing. Responsi­
bility for quality is assigned to individual employees working on a particular 
product line. JIT can also be implemented by a module system of production 
whereby separate testers, quality inspectors and assemblers are eliminated and 
transferred to the assembly department. Bought-out parts and in-house fabri­
cations are built up in a series of modules that are delivered to final assembly just 
in time to complete the sales order intake.
In practice, there are many changes needed to a traditional factory environment 
in order to introduce the JIT principle. The reduced batch sizes and more fre­
quent change over mean that it is essential to review the set up procedures so that 
the time taken (wasted, since no added value occurs) is kept to a minimum. This 
might mean redesign of the equipment and tooling or even redesign o f the product 
itself. The more frequent change over of product type will almost certainly need 
a more flexible workforce who can perform a variety o f tasks as and when required 
rather than repeating the same activity all day and every day.
If the full potential o f JIT is to be achieved (i.e. buffer stocks and buffer personnel 
are reduced), management must still seek to secure employee cooperation and 
commitment. However, the implementation of JIT would leave the workforce 
no option but to cooperate in such a way that would present a superficial ap­
pearance of some kind of goal congruence: the goal of the worker and that o f the 
employer would appear to be similar. A closer inspection would o f course present 
a rather different picture; such a radical change in the situational characteristics 
of the workplace leaves the worker little or no room for anything else but to co­
operate.
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On the other hand, JIT itself might be enough to motivate the workforce: the new 
arrangements will enhance employees interest and involvement in their work, 
therefore increasing their motivation. However, it could also mean a more 
stressful arrangement with responsibility for quality being more o f a burden than 
an enrichment to the job. Furthermore, the re-skilling is primarily intended to 
increase the utilisation of labour through multi-manning and similar practices and 
not to increase the intrinsic value of the work.
If the employer has faith in this method, the traditional forms o f supervision will 
be removed and the new methods will be allowed to generate a so-called 'self dis­
ciplined' workforce. This would be a real test of this management method. There 
are clear grounds fo* believing that JIT will be applied in a way that requires the 
worker to be no more self disciplined than the prisoner who realises that his de­
cision not to walk out of jail, is heavily influenced by his circumstances; he is 
locked in.
Does it matter if the worker shares the goals o f the employing organisation? Well 
yes it does. JIT has credibility in so far as it appears to draw upon the worker's 
otherwise untapped desires to be creative, to be more than simply a part of a 
process. Because JIT is drawing upon this creative aspect o f human nature it 
would require the worker to participate enthusiastically in the productive 
endeavour.
JIT is an interesting concept. It is a production technique which gives the worker 
the opportunity to get a real view and value for the products o f his labour. It 
seems to recognise the creative nature of the human being and give the worker 
back some respect as a person and remove (to some extent) the view of the worker 
as an automaton. JIT seems to function as a production technique designed to 
relieve the monotony of dull, repetitive assembly line where only components or 
small contributions are made in a product cycle. If the worker is expected to 
participate 'as i f  he shares the goals of the Company then JIT will fail. It will 
not draw upon this untapped creative resource, rather it will force a different 
production arrangement: a mere cosmetic change in the relationship between 
management, the worker and the product.
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Companies introducing JIT are attempting to reshape employee attitudes and to 
develop a higher level of commitment by introducing this notion of team spirit, 
intended to generate enthusiasm and a sense of ownership of the process. Essen­
tially, the objective remains the same as in all other management strategies; get the 
workers to (behave as if they) enthusiastically share the goals o f the employing 
organisation, and if they do not want to, then shape their behaviour until they 
perform as if they do. A close inspection o f methods such as JIT will show that 
the real attempt in JIT is to close down any opportunities that a worker might 
have for non-compliance. So, when the management discover that JIT in fact 
will not itself suffice as a means of goal alignment, there is one o f two options 
open: jettison the method, or appeal to the workforce. And so we go round the 
routine again by looking for another method of production to fill the gap, or look 
to another method to apply to the manager's portfolio of tools to motivate the 
workforce.
Let me put the question again: does it matter if the worker shares the goals o f the 
employing organisation? If this question is put to managment, the answer will 
depend upon whether management control takes priority over all other corporate 
considerations. My view on this is that if the employee is managed in such a way 
that he behaves as if  he shares the corporate goals, then this is ideal from the 
management point o f view. They will have the ideal; the desired output, a 
compliant workforce and management control. In this situation, the legitimacy 
of management as a practice is beyond question - this legitimacy aspect is by far 
the most important of the priorities o f management (it protects the species).
It is consistent with even the most modem management methods that it is ideal 
if the worker shares the goals of the employing organisation, but it is not necessary 
if the manager can implement a set of working practices that will circumscribe the 
choices that the worker has about how he carries out his tasks: working practices 
that will compel the worker to behave as i f  shares the goals o f the employing 
organisation.
It is fundamental to management control that the Company does not rely upon 
the sentiment of the worker, despite the fact that almost all management
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endeavour is to get the workers to behave or perform in a manner which would 
suggest to an observer that the worker seeks to achieve the employer's goals (and 
it is not contingent that they do so). Here we touch again upon a fundamental 
dilemma of the manager. If the manager finds the ideal method of managing 
people in a way that recruits their sentiment, that they actually share goals o f the 
organisation, then the role of the manager becomes something radically different. 
One might say that there is no need for management at all. What would be re­
quired would be service and support staff to facilitate the requirements of the 
productive workers. If on the other hand the manager finds a way to get the 
workers to work as i f  they shared the Company goals, but they do not do so in 
reality, then as long as this method produced the goods to the same extent, the 
manager justifies his own existence whilst getting the same end result. The di­
lemma is this: management find the key to self motivation of the workforce, then 
they (management) become redundant; or, they do not fmd this key and continue 
to implement methodologies which fail through lack o f commitment o f the 
workers.
The reality of JIT from the point of view of motivation is that it is introduced to 
meet the demands of production and by design, it forces the aligment of the 
workers' goals with the corporate goals, but JIT fails in its own terms because it 
requires more than structural processes. It requires the manager to intervene in 
that he still has to address the requirement to motivate the workforce. The 
manipulative endeavour o f introducing JIT has to be supplemented by further 
manipulative endeavours to motivate the workforce. JIT then fails as a substitute 
for self motivation, but given that the structure o f JIT aims to bypass or eliminate 
the need for self-motivated workers, it fails also in terms of the demands o f re­
cognition in that the self conscious subject requires that recognition be given freely 
and not be given in an instrumental manner; a manner which may be characterised 
as simply manipulative.
Let me look at an example of intervention by management to motivate workers 
to supplement production methods. I aim to show that the as i f  does not address 
the real issues of motivation because it is inherently insincere. It is doomed to fail
5. M anager and W orker 163
because of the superficial nature o f its objective (the as if  treats people merely as 
a means and does not address the desire for recognition necessary to the self con­
scious subject) and it cannot have any more sincere objective without risking the 
surrender o f managment control and hence management legitimacy.
Motivation and Goal Alignment
To the situational approach (to goal alignment) o f production methods such as 
JIT, there are the psychological approaches.60
A particularly interesting example advocated by the management theorists, who 
describe themselves as o f the behavioural school, is behavioural modification (or 
conditioning). Here we find extensive application of stimulus response methods 
of manipulation (once popular in the psychology experiments o f the past few 
decades) applied to the management of people in the workplace to secure the 
productivity advantages o f getting the worker to behave in concert with the 
organisation.
To fmd a rather bold advocate o f the as i f  one need look no further than Paul 
Brown (1985), whose influence in management should not be underestimated. 
His book Managing Behaviour on the Job, is described be Brown as a practical 
guide for the working manager. Whilst his book is more of a course manual, and 
not so much an academic text, the most concerning aspect of his involvement in 
management has not been in the critical environment of the classroom. Instead, 
it has been as a paid consultant, lecturing at length to working managers, people 
who when they have paid for the consultancy, either act on the advice or not, but 
who seldom demand their money back if they feel that they have made a mistake. 
Brown's style is to use a variation on the case study method of management 
teaching, which for him, yields a lot of credibility with the working managers. In 
essence, his prescriptions seem to be a product of a view that it does not matter 
if the worker does not share the goals of the corporation, because he has a method
60 See my discussion on Motivation in the Introduction to this essay. 
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which will work to achieve the same effect if it is applied properly. The problem 
with this as i f  approach is that it relies upon a profoundly impoverished con­
ception of human nature. Having made this charge, let me now qualify what I 
have said.
In the preface, Brown says that “The behavioural approach, which has made such 
a great contribution to the fields of education, parenting, mental retardation, and 
mental health, is now coming of age in the business world.” Brown acknowledges 
that not everyone will welcome this “innovation”, this attempt “to drag busi­
nessmen to an understanding of people and human behaviour”, yet he claims that 
his experience so far is that people have reacted with approval.
Many welcomed the approach as a confirmation of things they felt they had always
known about people and how to manage th em   Others were forced by their
training in Management by Consequences to take a long, hard look at their basic
management style ..... They were at first somewhat uncomfortable with a
behaviourally oriented view of people  However, these men and women em­
braced what they themselves came to believe was a 'better way' o f managing and 
influencing others. (Brown 1985: ix)
Brown's claim to success sounds quite genuine. Furthermore, as a management 
training manual, the book appears quite impressive in the context of the training 
literature produced by employers. The structure c the book takes the form of 
descriptions o f procedures, case studies, worksheets and various self teaching ex­
ercises. These are interspersed with charts, graphs and flow diagrams set in the 
context of very persuasive rhetoric in favour of the benefits to be had from the 
application o f operant conditioning. A  first glance at what Brown advocates in 
his book, suggests that he has a lot to offer the discipline of management in terms 
of methods and practices. A closer inspection reveals a somewhat different pack­
age. Let me explain.
Essentially Brown presents a method of managing people in the workplace which 
he calls "Management by Consequences" (MBC). This is described as a five step 
approach which can be used to improve the effectiveness o f the employing
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organisation and whilst these steps form a system, they are elements which can 
be used separately. For example, managers in manufacturing, sales and other 
manual tasks might all find that they use differing elements o f MBC with varying 
degrees of ease, but the basic steps and principles apply at all levels o f all 
organisations. The evidence for this is presented by Brown in the form of exam­
ples and case histories. The constituents o f MBC are set out in the form of five 
steps: at the end of the last chapter, he gives a succinct statement o f each step.61
The first step is Pinpointing. Brown tells us that this “says simply that successful 
leaders are specific and explicit in communicating job expectations to others”. 
They avoid what Brown refers to as labelling and along with their subordinates 
they pinpoint those behaviours to be used in achieving objectives and end results.
The second step is Tracking, which “emphasises that effective supervisors not only 
know and communicate what is expected, but how much. They understand the 
need for standards o f performance and communicate these standards clearly. As 
with pinpointing, they are comfortable with involving employees in determining 
these standards. They realise that the majority of workers appreciate an oppor­
tunity to help determine what they do and how they will do it”.
Step three is Analyzing, which “ensures that a manager will not charge off to fix 
something that is broken. The best managers work efficiently. They determine the 
causes of a problem before making changes. They ivoid making inferences and 
assumptions about the causes of behaviour. Good managers are not locked into 
one rigid view of why people behave as they do. They are willing to consider a 
number of possibilities. They understand that a wide variety o f environmental 
factors can affect performance and attempt to determine the impact of each sys­
tematically.”
Step four focuses on environmental changes The belief here is that “Changing the 
environment in some way to encourage changes in behaviour is something suc­
cessful managers have always done. Effective leaders have a large repertoire of
« Brown 1985: 138.
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procedures for influencing others and are not tied to a single method that used 
once without success leaves them helpless.”
Evaluating is the fifth and last step; “evaluating the effectiveness o f any procedure 
is crucial to success. Good managers know when they have succeeded, and de­
serve the credit. They also know when they have not been successful, but because 
they are not locked into a single solution, they can try again with another o f a 
variety of change techniques”.
This is all very sound commonsense when sagaciously delivered by the experi­
enced manager as words of advice to a more inexperienced colleague. But this is 
not the case with B own. He is in the business o f management training and he 
claims to be offering a scientific approach to managing behaviour in the 
workplace. The fundamental concern is that what is being presented is not sci­
entific and is in fact, some dreadful philosophy masquerading as scientific theory. 
Furthermore, Brown's practical guide to the working manager epitomises a drastic 
absence o f a concept of morality, an absence which makes one despair for the 
moral behaviour o f managers, those we know as the captains o f  industry.
Let me take each o f the first three steps in turn and examine Brown's MBC ap­
proach in some detail.
Pinpointing is a skill that helps managers translate heir general concerns into 
specific measurable behaviours (Brown 1985: 23)
Pinpointing involves describing the behaviour o f an employee in very specific 
terms rather than simply saying for example John Smith produces very poor quality 
output. What should be done at this step in the MBC process is identify the 
problem in more specific terms, such as the frequency of failure to produce the 
required levels of quality in the output. In fact, pinpointing involves not only a 
description of specific behaviour, but also quantifying the behaviour in some way. 
When properly applied to employees this step eliminates labelling, we would then 
say something like; Smith produced sixty per cent o f  average output, ye t had one 
hundred percent attendance fo r  the past three months.
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Brown lists some of the words used as labels (lazy, negative, immature, stupid, 
careless, disruptive etc). Whilst labelling can give a general description of 
behaviour or job performance, according to Brown, it can not give an accurate 
picture. The consequence of labelling means that there is no way forward, we do 
not know from the labels just what concrete steps to take with the employee to 
rectify undesired behaviour. “Labels do not lead to solutions” (Brown 1985: 25).
Labels come from three main sources, says Brown. They arise from:
•  the 'rumour mill' or from old appraisal forms.
•  when a manager sees employees doing something they should not be doing.
•  when a manager notices that employees are not doing something they should 
be doing.
Brown stresses that knowledge of the sources of labelling, in each case, can help 
avoid falling into the trap of making generalisations about unsatisfactory 
behaviour or job performance.
There is certainly some merit in advocating a management practice o f being spe­
cific about employees' behaviour rather than making crude generalisations. Even 
if it does not help the employee rectify the behaviour, it can provide the employee 
with an greater understanding of the disapproval expressed by his management. 
However, it must be pointed out that there are many purposes for which labelling 
is useful. For example, when we wish to convey a thought or opinion, it is often 
useful to encapsulate the meaning in a single word or expression, thus labelling 
functions as a kind of shorthand. Take for example terms such as happy, sad, 
cheerful, satisfied, excited, depressed. Such terms are obviously useful to use in 
conversation so that points of interest for discussion are not lost. Whilst it is fair 
to say that labelling does not lend itself well to Brown's scientific approach to 
management, it is not a totally useless aspect of reporting behaviour as Brown 
claims; but I shall come back to this point in due course.
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Let me summarise the essential points of the distinction between pinpointing and 
labelling. It looks to me as though it were a distinction which can be characterised 
in one or all o f these ways:
•  specific vs general (or rough and ready)
•  accurate vs inaccurate
•  reflective vs snap judgement
• impartial vs prejudiced
It is no wonder that Brown sees pinpointing as good and labelling as bad, but this 
is no more than a simple application of common sense. It seems to me that 
Brown is theorising the idea that pinpointing judgements are non-intentional, 
whereas labelling judgements are intentional (they impute character or moti­
vation); thus, “Smith's machine breaks down 1.7 times per shift” is pinpointing, 
whereas “Smith is a careless sod” is labelling. The interesting point here is that 
Brown, via the theory of behaviourism seems to want to eliminate all judgement 
of intention, motive, character etc. Does he thereby forego all explanation o f the 
behaviour pinpointed? I shall come back to answer this in my summary of 
Brown's views.
The next step in the MBC method is, “tracking the frequency of the pinpointed
behaviour itself ..... or some product or output produced by the pinpointed
behaviour” (Brown 1985: P37). In short, "tracking" is simply recording the ob­
served behaviour in terms o f frequency and any other quantifiable characteristics. 
This should present little or no problem, says Brown, “if a behaviour is pinpointed 
correctly”. Brown does however point out that there is no requirement to keep 
surreptitious records on people, but he really does show an unwarranted faith in 
the judgement of management when it comes to “deciding whether it was appro­
priate to track some behaviour without the knowledge o f the employee 
involved”; he says that “the only reason a working manager might measure a
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behaviour without an individual's knowledge would be to see if the problem was 
really as serious as he or she anticipated”. (Brown 1985: 42)62
Given that management is about observing the performance o f workers as pro­
ducers, why does Brown see the need for making a case for secret observation? 
Perhaps he is merely seeking to make managers more comfortable about the ethics 
of something they would do anyway.
Tracking does not seem to me to be independent of pinpointing. It is merely an 
amplification o f the demands o f pinpointing, which, I suppose, is merely a qual­
itative description of how far the behaviour described meets explicit standards.
Step three of MBC is “analysing”, which is of course attempting to understand 
why a certain type of behaviour is occurring. Rather than a clear statement, 
Brown gives us a feel for what analysing is by way of what he refers to as case 
studies. He says that when people (workers) do not perform as expected the 
manager will often jump in and haphazardly begin to make changes, in the hope 
that something might work.
The manager may try to convince, cajole, counsel, coach, embarrass, threaten or 
frighten employees into changing their behaviour. But there is a better way. By 
using MBC you can objectively analyze and audit human performance systems.
The results of these analyses and audits can often ler I you directly to systematic 
changes in the environment (not in peoples heartr. souls or minds) that may 
produce improved work performance. (Brown 1985: 43).
The term “human performance systems” that we can objectively analyse does 
seem somewhat mysterious. I would suspect that he means by this a systematic 
approach to modifying workers behaviour. Perhaps more concerning to the reader 
is Brown's insistence upon being “scientific”.
62 This is certainly not a satisfactory reason for secret observation since it can be used to justify secret 
observation on all occasions, thus undermining any basis o f trust that may be possible in the 
workplace.
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Analysing, like tracking, does not seem independent o f pinpointing, but it does 
introduce an appropriate (as opposed to an inappropriate) language of description.
If we apply some common sense to this pile of jargon issued by Brown, we can 
sort it out as follows.
1. The adept manager will seek to describe the behaviour o f employees in ac­
cordance with those requirements which most accurately represent the nature 
of what he is doing in the light of what he ought to be doing; this is a general 
requirement, of pinpointing and it is formulaic, empty of content.
2. This will be achieved by employing a terminology (scientific language) the 
terms of which are objective and not open to dispute (between manager and 
employee); this is what analysing amounts to.
3. The appropriate managerial language will permit the qualitative assessment 
of proper performance and the precise statement o f standards to be reached; 
this is tracking (and I cannot see how it differs from evaluation).
Everything then depends upon the method of analysis employed. A  sound analysis 
will pinpoint and not label the activities of employees. So far so good; it looks like 
common sense. The account looks plausible because it conjures up these con­
trasting 'scenarios;
•  Scenario I
1. Manager A to Employee a “You are breaking too many eggs. You are 
a careless waster, sloppy in your work, sloppy in your appearance. Take 
your hands out of your pockets!”
2. Employee a Manager A “You do not understand my problems, I am not 
a sloppy person, I am having a hard time at home and its affecting my 
work.”
3. Manager A to Employee a “I do not believe you. It is always you who
>>
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As can be seen, this interview is going nowhere. Contrasted with this, we
have :
•  Scenario II
1. Manager B to employee b “You have broken 10 eggs out of 100 on this 
shift. But observation shows that some break as few as 2 eggs per hun­
dred. The average number of eggs broken per employee / shift is 5. 
Why are you breaking so many eggs.”
2. Employee b to Manager B “I am not sure; perhaps it is reason X or 
reason Y .”
3. Manager B to employee b “I shall get the foreman to watch you carefully. 
Perhaps you need re-training, or maybe you will need to do something 
else. Come back tomorrow with an agreed improvement plan and we 
will review it and then monitor your performance.”
What Brown is after is a language of description employing clear standards of 
appraisal which permit an accurate measure o f present and future performance. 
Again, no complaint so far.
Brown's theory is that the step from manager A to- manager B, is the step from 
folk-management to managerial science, and that there is a scientific explanation 
of why manager B is better at his job. An explanation in terms o f management 
theory which permits accurate description, appraisal and prescription. Teach this 
theory to managers and they will improve. What is the theory? Answer - Simple- 
minded behaviourism.
If the business of management is about obtaining the best use of resources, in­
cluding human resources, then Brown would do better to acknowledge not only 
the positive / normative distinction in matters theoretical, but also the difference 
between case studies and anecdotes. Brown seldom uses the case study method,
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but he seems to think he is doing so.63 He continually draws upon little stories and 
sketches to validate his claims to understand behaviour and its analysis. This is 
a serious flaw in management theorising in general, and in the particular case of 
Brown's book, it undermines his credibility as a student of human behaviour.64
Whilst advocating a scientific approach to management, Brown launches into an­
other o f his case studies. Again this is done with a flair for anecdotal style, under 
the heading of “Some Managerial Hypotheses”. Brown considers the case o f a 
traffic control policeman's behaviour in “downtown Pittsburgh” as captured by a 
television crew filming a television programme called Candid Camera. This case 
study is cited by Brown in order to illustrate how we can come to understand why 
people behave as they do. Let me quote at length in order to draw out some very 
interesting points.65
The traffic officer is not merely standing quietly giving the standard hand signals, 
the behavior we are accustomed to seeing at intersections. Instead, when a m o­
torist begins to inch forward in spite o f a red signal, the officer adopts the stern
63 The case study method in management education is worth noting. Case studies are often presented 
as evidence of 'best practice', and as such they are used as the basis o f inductions. But as evidence 
they are much weaker than statistical data. If, on the other hand they were functioning as philo­
sophical examples, clarifying theoretical points by addressing practical applications, they do not 
need to be true, and in most cases they are quite illustrative but als^ false. It is notable that Brown 
employs an anecdotal style of case study to serve as examples to support points in the way o f in­
ductive (evidential) support, and Brown's very questionable use of the case study method is prevalent 
in management education generally and does indeed confuse evidential support and clarification (or 
illustration).
64 Among the number o f problems involved in the case study method is that too great a leap o f faith
is required to accept that a general principle can be drawn from (or founded upon) a few cases. 
Furthermore, the case study tends to produce a normative output of the form, The best Ys are 
achieved by doing X , whilst its proponents in management theorising are seeding credit for this very 
different output, I f  you want to achieve Y then do X
65 All quotes regarding the Traffic Policeman example are in Brown 1985: pp 44 -45. 
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expression o f a parent disciplining a child, and with one hand on his hip he uses 
the other to shake a scolding finger at the motorist. The policeman gets his mes­
sage across.
In describing this behaviour, Brown stresses that this policeman is unique in his 
method of conveying his meaning to the motorist. He goes on:
When another car moves too slowly, the officer places his hands against his nod­
ding head and pretends that he is falling asleep from boredom. Should a motorist 
appear upset at the heavy traffic, the officer takes up an imaginary violin and im­
itates a musician playing a soothing melody. And when motorists move swiftly 
across the the intersection, they do so to wild applause from the officer. However, 
if a pedestrian moves too slowly, the officer clasps his hands together as if in prayer 
and beseeches them to cross the street more quickly. Occasionally he takes a pe­
destrian's arm and has a brief conversation with that person as he escorts him or 
her to the other side o f the intersection. Throughout all o f this activity the officer 
punctuates his antics with hops, skips, jumps, and exaggerated facial expressions.
At this stage, Brown requires that his reader make some kind of attempt to com­
plete the following: “In my opinion the police officer behaved the way he did be­
cause ..................  ”
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Some Reasons Given to Explain Why the Police Officer Behaves
as He Does:
The officer
Enjoys his work. Gets attention.
Is happy. Is effective.
Is creative. Is trained.
Is bored. Gets paid.
Is an extrovert.
Is unhappy.
Is self-actualized.
Has personality.
Likes people.
Is insecure about people.
Is motivated.
Has a good attitude.
Has a bad attitude.
Has ego needs.
Has drive.
Some explanations are poor - those on the left, given by managers. Some are 
acceptable - those on the right, given by Brown. The difference in principle be­
tween the lists is “logical” says Brown.
What differentiates the list on the left from that on the right says Brown is that 
those on the left suggest causes of human behaviour “that tend to be from inner 
or internal forces” which are “subjective” by which he means they are not the 
products of direct observation.
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You can only infer or assume that these causes exist; you have no means o f veri­
fying that the statements on the left truly represent the causes of human behavior.
You could of course, ask the police officer whether he was bored, happy, moti­
vated, and so on, but his verbal report might or might not be reliable. Sometimes 
people don't fully understand their own internal feelings.
Only the list on the right o f course contains the possible reasons because these are 
“outer or external” statements and concerned with real events, says Brown, thus 
no inference or assumptions need be made. He tells us that to establish real rea­
sons, we can “simply observe and conduct experiments to determine whether they 
are, in fact, affecting behaviour”
What is wrong with the terms on the left? Well, he tells us that we have no means 
of verifying that the statements such as “enjoys his work” or “is motivated” truly 
represent causes of the policeman's behaviour, we have to rely on inference or 
assumptions. But must I rely on inference or assumption when I simply ask the 
policemen? I think not. At least no more so than accepting the terms on the 
right, such as “is trained”.
It looks as though Brown is trying to appeal to some distorted ideal or notion of 
'scientific'. He is trying to eliminate the 'subjective' or 'inner' statements by re­
ducing them to statements of observable behaviour. He attempts to persuade his 
readers that the reasons on the left (above) represent assumptions about the 
internal states of the policeman whilst those on the right are the external, observ­
able and consequently measurable causes o f behaviour. Just as the scientist uses 
more fundamental terms for our everyday references (what we call 'water' the sci­
entist calls 'H 20') what Brown is purporting to do is eliminate the list on the left 
by reducing them to the more fundamental terms listed on the right. This is an 
attempt at scientific reduction and it fails. To say that the policeman “gets at­
tention” is not to explain the causes o f his behaviour in any more fundamental 
terms than, for example, “enjoys his work”, nor is there any difference in terms 
of the extent to which these are measurable. To say that the policeman “is 
trained”, is really quite uninformative in this context.
Chapter 5. M anager and W orker 176
Because a term may be described as subjective does not imply that it cannot be 
understood. Such terms are not simply referring to inner processes. On the con­
trary, we understand them because they describe behaviour; they are very useful 
labels.
To get a grasp of what Brown is up to, consider this series of questions and an­
swers.
Q(A) What is that policeman doing?
Ans. He is directing traffic (the whole story above)
Q(B) Why is he doing that?
Ans. His boss told him to.
Q(C) Why is he doing what his boss told him to do?
Ans. He is well trained, he gets paid to do so.
Q(D) Why is he doing it like that?
Ans. It gets him attention.
It is effective.
He is an expert.
He likes people.
With this in mind, it looks like the reason Brown and his management students 
differ is that, for the most part, they take themselves to be answering a question 
which the proffered question obscures. Whilst the managers read the question as 
type (D), Brown reads the question as type (C) or (D). Note that none of 
Brown's answers if taken as answers to question type (D) can be assessed true or 
false without recourse to the policeman's motivations. Of course gets attention, 
but would he act that way even if he didn't? This is a different question from 
Brown's; it is one of a set o f questions which the ambiguity of the preferred
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question obscures. Sure he gets paid, but so does his colleague down the road and 
his way of working is different. Yes he was no doubt trained, but not to do that.
Let me assess Brown in terms of a distinction between, on the one hand, philo­
sophical behaviourism and, on the other, behaviourism as a method in psychol­
ogy.
What Brown says about verification suggests that he takes the view of philosoph­
ical behaviourism as thesis about the meaning of mental terms; that mental terms 
are understood in terms of the behaviour o f the people they are ascribed to - thus, 
“he feels an itch” means “he is disposed to scratch”. On this account, the terms 
in the left hand co’umn would be perfectly acceptable to the behaviourist, in 
principle. For to say “he is an extrovert” just means, inter alia, “if he were a po­
liceman on traffic duty, he would be disposed to jump about etc” (some of the 
suggested descriptions would of course be self evidently false - for example, “he 
is bored”).
Considering behaviourism as a methodology in psychology, I would suggest that 
this is really where Brown is working. I suspect that Brown's point is really that 
terms used in management theory to explain behaviour should be operationally 
defined - something like “objective” on his account. Thus, his objection to the 
terms on the left hand side would be that there is no scientific operational account 
to be given of them since (contra philosophical bel. iviourism) they refer in part 
to mental states.
At this point we can begin to see that Brown seems to believe that management 
science is a part of psychology, and that behaviourism is the best way to proceed 
in psychology.66 In any event, it is obvious that the psychologist who does use this 
methodology is precluded from understanding much of human behaviour. So the 
question must be asked, is the behaviourist methodology suited to explaining what 
other people do at work?
66 To counter this claim, I have cited below my concerns that behaviourism as a theory is not testable, 
and to reinforce this point, I have drawn upon the criticism o f B F Skinner by Chomsky (1964).
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Brown might well discount this global behaviourism, saying simply that this is the 
best framework for understanding human beings at work After all, there are clear 
analogies between reward (pay) and punishment (suspension, demotion etc) and 
positive and negative reinforcement. His conclusion then would be that the best 
way to manage people is to treat them as i f  they are the subjects o f a behaviourist 
theory of behaviour. Lots of things may be going on in their heads which are not 
suitable to this kind of treatment but these things are not central to the manage­
ment of employees' responses.
So we go back to the drawing board. What conception of man at work does 
Brown employ, and what is he assuming of human nature (with reference to 
labour) which make s this behaviouristic model suitable? The answer is perhaps 
two things:
1. that man is fundamentally egotistical (at work).
2. That workers are susceptible in virtue of psychological behaviourism, to 
training and reinforcement.
Are these the best working assumptions for managers to employ? I think not, 
and I shall try to show this.
Brown's persuasive rhetoric also aims at a sense o f righteousness. For example, 
he defines 'operant conditioning' as “learning that is iffected by the consequences 
of behaviour” and gives many examples from his case studies to show how both 
the worker and the employer were 'better' due to the correct application o f Man­
agement by Consequences: a technique which, he says, focuses on the individual 
in the organization and epitomizes respect for that individual and much more 
“This approach helps organizations create environments in which good can 
flourish”67
From MBC we get learning, flourishing goodness and respect for the individual; 
all this and increased productivity. What more could we want? Perhaps an ex-
v  (Brown 1985: 8).
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planation of why we so often see poorly run organisations and ineffective manag­
ers. One has to look no further than the next page where this question is posed. 
The answer, however, is crystal clear: “organizations and managers inadvertently 
reward poor performance and punish good performance” (Brown, 1985: 8). 
Brown believes that often, we are actually using behaviourism in our attempts to 
influence others quite by chance: we are actually using this “operant 
conditioning” without realising it. When we are not aware o f using the 
behaviourist influence techniques, Brown believes that sometimes we get it right 
but other times we get it wrong by rewarding poor performance. But when we 
get it right and think we know why, unless we think it is due to operant condi­
tioning, then we just do not know what we are doing.
Whether they know it or not, effective people managers are applying laws of hu­
man behaviour that work. Management by Consequences is based on the direct 
observation of what works and why in terms o f the natural laws of human 
behaviour. (Brown 1985: 3)
Brown does not spell out what these natural laws o f human behaviour are, except 
to imply that rewards reinforce all types o f behaviour and punishment discourages 
all types of behaviour. Quite apart from this astoundingly bold yet uninformative 
belief, the reader is given no indication that Brown can state clearly just what he 
understands a law to be, let alone a natural law. This painful omission in his book 
does not inhibit the continual reference to the scientific status o f MBC. For ex­
ample, he says that economists have proposed many theories to explain the de­
clining hourly output of goods and services per worker in the United States of 
America; these range from a decrease in research and development spending to 
diminishing returns from technological advances. Brown's response is o f course 
predictably forthright.
Although many grandiose hypotheses may be considered to explain productivity 
declines, one hypothesis certainly deserves consideration: Perhaps hundreds of
thousands of employees are doing slightly less each hour o f every working d a y .....
And while some focus on macrotheories and macrocauses, the Management by 
Consequences approach focuses on the individual employee
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.... The proper use of the basic science of human behaviour, which is the core of
MBC, has led to literally hundreds of examples of productivity improvement.
(Brown 1985: 12)
The answer is there facing us all o f the time. It seems we were just rewarding poor 
performance. But is it not a weakness of this approach to management that it 
concentrates upon one aspect of the production process to the exclusion o f all 
others? Notice that Brown's question is a macro question, and his answer that 
every worker is putting in a little less effort is certainly false. The real answer is 
likely to be a mix of the “grandiose hypotheses” and perhaps something o f what 
Brown says, and depreciation of capital together with a lack o f re-investment 
(which he does not mention). All o f these look likely to be important, but re­
search and development, which he does mention is directed to improvements in 
productivity, not keeping it constant. Brown shows that if nothing else will help 
the manager, then MBC is a splendid model for those who seek other people to 
blame for their faults.
With behaviourism there is no room for dispute; the theory can never be in 
question, only the skill o f the practitioner. But Brown is not alone. It has become 
fashionable in management literature to write about the merits o f behaviourism.68 
Kerr uses case studies to “understand and explain” the very many examples of 
“reward systems that are fouled up in that behaviours which are rewarded are 
those which the rewarder is trying to discourage.” (Kerr 1975: 769) The title of 
his paper indicates fairly accurately the unquestioning nature of its behaviourist 
content.
He tells us that “managers who complain that their workers are not motivated 
might do well to consider the possibility that they have installed reward systems 
which are paying off for behaviours other than those they are seeking.” (Kerr
68 For example, see the paper by Kerr, S. 1975, On the Folly o f Rewarding A, Whilst Hoping fo r B, 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol 18, No 4, 1975. pp 769 - 783.
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1975: 768) This is an example of the belief in the infallibility o f behaviourism: if 
behaviourism is not working for you, then are not doing it right.
Kerr closes his paper with a morally disconcerting statement:
By altering the reward system the organization escapes the necessity o f selecting 
only desirable people or of trying to alter undesirable ones. (Kerr 1975: 783)
He continues with what he calls a Skinnerian quotation from G E Swanson (1972) 
which is quite morally perverse:
As for responsibility and goodness - as commonly defined - no one would want 
or need them. They refer to a man's behaving well despite the absence o f positive 
reinforcement that is obviously sufficient to explain it. When such reinforcement 
exists, “no one needs goodness.”69
My concern at this point is not with the obvious moral outrageousness o f this 
paper; rather, I refer to it to cite another example of Brown's endeavour. We have 
in this behaviourist management school, advocates o f right and wrong behaviour 
and they beg the question o f standards: where is the standard of wrong behaviour? 
The answer is in the efficiency o f the behaviour, or the desired response to the 
administrator o f rewirds. But the fundamental issue here is that the system of 
rewards is independent of the recipient; this in turr, leads to two problems that 
collapse into one. On the one hand, even if the system of rewards was correct, 
there is no requirement o f the recipient to understand what is going on, and on 
the other, there is no way to judge if the system of rewards is wrong, independently 
of the theory.
The consequence of this is that the behaviourists can, with a certain degree o f ar­
rogance, argue that the theory is never proved wrong. If behaviourism is not 
working for you, then you either have the wrong rewards or you are rewarding the
69 Quoted from Swanson G E, 1972 Review Symposium: Beyond freedom and Dignity American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol 78 pp 702 - 705.
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wrong behaviour. In other words, you are not doing it properly. The problem 
this brings is that the theory is just not testable.
We can of course ask what a reward consists of, independent of the theory. If, 
as the behaviourists imply, a reward is any action that reinforces behaviour, then 
it is tautological. We have no measure of reinforcement other than repetitions of 
the same task.70
Chomsky's criticisms of Skinner's work are set in the context of a functional 
analysis of verbal behaviour; this is an analysis consisting of identification of the 
variables that control verbal behaviour along with a specification o f how these 
variables interact to determine a particular verbal response. It is a profound crit­
icism in that it addresses the glaring weaknesses o f behaviourism in general, and 
not just in the verbal arena.
Skinner's general framework for analysing behaviour divides 'responses' into two 
main categories. 'Respondents', which are reflex responses elicited by particular 
stimuli, and 'operants', which are emitted responses, for which no obvious stim­
ulus can be discovered. Since Skinner's concern has primarily been with operant 
behaviour, it is worth outlining his experimental arrangement in order to fully 
appreciate the audacity of attempts to apply Skinner's notions o f scientific research 
to human beings and higher animals.
Typically, Skinner uses a box which has on one wril a lever which, when pressed, 
will allow a food pellet to be dropped into a tray. Each press o f the lever is re­
corded. He places a rat in the box and after a period o f time the rat presses the 
lever, thus receiving some food. Eventually, after some presses, the receipt o f the 
food pellet increases the strength of the bar pressing operant. The food pellet 
becomes a reinforcer and the strength of the operant is defined by Skinner in terms 
of the rate of response during extinction: this is the rate worked out from after the
70 For a very clear elaboration of these criticisms one need look no further than Chomsky's paper A 
Review of B F Skinner's Verbal Behaviour in The Structure of Language, Readings in the Philosophy 
of Language, J A Fodor / J J Katz, Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp 547 - 578.
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last reinforcement and before the return to the original (or pre-conditioning) rate. 
Skinner then introduces such things as flashing lights etc in conditional form, so 
that after a while the rat's response becomes shaped to the frequency or occurrence 
of the flashing light. In this way, the rat can discriminate between stimuli, thus 
Skinner can derive, or establish the notions o f 'discriminated operant', 'response 
differentiation' and secondary reinforcers'. Very complex behaviours can eventu­
ally be introduced by a play on these techniques, but more importantly, Skinner 
uses these as an extension of his scientific vocabulary (stimulus, response and re­
inforcement).
These terms vary in scope, not only within the extensive literature produced by 
Skinner, but also amongst his followers, from the early days to the present. In 
Brown (1985), the Skinnerian terms are sufficiently broad in scope to allow any 
physical event to which an operant reacts, to be called a stimulus. We may ask 
then, which if any part o f the behaviour do we call a response? Brown seems to 
indicate an acceptance o f a very broad definition of stimulus and response, and 
this creates a problem for him in so far as he undermines his claim to be repres­
enting Taws of human behaviour'. If on the other hand he advocates narrower 
definitions of these notions, then behaviour is lawful by definition and Brown will 
have to limit his scope o f inquiry to the experimental situation of lever pressing 
rats.
What is obvious in both Skinner and Brown is a spurious use and extension of 
experimental results to create the illusion of a scientific status for their inquiries, 
whilst demonstrating the broadest possible scope o f application o f their 'theories'. 
Chomsky charges Skinner with a “metamorphic extension o f the technical vo­
cabulary of the laboratory” which he says:
creates an illusion of a scientific theory with a very broad scope, although in fact 
the terms used in the description of real life and of laboratory behaviour may be 
mere homonyms, with at most a vague similarity of meaning. (Chomsky 1964:
552)
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Although in academic circles behaviourism is generally considered to be unworthy 
of further analysis and criticism, it is taken very seriously in the business world as 
an effective method of managing people. Now this is, in itself, a concern. If the 
application of Skinnerian psychology to human beings is considered to have been 
thoroughly discredited in the academic sphere, the question remains as to why it 
is so popular in business management. Wherein lies the source o f the popularity 
of this crude view of human nature as reward orientated and unconcerned with 
higher values?
It is worth noting that it is easy to present and seems easy to understand; it tells 
the manager that people can be controlled if their true nature as reward orientated 
beings is properly understood. Careful selection of examples can be utilised to 
support this account of human nature, and when couched in the scientific 
"stimulus-response" jargon of behaviourism and operant conditioning, it can seem 
impressive. This sort of theory is presented in a way that appeals to what the 
manager might want to believe (i.e. that given the right S-R techniques, the 
manager can be in complete control, people can be effectively managed). The 
proponents of this view are in a fairly secure position so long as the assumptions 
are not challenged. If the theory does not seem to work for a particular manager, 
then he is not practising it properly: for example, he has failed to identify the ap­
propriate reward or punishment.
However, as I have indicated above in my criticism of Brown, the advocate o f this 
management school might respond to the above by showing that, whilst 
behaviourism might not work in all areas o f the entirety o f human life, 'work' is 
fundamentally different in as much as the worker is only working for reward in the 
first place. Thus, the workplace is the theatre of reward and punishment; for the 
duration of each performance the worker is willing to behave as if his true nature 
is that o f a reward orientated being. When the employee provides a good day's 
work for a good day's pay, both the worker and the employer are happy; and since 
this is the predicted outcome of the behavioural approach of management to this 
unique sphere of life, then as a manager I can conclude that behaviourism func­
tions well in the workplace and it is not contingent that it does so.
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A counter to the above response o f behaviourism is that the conception o f the 
workplace as the theatre of reward and punishment is fundamentally mistaken. 
The workplace takes many different forms and whatever else a workplace is, it is 
also a social environment within which the worker is present for a significant 
portion of his life: it is therefore subject to the influences that might pervade any 
social process: influences such as, position, status, friendship, enmity, envy, greed 
and gratitude. All o f these influences are external to the theory and would be 
likely to confound its practice. But the reader should note that in so far as the 
application of behaviourism to management techniques is prone to criticism, it is 
so, not only because the theory is false, but also because it is spurious and the 
uncritical acceptance of a spurious theory forecloses the possibility of other theo­
ries that are better.
Furthermore, it is wrong to base any theory of human resource management on 
an impoverished conception of human nature. At the level o f assumptions, the 
behaviourism in management implicitly denies that individuals have the capacity 
to order their desires. Thus the human being is depicted as no more than a slave 
of the passions, with no capacity for self control, and no other source o f moti­
vation to work than the expected reward.
The popularity and practice of behaviourism in management shows that its op­
ponents have in fact failed to thoroughly discredit the Skinnerian view of human 
nature; or if they have done so in academic debate, * len they have failed to attend 
to its pervasiveness in the conditions of social existence. Perhaps in academia the 
Skinnerian view is not considered worthy of further attention, but given that it is 
alive and kicking in the working lives o f citizens, the onus is on philosophers to 
broaden their view and give some attention to the consequences of its practice. 
Any denial of self control requires the student of human nature and society to 
show the source and importance of self control as a fundamental moral charac­
teristic of human beings.
Whatever else I am, my occupation is what I am, but it does not own me. When 
seek an understanding of why workers seldom share the goals of the employing 
organisation, we can look closely at the manipulative nature o f the relationships
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between workers and employers to throw some light on the matter. A  more rich 
and deeper understanding can be gained if we look closely at the demands o f the 
self conscious subject.
The application of a new management technique, often results in a marked in­
crease in productivity, or a desirable response from the workforce. This may well 
be viewed as evidence in support of the implementation of that particular theory, 
but the very act of change itself can generate a response which conforms to that 
required or expected by management. In any case, if the response meets with the 
approval of the management, the theory is claimed to be valid and its practice 
justified. But this of course begs the question: if a management theory works 
when put into practice, why are theories superseded by new or more popular ones? 
Perhaps it is to gain even more productivity than that yielded by the previous 
theory. Whilst this may be the claim, it is difficult to imagine that each new theory 
can yield increases upon those yielded by the previous theory ad infinitum. It is 
more often the case that after the initial desirable responses, the effects o f the new 
management methods diminish. However, the question still remains as to why a 
new management practice that works for some of the time does not work for all 
of the time.
We might explain the diminishing effects of the theory in terms of the naivety of 
the worker. A theory is effective in the initial stages because the workers are naive 
and do not see the new practice as manipulative. Nc n  whilst this may be true for 
some of the workers, some of the time, it will not do as an adequate explanation. 
It is more likely that until the worker can grasp the practice and intention, the 
best way to respond is to participate with enough enthusiasm to give the new sit­
uation a real try. Then if it works, both the worker and the manager have devel­
oped their working relationship a stage further. They now have new postures and 
stakes that can be brought to bear in their working relationship. In other words, 
as soon as the implications o f the new working practice is apparent to each of the 
parties, another phase in a relationship of manipulation commences.
The reality of the relationship that exists between the manager and the worker, is 
a continual struggle where strategies o f manipulation and the emergent tactics 
form the creative component in the lot o f the modem worker. It is not just 
management who are manipulative. It is also the worker. So whilst management 
look to methodologies of various kinds, the management mind closes down op­
portunities to better understand the nature o f work and the worker.
The power and influence of corporations is not new, but the effects of corporate 
. influence is becoming more obvious. The trend in the literature on the subject 
of management is steadily moving away from how a manager uses his personal 
influence to do his job and is focusing more on a uniform approach, consistent 
with corporate stan ards of business control. However, no management theory 
has yet been developed and implemented and proved enduringly successful. 
Management is looking ever more closely at the nature of the corporation to seek 
an explanation of why managment theories and practices become redundant. I 
argue that we should look not to the notions of corporate personality to explain 
the peculiar phenomena which emerge in industrial relationships. Look instead 
to the development of the consciousness manager and worker.
If my charge o f emptiness of the concept of self which underpins the managment 
thinking in industrial society is valid, then one can be nothing but pessimistic 
about the future of organised labour and the ability o f managers to work with their 
subordinates. More importantly, if my thesis abc at the development o f con­
sciousness is valid, then there can be no way out o f the manipulative struggle of 
dominance and submission in the workplace. What would be required o f a 
manager is that he be wise. Wisdom is then a necessary attribute of a manager.
Wisdom might provide the insight into the worker as a self conscious subject, and 
at the same time recognise the worker as a person and not simply a human re­
source. Wisdom will also enable an insight into the distinction between getting 
the worker to behave as if  the goals o f the organisation were his own, and actually 
sharing those goals. In other words, a distinction between treating people as ends 
as well as means. Manager as controller is a redundant function if employees 
share the coporate goals or identify with them. On the other hand, manager as
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sage might have a value, not particularly as a motivator, but as director o f self 
motivated, self regarding workers.
This thesis has argued that corporations are big motivational devices and resemble 
persons only to the extent that we intuitively talk about them and relate to them 
in language and attitudes we normally ascribe to other humans. This intuitive 
reference to corporations as people does not dilute or confuse the moral status and 
moral responsibility of each person who works for the corporation. Nor does it 
confer any moral status to the corporation when we pass judgement or morally 
condemn actions done in its name. I have challenged the very idea of ascribing 
moral personhood to corporations as a mistaken endeavour on the part o f man­
agement theorists /ho have lost their sense o f direction in their studies o f the 
manager and worker relationship.
Understanding the manager/worker relationship can only be fruitfully undertaken 
if one understands the demands of the worker as a self conscious being. A being 
who requires recognition of his self not as merely a means: This understanding 
will not be complete without a grasp of the patterns of domination and sub­
mission which characterises the developing consciousness in the formative activity 
of work. Work is, in this sense, the fundamental form of self expression insofar 
as it not only provides a context to exhibit the self one wants to be seen as, but 
it is also the activity which develops the very consciousness o f one's self.
This analysis o f the manager/worker relationship has presented a scenario o f un­
ceasing patterns o f domination and submission and it also yields a framework for 
a better understanding o f the nature of the corporation as the context within which 
the activity o f work takes place. I conclude with the remark that the workplace 
is not simply the theatre of reward and punishment, rather, it is the theatre.
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